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In one-sided markets with externalities and established, tradeable property rights, 
the Coase Theorem states that agents can negotiate to a Pareto efficient outcome.  For 
intermediaries serving one-sided markets between two or more groups of agents, 
transaction volume is completely dependent on total price level.  Thus, intermediaries 
cannot alter transaction volume by changing the price allocation across the participating 
groups. 
However, in multisided markets (or platforms), the intermediary must coordinate 
the participation of different groups whose behavior exhibits indirect network 
externalities: one group of agents participates because another group participates.  This 
means the intermediary can alter transaction volume by changing the price allocations 
across the groups of agents.  
This dissertation analyzes administrative data from Utah and other states to 
investigate whether the U.S. Employment Service (USES), a federal agency that partners 
with state employment security agencies (SESA), operates as an intermediary of a two-
sided market.  If the USES does serve a two-sided market, strategic services (subsidies) 
could be utilized to coordinate the participation of employers and job seekers. 
The results indicate some evidence the public labor exchange does function as a 
two-sided market.  When the USES or SESA provide services to job seekers such as 




externality for employers as it increases the qualified pool of labor available to them on 
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In one-sided markets with externalities and established, tradeable property rights, 
the Coase Theorem states that agents can negotiate to a Pareto efficient outcome.  For 
matchmaking intermediaries trying to bring two or more groups of agents together in 
one-sided markets, transaction volume is completely dependent on total price level.  
Thus, intermediaries cannot alter transaction volume by changing the price allocation 
across the participating groups. 
However, in multisided markets (or platforms), the intermediary must “coordinate 
the demand of distinct groups of customers who need each other in some way” (Evans, 
2003, p. 191).  This means the intermediary can alter transaction volume by changing the 
price allocations across the groups of agents. This is because of indirect network 
externalities: One group of agents participates because another group participates.  
This paper investigates whether the U.S. Employment Service (USES), a federal 
agency that partners with state employment security agencies (SESA), operates as an 
intermediary of a two-sided market (the public labor exchange) coordinating the demand 





two-sided market, USES policy could effectively alter the transaction volume of the 
public labor exchange by choosing which services (subsidies) it provides. 
 
1.2 The Role of Subsidies 
Several two-sided platforms have been analyzed in the literature with typical 
examples including credit cards and computer operating systems (Armstrong, 2006; 
Evans, 2003).   With credit cards, a payment card company provides a credit card to a 
cardholder.  That creates an indirect network externality for every merchant who partners 
with that payment card company.  The merchants will benefit from the larger potential 
customer base and will be more likely to offer that credit card to access that larger base of 
consumers.  Similarly, an operating system developer provides their product to a 
customer.  That creates an indirect network externality for application developers who 
target that operating system.  The application developers now have a larger potential 
customer group and will be more likely to continue to target that operating system to 
access these customers. 
In each of these instances, one side of the market is subsidized to coordinate the 
behavior of both.  This is typical of two-sided markets as it helps the intermediary get 
both sides participating.  For the payment card example, the cardholder receives the 
subsidy.  The individual may use that card at little or no cost, and may even receive cash 
for using it.  In the operating system example, the application developers pay little or no 
fees to target that operating system while the individual who purchased the operating 





If the USES functions similar to these platforms, it will have to coordinate 
employer and job seeker demand using strategic subsidies.  Since the USES offers its 
labor exchange to employers and job seekers at no cost, additional subsidies (services) 
will need to be provided by the USES to coordinate employer and job seeker behavior 
and facilitate matching.  These services would reduce the search costs of either job 
seekers or employers, encouraging their participation.  Thus, because of indirect network 
externalities, the other group would then increase their participation. 
For example, by providing Unemployment Insurance (UI) to a job seeker and 
requiring that person to register with the state employment service (SES), an indirect 
network externality may emerge for employers who recruit workers from the SES in that 
one more worker will be available.  Similarly, as the SES provides additional services to 
job seekers such as aptitude testing, employment counseling, and skills training, the 
employers who recruit from that pool of workers will likely increase their participation 
because they will find more qualified candidates.  Because this improves the efficiency of 
the labor market, the public internalizes part of that externality.   
To that end, this paper will examine several different services provided by the 
USES, each of which could function as a strategic subsidy used to better coordinate 
employer and job seeker behavior.  In order for the USES to be considered a two-sided 
market intermediary, the subsidy (service) to one group should increase the participation 
of the other.  The subsidies to be investigated include UI benefits, aptitude testing, 
employment counseling, skills training and job search support.  If the public labor 





subsidies that provide the greatest ability to coordinate employer and job seeker behavior.  
  
1.3 The Impact on Policy 
While the USES and SESA have been frequently analyzed in the literature, very 
little work has been done to investigate the aspects of the USES and SESA that are 
relevant to the multisided platform literature.  Yet, whether the market it serves is one-
sided or multisided carries significant implications for policy as well as the degree to 
which the USES can fulfill its mission to improve labor market efficiency through its 
SES partners. 
If the SESA operate as an intermediary in a one-sided market, there is little the 
USES can do in terms of policy to alter the transaction volume (joint participation) of 
employers and job seekers in the public labor exchange.  Levels of employment demand 
will follow the business cycle which will constantly impact the participation of employers 
and job seekers.  This means that overall SES transaction volume would be subject to 
labor market forces rather than the SES being able to offset the swings of the labor 
market.  Thus, employers would be more likely to participate during periods of lower 
unemployment when there are fewer job seekers available on the platform at that time.  
Conversely, job seekers would be more likely to participate during periods of higher 
unemployment when employers would be less likely to participate because they have 
fewer employment needs.   However, if the SESA operate in a two-sided market, explicit 
or implicit subsidies could affect transaction volume and provide more freedom for the 






There are several other implications for policy if the SESA operate as an 
intermediary of a two-sided market.  One implication is the relationship of the labor 
exchange with other federally funded workforce related programs such as UI and 
federally sponsored job training.  Throughout the history of the USES, various policies 
have emphasized these programs differently, often creating a sense that some of these 
efforts compete with labor exchange activities.  However, if the SESA serve a two-sided 
market, these other programs may function as subsidies that will be critical to optimize 
labor exchange transaction volume.  Thus, these “competing” programs could actually be 
highly complementary and workforce development policy could be constructed in a 
manner that emphasizes and maximizes the complementary nature of these various 
programs. 
This leads to the second implication: prioritized subsidization.  USES and SES 
administrators must prioritize activities such as job seeker testing, employment 
counseling, vocational training and providing job search information to individuals.  By 
viewing these activities through the lens of strategic pricing (subsidization) and two-sided 
markets, administrators can methodically prioritize these efforts with a view toward 
maximizing labor exchange transactions. 
A final implication impacts how policymakers approach funding of the USES. 
SESA and related workforce programs.  Each of the subsidies that encourage job seeker 
or employer participation is associated with different costs.  At times, policymakers may 





fully understanding the impact that could happen to participation on the other side of the 
market.  Similarly, when SES implementers are tasked with serving a population with 
reduced funding, a subsidy-centric understanding will help these individuals spend 
limited resources in the most strategic manner. 
 
1.4 Testing the Hypothesis 
Administrative data from the Utah Department of Employment Security (UDES),1 
later known as the Utah Department of Workforce Services, will be used to analyze the 
behavior of employers and job seekers and whether indirect network externalities exist 
and what role subsidies play. The results of this analysis will be analyzed alongside 
public labor exchange literature for consistency.  Finally, the SES data from several states 
will also be analyzed in an effort to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the 
behavior of employers and job seekers as well as the role of subsidies in the U.S. 
workforce system.  
                                                 
1 The Utah Department of Employment Security (Utah Department of Workforce Services) is the 








THE HISTORY OF THE U.S. EMPLOYMENT SERVICE 
 
2.1 The Beginnings 
The USES was formed on January 3, 1918 as part of a reorganization of the 
Division of Information within the Labor Department designed to accommodate 
production for World War I.  However, there was little interest in retaining the U.S. 
Employment Service following the war as the economy boomed.  When the Great 
Depression set in, Frances Perkins persuaded President Roosevelt to revitalize the service 
(Balducchi, 1997). 
The USES was subsequently established as a federal-state partnership in its 
current form by the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933.2   A report from the Employment and 
Training Administration in 1998 recounts the initial purpose of the public labor exchange 
as laid out in reports to the Senate and the House of Representatives in May, 1933: 
To foster, promote and develop the welfare of the wage earners of the 
United States including juniors (youth) regularly employed; 
To improve working conditions; 
To advance their opportunities for profitable employment by regularly 
collecting, furnishing, and publishing employment information as to 
opportunities for employment; 
For maintaining a system for clearing labor between the several States; and 
For cooperating and coordinating the public employment offices 
                                                 





throughout the country.3 
 
For the first 2 years of its existence, the mission of the USES was to serve as a 
labor exchange focusing on reemployment services attempting to match unemployed 
workers with the job openings posted by employers (Balducchi, 1997; Bendick, 1989).   
Because of the lack of private sector job openings during the Great Depression, the SESA 
were primarily used to provide recruitment services for the New Deal public works 
programs through the National Reemployment Service.  The National Reemployment 
Service also developed a nationwide network of employment exchanges to service 
employers and job seekers until the SES offices were established (Haber & Kruger, 
1964). 
In 1934, the USES established its occupational research program designed to 
analyze industries, occupations, and workers in order to facilitate job placements.  In 
1937, the USES expanded this research to encompass SES operations and activities.  The 
culmination of this work came in 1939 with the release of the Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles (Haber & Kruger, 1964). 
As a federal-state partnership, the USES and SESA have always been funded to 
some degree by federal tax dollars that have been allocated back to states according to a 
legislated formula.  For the first years of its existence, funding for the ES came about 
from a federal-state matching program.  Economic historians appear to differ on the 
levels of contribution from the federal and state governments.  Ruttenberg and Gutchess 
(1970) report that 50% came from the federal government and the other 50% from states.   
                                                 





However, according to Adams,  
…during the first years of operation under the Wagner-Peyser Act, 75 
percent of [allocated] federal funds, as required by the original law, were 
distributed to cooperating states on the basis of relative size of population.  
This was changed after the coming of unemployment insurance to require 
semiannual combined budgets for insurance and employment service 
operations, although funds continued to be made available to the states 
under the Wagner-Peyser Act. (Adams, 1969, p. 27) 
 
The USES was subsequently partnered with the UI program and administered by 
the employment security system with the passage of the Social Security Act (SSA) of 
1935.  The intent was to “mitigate the vagaries of cyclical unemployment that 
characterized the U.S. labor market” (Balducchi, 1997, p. 458).  Under the direction of 
the employment security system, the USES administered the work test for UI claimants, 
verifying that job seekers collecting UI benefits were actively pursuing employment 
(Balducchi, 1997).   
From the very beginning, UI activities dwarfed labor exchange operations.  
During 1938, 1939, and 1940, the SESA placed 2.7, 4.2, and 3.7 million job seekers in 
nonagricultural jobs while processing 9.6, 9.8, and 11.1 million initial UI claims and 
22.7, 56.5, and 66.8 million continued claims, respectively (Haber & Kruger, 1964).  In 
1939, a presidential order merged the USES with the Bureau of Unemployment 
Compensation in the Social Security Board creating the Bureau of Employment Security.  
The USES was relegated to a division within this new organization (Haber & Kruger, 
1964). 
With the passage of the SSA, funding for the USES became linked to a tax on 





employers based on their payroll size and credited to the UI Administrative Account 
maintained by the U.S. Treasury Department.  This tax was encompassed in the 
subsequent passage of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) in 1939 (OECD, 
1999).  In 1954, this tax became part of the Chapter 23 of the Internal Revenue Code 
(Adams, 1969).    
Allocations to states from this tax took place according to Section 302(a) of Title 
III of the SSA.  It instructs the Secretary of Labor to base allocations to states on “1) the 
population of the State; an estimate of the number of persons covered by the State law 
and the cost of proper administration of such law; and 3) such other factors as the 
Secretary of Labor finds relevant” (Adams, 1969, p. 165).  Lump-sum grants were 
replaced by line-item budgeting on January 1, 1940 (Adams, 1969). 
Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the labor exchange and UI programs 
were federalized and placed under the control of the Social Security Board (Haber & 
Kruger, 1964).  By 1942, the USES administration was placed under the control of the 
War Manpower Commission with the goal of providing adequate labor for war industries 
(Ainsworth, 1991).   
Prior to 1939, the USES only provided limited amounts of labor market 
information.  However, with the onset of World War II, the USES began to provide more 
detailed descriptions of labor and skill shortages.  This new information enabled the 
USES to begin serving employers and mobilizing the workforce during World War II 
(Haber & Kruger, 1964). 





with placements totaling 12.2 million in 1944.  In addition, the passage of The 
Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944, otherwise known as the G.I. Bill of Rights, 
provided a $20 weekly unemployment allowance distributed through the SESA.  
Consequently, millions of veterans poured through SES offices from September 1, 1944 
to August 31, 1949 and the Veterans Employment Service was folded into the USES 
(Haber & Kruger, 1964). 
Following the war, states regained control of operations and emphasized serving 
the needs of returning veterans and civilian workers who were negatively impacted as the 
economy transitioned (Ainsworth, 1991; Balducchi, 1997; Bendick, 1989).   Executive 
Order 9617 dissolved the War Labor Board and brought USES under the administration 
of USDOL.  The USES was permanently transferred to USDOL in 1949 after an 
appropriations bill temporarily moved it back to the Federal Security Agency in 1948 
(Janoski, 1990). 
With the exception of complete federalized funding during World War II (1942-
1946), this matching mechanism was in place until the passage of an amendment to the 
Wagner-Peyser Act in 1949.  The amendment eliminated the federal-state matching 
mechanism for funding and directed FUTA taxes collected to cover all USES services 
(Ruttenberg & Gutchess, 1970).  According to Adams, the matching mechanism was 
never in place following World War II:   
The Congress did not revert to the former system of matching grants under 
the Wagner-Peyser Act as a means of financing the state employment 
services.  From 1946 forward, these agencies were financed mainly from 
the proceeds of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act which provided 






2.2 The Foundational Period: 1947 – 1963 
The Employment Act of 1946 focused the nation on the pursuit of full 
employment and overall economic improvement.  The USES served as a key source of 
labor market information in this effort providing service to civic groups interested in 
economic development as well as the Council of Economic Advisors on the national 
level.  Occupational analysis also continued and led to the second edition of the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (Haber & Kruger, 1964). 
Toward the end of World War II, the USES conducted research attempting to 
estimate the impact of veterans returning home and entering the labor market.  This 
research led to the implementation of the Six-Point Program launched in 1946 by the 
USES.  The six points encompassed placement services, employment counseling, 
services to special applicant groups (i.e., veterans and youth), management service 
(assisting employers in job analysis and testing), labor market information, and 
community participation (cooperation with community organizations involved in 
employment planning) (Haber & Kruger, 1964).  However, despite the implementation of 
this program, USES budgets were cut by the Truman administration between 1946 and 
1949.  One thousand administrative jobs were lost at USES headquarters in FY 1947 
(Janoski, 1990). 
In 1950, USES redirected SES labor market research to anticipating the impact of 
the Korean War on the U.S. labor market.  In many ways the USES functioned as it did 
during World War II and attempted to identify the manpower needs of the defense 





However, the organizational restructuring that was so prevalent in the previous war effort 
never surfaced during the Korean War.  In addition, with the exception of a few 
geographic areas, the transition from wartime to civilian structure was relatively smooth 
(Haber & Kruger, 1964). 
The 1950s also marked the period where the ES began to solidify its operations 
and role.  It expanded its focus to other special groups such as youth, the disabled, and 
older workers.  In addition, a supplement of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles was 
released in 1955 further reflecting increased understanding of occupational characteristics 
in the labor market.  Furthermore, management and organization of SES offices grew 
more sophisticated adopting standardization and metrics for service delivery.  SES 
personnel were also able to undergo training in the university setting (Haber & Kruger, 
1964). 
In the 1950s and until FY 1962, allocation to states was heavily influenced by 
estimated transaction volume (applications, counseling, testing, and placements) 
multiplied by time factors.  Thus, while openings declined over time, so did allocations, 
which also created an incentive for SES staff to seek out easy placements in order to 
increase funding (Adams, 1969).   
Allocations could also come from infrequent distributions.  The Reed Act of 1954 
enables the possibility of additional allocations to SES offices if tax revenues collected 
under FUTA exceed the amount USDOL allocates for program administration (Chadwin, 
Mitchell, Hargrove & Mead, 1977).  For example, during the late 1950s, when the UI 





accordance with the Reed Act.  One key outcome was the building of new employment 
security offices placing labor exchange and UI programs under the same roof.  Many 
claim this co-location served to give rise to the image of the SES as the “unemployment 
office” (Haber & Kruger, 1964).   
Throughout its early years, and even as late as 1964, the USES prioritized service 
to employers over job seekers.  SES workers made conscious efforts to refer the most 
qualified workers to employers in an effort to encourage employers to continue to use the 
SES in the future.  This approach was established during the Great Depression and after 
World War II when excess labor supply was substantial (Ruttenberg & Gutchess, 1970).  
However, despite prioritizing service to employers in employment service 
activities, the workload associated with processing of UI claims always exceeded the 
workload associated with employment service activities.    The only exception was during 
World War II and in 1946 when numerous veterans poured in to SES offices (Ruttenberg 
& Gutchess, 1970). Throughout the 1950s, approximately 17,000 SESA workers across 
the country focused on placements while 28,000 provided UI operations (Janoski, 1990). 
By the end of the 1950s and into the early 1960s, the USES was coming under 
sharp criticism.  In 1958, former Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell accused the USES 
of being too preoccupied with processing UI claims.  In 1960, the Senate Special 
Committee on Unemployment Problems described the USES as playing only “a minor 
role in placement of the American labor force” (Levitan, 1964, p. 6).    
The USES appears to have made a concerted effort to respond to this criticism.  





claims to placing job seekers.  In 1958, 1 in 20 SES offices was devoted exclusively to 
the placement of job seekers.  By 1963, almost 3 in 20 took on such a role (Levitan, 
1964).  In addition, in the late 1950s and 1960s, offices were established according to 
occupational grouping found in the labor market.  For example, offices that specialized in 
manufacturing occupations were located close to industrial plants (Ruttenberg & 
Gutchess, 1970).  Furthermore, in an effort to improve its image with employers, in the 
early 1960s, the USES attempted to make physical separations from labor exchange and 
UI staffs (Ruttenberg & Gutchess, 1970) in response to a 1960 report by the Senate 
Special Committee on Unemployment Problems (Nemore & Mangum, 1968). 
 
2.3 The Manpower Years: 1963 – 1973 
However, much of this reorientation was short lived.  Probably the greatest signal 
that the USES would again have to shift course came early in the Kennedy 
administration.  In his first Economic Message to Congress, President Kennedy directed 
the Secretary of Labor “to take necessary steps to provide better service for unemployed 
insurance claimants and other job applicants registered with the United States 
Employment Service” (Levitan, 1964, p. 7). 
The Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 (ARA) required SES offices to provide 
unemployment information to the U.S. Department of Commerce for areas experiencing 
economic distress.  The U.S. Department of Commerce would then use the information to 
determine federal assistance.  In addition, the SESA assisted in the training efforts for the 





placing them in jobs once training was complete (Ainsworth, 1991). 
This type of legislation proved to only be the beginning.  In the 1960s three 
significant pieces of legislation directed a large portion of ES resources away from its 
established labor exchange activities.  The Manpower Development and Training Act of 
1962 (MDTA), the Vocational Education Act of 1963, and the Economic Opportunity 
Act of 1964 (EOA) focused the SESA on job training and human resource development 
activities.  The EOA was actually part of the War on Poverty legislation established in 
1964 that led to a reorientation of the SES priorities.  The SESA would now seek out the 
disadvantaged rather than waiting for them to come to the SES to apply for services 
(Clague & Kramer, 1976).  By 1965, the SESA concentrated much of their efforts on 
low-income and disadvantaged workers (Ainsworth, 1991).     
The primary focus of the MDTA emphasized retraining experienced workers 
displaced by automation and technological change.  However, the MDTA had several 
other objectives, many of which were at odds with the existing USES approach of 
providing the best applicant for a job opening.  The MDTA attempted to place the 
unemployed in jobs as much as possible, improve the skill level of the labor force and 
alleviate poverty (Clague & Kramer, 1976).  In order to fully comply with these 
objectives, the USES had to adopt an entirely new approach to its operations and turn its 
local offices into “manpower service agencies” (Levitan & Mangum, 1967).  This new 
emphasis is evident in the words of Louis Levine who assumed the role of USES Director 
in 1962: 
[The USES] shall not operate merely as a system of labor exchanges but 





with all aspects of manpower.  Each local office must serve as the local 
community manpower center and, beyond that, must also function in a 
strongly-linked nationwide network of offices operating to meet national 
manpower purposes and goals. (Nemore & Mangum, 1968, p. 8) 
 
This new approach translated into different performance goals.  For instance, the 
SESA had to follow a rule where one-third of placements involved less qualified job 
seekers (Clague & Kramer, 1976).  Frank Cassell, who became administrator of the 
USES early in 1966, described the change in mission from “screening out” to “screening 
in” (Levitan & Mangum, 1967, p. 8). 
The Vocational Education Act of 1963 was designed to prepare noncollege-bound 
young adults for occupations requiring increased technical knowledge.  The SESA had to 
both approve vocational training programs and refer qualified job seekers to them 
(Clague & Kramer, 1976).  The law also required the SESA to provide information on 
occupational trends in order to guide curriculum development and inform course 
counseling (Adams, 1969). 
The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (EOA) provided funds that led to the 
creation of several programs designed to increase the employability of disadvantaged job 
seekers.  These programs include the Community Action Program, Job Corps, 
Neighborhood Youth Corps, Operation Mainstream, Adult Basic Education, and the 
Work Experience Program (Claque & Kramer, 1976). 
For Community Action Programs, the SESA would provide manpower services 
such as labor market information, “manpower planning, counseling, testing, placement 
and related services” (Adams, 1969, p. 198).  For the Job Corps and the Neighborhood 





Operation Mainstream began in FY 1967 and was intended to aid unemployed 
workers over the age of 55 who lacked in-demand skills by placing them in unsubsidized 
employment.  While this program was typically sponsored by Community Action 
Agencies (CAA), the SES offices were called upon to provide the placement services 
when the CAA were unable to do so (Claque & Kramer, 1976). 
Amendments to the EOA in 1966 and 1967 brought about the additional programs 
such as New Careers, Special Impact, and the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP) 
(Claque & Kramer, 1976).  The CEP was launched in late summer of 1967 as an effort to 
streamline and integrate overlapping manpower programs.    The Community Action 
Agencies served as the prime sponsors of manpower projects while the SESA would 
deliver services such as testing, counseling, referral to training, job placement, and 
follow-up (Claque & Kramer, 1976). 
In 1965, Human Resources Development (HRD) was implemented when the 
USDOL perceived that existing MDTA programs were still not reaching the 
disadvantaged unemployed worker.  HRD reorganized a local employment office into 
“employability development teams” giving each client access to all services.  The client 
was required to continue the relationship with the team until the desired objective was 
obtained (Ruttenberg & Gutchess, 1970).  HRD also affected a budgeting change in FY 
1968.  Not only were SESA required to develop localized plans to receive funding, but 
these plans had to be set within the context of HRD (Nemore & Mangum, 1968). 
HRD became a key practice of the Work Incentive Program (WIN) (Ruttenberg & 





amendment required mothers with children aged six or older who were receiving aid 
under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to register with the SESA and 
be available for work or training.  The WIN program did not get underway until FY 1969 
(Claque & Kramer, 1976). 
Amendments to the MDTA in 1968 directed the USES to utilize technological 
advances in the job matching process.  The USES was to incorporate electronic data 
processing system and telecommunications systems (Claque & Kramer, 1976).  In 1968, 
the first job bank was introduced to the SESA in Baltimore.  A job bank is a 
computerized system of collecting information regarding job openings and generating a 
printout made available to local SESA offices.  By October 1969, the success of this 
initial job bank system led to the development of job banks in five additional cities 
(Ruttenberg & Gutchess, 1970). 
In addition, the federal government has also occasionally supplemented USES 
funding through other federal programs connected to USES operations.  In the 1960s this 
supplement increased from 1% to 27% of USES funding (Ruttenberg & Gutchess, 1970).  
Overall, funding for ES operations soared from 1961 to 1967 due to removal of the 
Unemployment Trust Fund from federal budget negotiations in 1960.  However, fiscal 
pressure imposed by the Vietnam War forced the Unemployment Trust Fund back into 
the federal budget (Janoski, 1990). 
Several policy changes introduced by the Nixon administration led to substantial 
restructuring of USES operations.  The new administration dissolved the Bureau of 





and the United States Training and Employment Service (USTES).   The UIS 
administered UI while the USTS took over responsibility of manpower training programs 
as well as the employment service activities (Ruttenberg & Gutchess, 1970). 
Insufficient reporting in the WIN program led the Nixon Administration to have 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Department of Labor to sift 
through AFDC rolls to locate employable persons.  The SESA would then attempt to 
place these individuals to training or employment.  While in some states this forced 
cooperation created substantial conflicts between the two departments, in most states the 
two departments worked well together in this task.  However, in some instances, 
placement of WIN clients actually replaced labor exchange activities directed toward UI 
claimants (Claque & Kramer, 1976). 
In addition, the administration revamped the CEP directing the CAAs to 
concentrate on overall management of service delivery while job-getting activities of 
various manpower programs were consolidated under the USES.  The SESA also took 
responsibility for ensuring clients received manpower services (Claque & Kramer, 1976).  
This was the result of a revision of CEP guidelines in 1969 (Ruttenberg & Gutchess, 
1970). 
 
2.4 Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(CETA): 1974 – 1982 
By the end of the 1960s, the plethora of manpower programs and their inability to 





Administration.  New federalism maintained that the federal government is the best 
source of tax revenue but that local governments are in the best position to manage 
programs to respond to local needs.  Despite an initial failure to pass this type of 
legislation, the administration eventually garnished enough support to see the passage of 
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) in 1973. 
Under CETA, local governments would apply for revenue from the federal 
government and then sponsor their own unique mix of manpower programs tailored to 
their geographic area.  However, the federal government retained much administrative 
power by being able to review local manpower plans and monitoring overhead and 
administrative costs (Claque & Kramer, 1976).  Prior to CETA, the federal government 
was engaged in 10,000 separate contracts with local program operators (Franklin & 
Ripley, 1984).  CETA divested much of the job training efforts away from the USES and 
re-established the labor exchange activities as the primary mission of the USES 
(Balducchi, 1997).  
Under CETA, planning, administration, and decision-making were decentralized 
and placed under the control of local and state governments in the form of Prime 
Sponsors.  In addition, CETA created Manpower Advisory Councils (MACs) which were 
authorized to make recommendations regarding goals, procedures, and plans; however, 
Prime Sponsors served as the authoritative decision makers (Franklin & Ripley, 1984).   
While other similar groups were incorporated through amendments to CETA, such as 
youth councils and Private Industry Councils, SESA involvement was generally restricted 





SESA as insensitive to needs of CETA clientele and too focused on labor exchange 
operations (Franklin & Ripley, 1984).  Thus, with the advent of CETA, SESA 
participation under Title I in training activities FY 1975 declined about 30% from FY 
1974.  In addition, 20% of Prime Sponsors completely discontinued the use of SESA 
nonlabor exchange services.  Consequently, SESA manpower-related staff was reduced 
about 25% from FY 1974 to FY 1976.  An even greater percentage of Prime Sponsors 
reduced the overall level of services provided by the SESA (Franklin & Ripley, 1984). 
While SESA witnessed a decreased role in CETA efforts, SES offices sought to 
improve relationships with employers in the 1970s through the use of the Employer 
Services Improvement Program (ESIP).  This program established Employer Advisory 
Committees (EACs) that would coordinate with task forces comprised of personnel from 
local SES offices designed to improve services to employers and subsequently increase 
employer usage of ES services.  This program replaced the Employer Service 
Representatives (ESRs) which served in a relatively small role during the MDTA years.  
In addition, the USES national office issued a directive in 1975 admonishing SES offices 
not to divert SES staff to UI activities.  It is not clear to what degree this directive was 
actually followed (Chadwin et al., 1977). 
Throughout the 1970s, the allocation of funding to SESA programs experienced 





FUTA4 dollars was based upon perceived need through the use of the ratio of SES staff to 
the size of the labor force it served (Adams, 1969; Chadwin et al., 1977).   However, in 
FY 1975 and FY 1976, The Balanced Placement Formula (BPF) was introduced to 
allocate funds to SES offices.  This formula was replaced by the Resource Allocation 
Formula (RAF) in FY 1977 (Chadwin et al., 1977).  The RAF included a 15% weight for 
“external factors” and “reflects national policy and emphasis through the measure used 
and the weights assigned to them” (Chadwin et al., 1977, p. 183). 
 
2.5 Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA): 1983 – 1998 
The 1980s brought about a major shift toward increased decentralization of the 
federal-state partnership, placing more control of SES operations under state control and 
attempting to simplify SES funding.  The Job Training Partnership Act of 1982 (JTPA) 
amended the Wagner-Peyser Act enabling states to customize both job training efforts for 
the disadvantaged as well as their ES labor exchange programs through federal funding. 
JTPA further required partnership between job training efforts with SES 
operations.  As part of its structure, JTPA provided both training and job placement 
services.  However, these services, while in some sense duplicative of SES operations, 
were required to be coordinated with the local SES plan.  In many instances, the intended 
cooperation took place between JTPA and the SES, even to the point of co-location of 
programs.  In other instances, competition emerged as JTPA programs sought after the 
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“same clients, job leads, employer contacts, and placement credits” as the SES 
(Ainsworth, 1991, p. 11). 
Another substantial impact brought about by JTPA legislation was the changing 
of the formula used to fund SES operations from the FUTA tax, emphasizing the role of 
unemployment indicators (Balducchi, 1997).  Consequently, funding for state 
administration of the labor exchange was predicated on the policy assumption that 
increases in unemployment will be associated with increases in SES activity.  
Approximately two-thirds of the distribution of these taxes back to states was based on 
the state's share of the nation's civilian labor force and approximately one-third was based 
on the state's share of the nation's number of unemployed individuals.  Thus, if 
employment growth stagnated or declined while unemployment increased relative to that 
of other states, a state could reasonably expect an increase in ES funding.   
While the funding allocation formula was altered under JTPA, overall revenue for 
SES operations was reduced substantially in 1982 to $610 million from $675 million in 
1981.  Funding in subsequent years continued to decline on an inflation-adjusted basis.  
This funding decline largely contributed to the reduction of 600 SES offices from 1980 to 
1988 (Ainsworth, 1991).   
In the early years transitioning to JTPA, the Secretary of Labor conducted four 
public hearings in 1986 in order to obtain stakeholders' assessment of the role played by 
the public labor exchange and identify the most appropriate role moving forward.  
Respondents overwhelming asserted its value but requested a more streamlined structure 





accountability of service provision and the automation of labor exchange information 
provision.5    
Improved integration of services was facilitated by the Economic Dislocation and 
Worker Adjustment Assistance Act (EDWAA) of 1988 that sought to give states more 
control in the development of labor exchange services to dislocated workers and 
increased ES participation (Ainsworth, 1991).  EDWAA also sought to facilitate greater 
coordination between the SESA and JTPA in serving dislocated workers. 
In addition, the SESA continued to increase usage of automation technology.  In 
1989, the Interstate Job Bank System, the evolution of the first job bank in 1968, received 
122,400 job openings with 40% representing professional, technical, and managerial jobs 
(Ainsworth, 1991). 
The decentralization and restructuring of the SESA throughout the 1980s and 
early 1990s ultimately led to a GAO finding in 1991 that “wide variations in local office 
performance indicate that active assistance from Labor may help to improve effectiveness 
of their programs” (Balducchi, 1997, p. 470).  GAO further recommended “the Secretary 
of Labor work with the states to identify and solve problems affecting ES program 
quality and performance” (Balducchi, 1997, p. 470). 
Policymakers at both the federal and state levels sought to respond to GAO's 
recommendation to revamp the nation's workforce development system.  In 1994, 
President Clinton proposed the Reemployment Act.  The intent of this bill was to 
facilitate service provider collaboration and competition in a workforce system that was 
                                                 






While the bill never passed, its objectives were adopted by USDOL.  These new 
objectives focused on improved customer service that integrated technological 
improvements in service provision, increased labor market information to assist in job 
search and preparation, and the development of “One-Stop Career Centers” (OSCCs) 
designed to be delivery hubs of streamlined workforce development services (Balducchi, 
1997).  OSCC state plans submitted to USDOL for grants had to demonstrate integration 
of services from ES, UI, JTPA (Title II and Title III), Senior Community Service 
Employment Program, and Veterans Employment and Training Services (OECD, 1999). 
In addition, a renewed emphasis was placed on outcomes of SES customers, 
including customer satisfaction (Balducchi, 1997).  Performance and accountability 
measures such as these received substantially more attention during this time largely due 
to the legislative impact of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 
(OECD, 1999).  In 1998, USDOL released a draft of performance measures for comment 
based on input and trials in SES offices and one-stop centers across the country. 
This focus on performance was part of a larger “ES Revitalization Work Plan” 
launched by USDOL in 1994 aimed at improving information and services to customers.  
This plan established three tiers of service to customers: 
Tier I – Self-Help (resource center and automated self-help system containing 
information on jobs, and job search assistance); 
 
Tier II – Basic Intervention (basic assessment and services, such as referral to 
jobs, job search assistance, and training); 
 
Tier III – Intensive Services (job seekers could be served by ES or referred to 





The Clinton administration also placed great emphasis on labor market 
information and fostered America's Labor Market Information System (ALMIS).  The 
goal of this effort is to provide one-stop access to a wealth of labor market information to 
SES customers.  In many ways, innovations in technology and dissemination in the 1990s 
were utilized to deliver this information. 
At the same time, the Interstate Job Bank was replaced with America's Job Bank 
(AJB).  In 1995, AJB became fully accessible on the Internet (Balducchi, 1997).  By 
1997, virtually every SES had linked their job openings databases with AJB (OECD, 
1999).  By the middle of 1998, AJB contained approximately 712,500 job openings 
(OECD, 1999). 
 
2.6 The Workforce Investment Act (WIA): 1998 – 2014 
Many of the objectives that were designed to integrate services eventually became 
legislated with the 1998 amendment to the Wagner-Peyser Act entitled the Workforce 
Investment Act (WIA).  Under WIA, the governor of a state identifies a state agency to 
administer Wagner-Peyser funds and workforce development services within the context 
of OSCC and according to a 5-year strategic plan.6 
In August 2000, USDOL published a set of proposed labor exchange performance 
measures tailored to WIA with a target implementation date of July 1, 2001.7  Part of this 
new performance measure system established a linkage to UI wage records.  In 2001, trial 
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implementations of these measures led USDOL to conclude that traditional method of 
follow-up of job seekers placed through the SES significantly understated the actual 
number.  This finding led USDOL to postpone implementation of these new performance 
measures until July 1, 2002 in order to allow each state time to implement a UI wage 
record matching system for SES performance reporting.8  The four performance 
measures implemented were: Job Seeker Entered Employment Rate (EER), Job Seeker 
Employment Retention Rate (ERR) at 6 months, job seeker customer satisfaction, and 
employer customer satisfaction (USDOL, 2002).  The culmination of these performance 
changes led to a “zeroing out” of all SES data such that new reporting could begin on 
July 1, 2002.  Thus, continuous historical analysis of administrative data is not possible 
past this date.   
 
2.7 The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act 
(WIOA): 2014 – Present 
On July 22, 2014, the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 was amended by the 
Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA).  While the USES falls within the 
scope of this legislation, the focus of this act is to improve federally funded job training 
programs by making training more accessible to clients than previously, more relevant to 
local employer needs and evaluated on a common scale across the country.9 
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From its inception in 1918 through the present, the USES has played a central role 
in the U.S. public workforce system.  While a key activity has been administering a 
matching service between employers and job seekers, the USES has also been tasked 
with overseeing the development of labor market information, administering aspects of 
the UI program and providing or partnering with job training efforts. 
Within this ecosystem, the USES has at times fought to maintain its employment-
matching identity.  This can be seen as the USES tried to prevent SESA from being 
labeled the “unemployment office” in the 1950s to its tenuous relationship with job 
training and job training partners, which often served to displace its labor exchange 
activities. 
Yet, if the USES is seen as an intermediary of a two-sided market, activities such 
as UI benefits and job training need not be seen as competing with labor exchange 
activities but potentially complementary.  As will be seen in subsequent chapters, UI 
benefits play a significant role in ensuring a labor pool is available when employers need 
workers.  Similarly, employment counseling and vocational training improve the welfare 
of both employers and job seekers, encouraging both sides to participate in the labor  
exchange.  Thus, the public workforce programs provide an integrated implementation 











Although the USES functions as an intermediary in the labor market, the 
intermediation theory literature, and by extension the multisided platform literature, has 
evolved almost independently of the Public Employment Service (PES) literature.  
Consequently, several evaluations of the PES have omitted aspects of intermediation and 
multisided platform theory.   Similarly, the multsided platform literature has investigated 
several industries and intermediaries, but the USES has yet to be analyzed through this 
framework. 
This paper seeks to provide an initial analysis of the USES from the multisided 
platform perspective and compare the results with that of the existing PES research.  In 
addition, this paper seeks to identify the subsidization strategies used by the USES to 
exploit any indirect network externalities present.  To provide a background for this 
investigation, this chapter presents the intermediary literature context surrounding and 
supporting multisided platform theory.  In addition, a review of the existing PES research 






3.2 Intermediaries in the Literature 
Multisided platform theory integrates several existing bodies of research 
including that of intermediation, networks, search markets, two-sided matching, 
externalities, and strategic pricing.  In order to provide context and a review of the 
multisided platform literature, this review will begin with the simplest aspects of 
intermediation and gradually incorporate the other areas of research.   
 
3.2.1 The Basic Intermediation Role: Reselling 
Understanding the multisided market intermediary’s role begins with examining 
the intermediary in the simplest of environments: reselling.  In these instances, an 
intermediary buys with the intention of reselling for a profit.   This role implies the 
intermediary will serve as a dealer who maintains inventories of cash and a traded good 
in a continuous market where asynchronous trading occurs during continuous intervals of 
time (Garman, 1976).10  
Prices are central to this role as the intermediary can help clear markets similar to 
the Walrasian auctioneer, even though the prices for the buyers and sellers may not 
represent a Walrasian outcome (Spulber, 1996b).  Yet, prices only represent a portion of 
agents’ transactions costs.  For example, even in the simplest of theoretical reselling 
roles, agents must incur costs when determining optimal prices.  Intermediaries, on the 
other hand, can reduce these costs by selecting an optimal pricing structure based on the 
                                                 





price signals of buyers and sellers (Spulber, 1996a). 
 
3.2.2 Value Addition 
However, because the intermediary must maintain an inventory in this simplest 
case, this basic intermediation role may not be profit-maximizing for the intermediary nor 
for the agents involved (Garman, 1976).  In fact, this is one reason why final prices may 
not represent a Walrasian outcome.  With an inventory, the intermediary now incurs 
maintenance costs which eventually create a bid-ask spread in prices (Spulber, 1996a).  
While the intermediary may be able to optimize prices due to its willingness to hold 
inventories for periods of time that improve profits (Johri & Leach, 2002), the 
intermediary is now faced with the need to optimize inventory size (Shevchenko, 2004) 
and risk aversion (Ho & Stoll, 1981).  See Amihud and Mendelson (1980, 1986) for 
greater discussion on the impact of the bid-ask spread on asset prices when intermediaries 
maintain an inventory.   
Thus, it may be optimal for all involved for the intermediary to add value to 
existing goods and services by incorporating other inputs to produce a similar but 
different good.  Winkler (1989) notes this is the predominant view of previous financial 
intermediation models and serves as the reason why intermediaries never developed a 
unique role in microeconomic theory. 
In a simple example, the intermediary may sell reputation by choosing to resell 
only high quality goods and services (Biglaiser, 1993).  However, adding other types of 





could come through verification services.  Buyers and sellers face asymmetric 
information prior to completing a transaction.  This translates to new costs and moral 
hazards each would face that the intermediary can reduce (Spulber, 1996a).   Li (1998) 
demonstrates that quality verification services provided by intermediaries improve agent 
welfare even though these intermediaries have chosen not to engage in production.  
Similarly, quality verification and monitoring intermediation can also apply to services, 
like loan contract monitoring (Diamond, 1984).    
At times, the value addition may simply be the possibility of a transaction taking 
place when buyers and sellers fail to come to an initial agreement on prices on their own.  
Thus, the intermediary performs the role of bargaining mediation.  See Yavas, Miceli, 
and Sirmans (2001) for a review of the literature on bargaining through intermediaries. 
Bargaining mediation can be extended to include brokerage activities.  When an 
intermediary serves as a mediator, the price preferences of the buyer and seller reduce the 
likelihood of a transaction.  However, when an intermediary serves as a broker, the buyer 
and seller do not have to reach a price agreement.  The broker may even “tax” or 
subsidize a transaction to facilitate the exchange (Myerson & Satterthwaite, 1983; 
Spulber 1996a).  Export intermediaries may also function as brokers (or matchmakers) 
(Peng & Ilinitch, 1998). 
 
3.2.3 Search Costs 
As the theoretical intermediary example grows in more detail, new costs emerge 





maintain the option of direct exchange in a decentralized, noncoordinated market 
alongside the intermediary.  Agents’ likelihood to use the intermediary will be 
determined by the efficiency of the decentralized market.  If buyers and sellers have to 
undertake a time-consuming, costly search process to find each other, using the 
intermediary becomes more profit-maximizing. 
These new costs lead to the evolution of the intermediary’s role as the 
intermediary seeks to increase his or her own profit by optimizing the search costs of the 
agents.  In some respects, this can simply mean reducing the time spent searching for a 
trading partner.  Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) present a model where some agents 
within the economy choose to serve as intermediaries (“middlemen”) instead of buyers 
and sellers when time-consuming matching inefficiencies provide the opportunity for 
positive profits from arbitrage.   
Intermediaries in the Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) model extract a portion of 
the buyers' and sellers' surplus in exchange for shortening their waiting time for a 
transaction.  This implies that the profitability of intermediaries (transactions costs of the 
buyers and sellers) is based on the impatience of the other agents.  Since the 
intermediaries are just as impatient as the buyers and sellers in this model, profitability 
primarily requires the intermediary to be more efficient in creating contacts than what the 
agents can find through decentralized search.  In other words, the matching technology of 
the intermediary must be more efficient than the latent matching technology of the 
decentralized market. 





assigned to the traded good or the transaction.  The role of valuation as it relates to search 
is explored by Cosimano (1996).  In this scenario, buyer and seller roles are determined 
endogenously, as is the choice for agents to trade directly with each other, trade through 
intermediated services, or even become nonparticipants.  The matching technology is 
completely random and each agent is allocated one unit of the traded asset in addition to 
one unit of transferable utility (for compensation) to facilitate negotiation in the 
exchange.  The resulting surplus, divided equally between buyer and seller, serves as the 
solution to a Nash bargaining game.  Buyers engaged in direct trade incur search 
(opportunity) costs while sellers incur marketing (opportunity) costs.  In this model, 
agents are not guaranteed a match unless they choose to trade with the intermediary and 
incur a transaction (opportunity) cost.  The intermediary establishes a profitable bid-ask 
spread that clears the market.  The agents' choice to trade directly or with the 
intermediary is determined by the lowest opportunity cost.  As a result, those agents with 
extreme valuations, who have the most to lose from direct trade, choose to trade with the 
intermediary while those agents with valuations at the margin choose direct trade instead. 
 
3.2.4 Matchmaking 
When not maintaining an inventory, the role of the intermediary can be 
generalized at this point to one of matchmaker who brings two sides of the market 
together alongside a decentralized environment where direct exchange (or matching) 
could take place.  This role could be active or passive.  In the passive sense, the 





instances, intermediaries passively facilitate transactions by merely informing buyers and 
sellers of current prices (information gatekeeping) or providing a means for buyers and 
sellers to easily find each other.  A firm or a commodity exchange, for example, can 
function as an information gatekeeper as in Baye and Morgan (2001). 
Whether active or passive, this matchmaking role intersects with an entire 
segment of the literature focused on two-sided matching in a largely decentralized 
environment.  The majority of the earlier job search literature reflects a decentralized 
environment as seen in the surveys by Lippman and McCall (1976a, 1976b).11  Similarly, 
the more general two-side matching models, like the “marriage market,” exhibit 
decentralized characteristics.  While a matchmaker is implicitly present in the two-sided 
matching models or even exists as an economic institution (Eeckhout & Munshi, 2003), 
the outcome does not deviate from a decentralized environment.  See Roth and 
Sotomayor (1990) for a review of the two-sided matching literature.   
The literature reflects several instances of matchmaking intermediaries 
intersecting with two-sided matching.  In Bloch and Ryder (2000) agents decide upfront 
to either form an exclusive agreement with the intermediary or engage in decentralized 
search according to a random meeting process.  The choice of whether to use the 
intermediary or not is governed by the intermediary's pricing scheme.  In Yavas (1994), 
search intensity of the agents is endogenously determined and ultimately influences 
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whether or not they use the intermediary.  By making the search cost decision 
endogenous, it becomes possible to identify the kinds of agents who choose to utilize the 
intermediary.  Consequently, Yavas finds that sellers with high valuations and buyers 
with low valuations drop out of the search market and choose to work with an 
intermediary instead, where their search costs equal zero.   
 
3.2.5 Matching Technology and Externalities 
Both Cosimano (1996) and Yavas (1994) link intermediary usage to search costs 
and valuations of the transaction or time.  At the heart of the agents’ decision lies the 
matching technology of the intermediary versus that of the decentralized market.  Yet, the 
type of matching technologies at work, and even the agents’ decisions themselves lead to 
externalities experienced by the other agents.   
This integration of the concepts of matching technology and externalities are 
brought together in Diamond and Maskin (1979) and Mortensen (1978, 1982).  In 
Diamond and Maskin (1979), two types of meeting technologies are portrayed that are 
drawn upon frequently by the literature.  One technology is the quadratic, where the 
number of matches increases with the square of the number of searchers.  The other 
technology is the linear, where the number of matches increases in linear fashion with the 
number of searchers.   
The market meeting technology subsequently offers the potential for both good 
and poor matches and may yield both positive and negative externalities (Diamond & 





possible all agents benefit from the increased ease of finding a match; however, as 
matches occur, there are fewer agents available for a match.  Additionally, an 
unsuccessful match may emerge from spatial limitations between agents, incomplete 
information (Mortensen, 1978), or inefficient search intensities based upon agent 
expectations (Mortensen, 1982).  An unsuccessful match may induce agents to either 
reconvene the search process or even force some agents to leave the market altogether 
(Diamond & Maskin, 1979).  When decentralized markets exhibit inefficiencies or 
failures such as these, intermediaries emerge to internalize these externalities. 
Recalling Yavas (1994), buyers (employers) and sellers (job seekers) search in a 
market with a matching technology similar to the quadratic model of Diamond and 
Maskin (1979) except that the positive externalities emerge from the increased search 
intensity of the agents and not necessarily from the number of agents searching.  
However, despite search intensity, the possibility exists that one agent will not be 
matched with another.  The intermediary's role, therefore, serves to reduce the uncertainty 
of the matching process and internalize the search intensity externalities. 
Bloch and Ryder (2000) consider a “marriage market” model where an agent's 
utility from a match depends entirely on the index of attractiveness of the “spouse.”  
Thus, no utility transfers (compensations) are allowed between agents when a match 
occurs.  In decentralized search, agents meet randomly at specified periods over an 
infinite time horizon and incur search costs (represented as a discount factor on the gains 
from marriage).  Bloch and Ryder (2000) further demonstrate that agents on both sides 





adopt the same threshold strategy.  This market segmentation result is similar to Burdett 
and Coles (1997) where sorting externalities arise. 
However, Bloch and Ryder (2000) also include an intermediary (marriage broker) 
who replaces the random matching process by establishing exclusive agreements with 
agents and proposes to match agents according to their identity (attractiveness).  In one 
scenario, the matchmaker charges each agent a fixed fee; in another, the matchmaker 
charges a commission after the quality of the agent has been revealed.  
The exclusive agreement between one agent and the intermediary creates 
externalities for the other agents.  The choice of whether or not to use the matchmaker 
affects the outcome of the agent's potential partner as well as those engaged in 
decentralized search. 
This exclusive agreement between agents and the intermediary combined with the 
pricing scheme adopted by the intermediary affects the number of equilibria generated 
within the model.  A unique participation equilibrium emerges when all agents are 
assessed a fixed transaction fee; however, only agents of higher quality utilize the 
intermediary.  Multiple equilibria exist when agents are assessed a commission; only 
agents of lower quality use the services of the intermediary. 
 
3.2.6 Competition and the Role of Market Share 
As can be seen above, both positive and negative externalities arise during the 
matching process.  Nevertheless, the impact of the externalities is determined by the 





directly experience positive externalities through decreased search costs: The intensity 
needed to find a match diminishes with a smaller pool of possible agents that have similar 
valuations.  Yet, the choice to utilize an intermediary as well as the direction of the 
intermediary's welfare effect hinges on the efficiency at which the market operates (the 
matching technology) and the size of market share possessed by the intermediary.   
Also, recalling Cosimono (1996), the optimal bid-ask spread of the intermediary 
is positively related to the matching costs of the intermediary—the costs of matching are 
passed on to the agents.  However, in Cosimano (1996), the matching costs are negatively 
related to the market share of the intermediary.  Thus, the intermediary can establish a 
bid-ask spread to influence market share to achieve optimal profitability.   
 
3.2.7 Indirect Network Externalities 
However, externalities and market share can also be a function of competition 
among intermediaries. In Yavas (1994) and Bloch and Ryder (2000) only one monopolist 
intermediary exists.  However, Caillaud and Jullien (2003) investigate the equilibrium 
market structures and subsequent (in)efficiency characteristics that result when 
matchmaking intermediaries compete against each other in a Bertrand game with users 
who form either exclusive or nonexclusive (multihoming) agreements and exercise price 
discrimination based upon identity and usage.   These nonexclusive agreements 
consequently generate indirect network externalities that foster a “chicken and egg” 
problem for the intermediaries within a context of two-sided market (Rochet & Tirole, 





However, a large base of sellers requires the ability to provide a large base of buyers.  
This dilemma leads to various pricing strategies to get both sides on board.  Evans (2003) 
identifies the entry and competitive strategies firms use to internalize the externalities in 
multisided platform (intermediation) industries where this “chicken and egg” problem 
surfaces. 
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) like Caillaud and Jullien (2000) find that efficient 
equilibria exist in both the exclusive or nonexclusive environments.  However, in the 
exclusive environment, the Bertrand game gives way to monopolization as profits 
disappear.  In the nonexclusive environment, inefficient equilibria also exist with positive 
profits where intermediaries influence users to follow multihoming strategies in order to 
exploit the network externalities.  Inefficient equilibria may generate the highest profits. 
The ability of intermediaries to exploit indirect network externalities with pricing 
schemes is further explored in the literature discussing competition between marketplace 
administrators, platforms or networks.  The theory of platform industries, or multisided 
markets, actually extends intermediation theory.  According to Evans (2003), multisided 
platforms are a special class of intermediaries that “coordinate the demand of distinct 
groups of customers who need each other in some way” (Evans, 2003, p. 191).  Examples 
of platforms analyzed in the literature include credit cards, resellers, telecommunication 
networks, media market advertising, matchmakers, marketplaces, and complementary 
software products (Armstrong, 2006). 
Networks can be construed as a type of platform.  Networks organize agent 





system.  Since service delivery is contingent upon several nodes, high complementarity 
exists between agent interactions.   
Rochet and Tirole (2004, 2006) define multisided markets by drawing a 
distinction between price level and price structure governing two or more sides of a 
market.  In this instance, price level reflects the total price charged by the platform to the 
different sides whereas price structure reflects the allocation of the total price between 
buyer and seller.   
In a one-sided market with a buyer, intermediary, and seller, the intermediary 
cannot change the volume of transactions by altering the price allocation between the 
buyer and seller since transaction volume is completely dependent on total price level.  In 
fact, the Coase Theorem states that in a world with established and tradeable property 
rights and no transaction costs or information asymmetries, the negotiated outcome will 
be Pareto efficient.   
In multisided platform markets, the Coase theorem no longer applies and the end-
user does not internalize the welfare impact on other end-users of his use of the platform.  
More importantly, when the total price level is held constant, different allocations of 
price to the buyer and sellers will alter the total volume of transactions.  This structure 
can lead the intermediary to subsidize one side of the market to capture the other side(s).  
Pricing thus becomes highly strategic, especially when one or more sides of the market 
follow a multihoming strategy.  Discussions of competition under this framework and the 
subsequent network externalities can be found in Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1994), Rochet 





(2006) provides a comprehensive view of the multisided literature. 
Damiano and Li (2003) assert previous multisided platform competition literature 
places great emphasis on network externalities and assumes homogeneous agents.  This 
tends to lead the analysis toward a model with a single, dominant marketplace.  However, 
by allowing for heterogeneity in agents, Damiano and Li (2003) enable the sorting 
phenomenon to emerge.  Competing marketplaces utilize pricing structures to facilitate 
the sorting process in order to survive.  However, the resulting outcome becomes less 
efficient than a two-price monopolistic structure.  This is consistent with Evans (2003) 
who notes that marketplace administration intermediation takes place within a multisided 
market by definition.  Participants are much more likely to utilize the market if a large 
number of agents already do.  This leads to concerns of “creaming,” where one exchange 
is able to attract more preferred agents than another. 
 
3.2.8 Conclusion 
A review of the multisided platform literature reveals a broad basis of support 
from a variety of existing areas of research.  What also is clear is that intermediaries play 
various roles depending on the markets they serve.  Furthermore, it is often the case that 
the type of market dictates to what degree agents will use the intermediary.  If the market 
is one-sided and the intermediary has a superior matching technology compared to the 
decentralized market, the notion of search costs and valuations have great explanatory 
value to the utilization of intermediaries.  However, if the market is multisided, indirect 





allocation to influence transaction volume.   
It is here where USES policy could be informed.  By understanding the multisided 
platform nature of the public labor exchange, better labor exchange policies can be 
developed.   
 
3.3 The Public Employment Service in the Literature 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In contrast to the largely theoretical nature of the intermediation literature, the 
PES literature consists of a small mix of empirical and theoretical studies that evaluate 
the labor exchange activities of the PES from two primary vantage points.  The first 
vantage point seeks to evaluate the overall ability of the PES to match workers and 
employers and analyze the subsequent impact.  The second vantage point attempts to 
identify why job seekers and employers choose to utilize the PES labor exchange 
services.   
 
3.3.2 Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Employment Service 
3.3.2.1 The Effectiveness of the Public Employment Service 
One of the few examples where the PES literature connects with the intermediary 
literature takes place in Walwei (1996) who sees the placement services of the PES 
analogous to the matchmaking conducted by the intermediary in Yavas (1994).  As such, 
the PES reduces uncertainty on both sides of the market and enables the public to 





in welfare analysis, Walwei (1996) lays out three practical approaches for evaluating the 
activities of public placement services.     
The first approach is that of process measurement or performance evaluation.  
The literature reflects both the development and application of process measurement.  
While Sultan and Virgo (1974) and Cavin and Stafford (1985) propose early 
measurement methodologies, Walwei (1996) contains the most comprehensive set of 
performance measurement calculations. One such example provided by Walwei (1996) is 
that of market share.  In Yavas (1994), the market share of the intermediary influences 
other agents as to whether or not they will use the intermediary.   
The second approach identified by Walwei (1996) is that of macrolevel outcome 
measurement, also referred to as aggregate impact analysis.  This type of measurement 
attempts to capture the negative or positive externalities generated by PES usage.  For 
example, in Yavas (1994), positive externalities generated by intermediation usage 
increased as other agents benefitted from the increased search intensity of others. 
Bellman and Jackman (1996a) present a methodology for identifying the impact 
of Active Labor Market Policy (ALMP) on aggregate economic variables, particularly 
employment and unemployment.  The goal is to determine the net impact of ALMP 
factoring out deadweight loss, substitution and displacement effects.  A matching 
function is typically a part of the analysis in an attempt to relate the flow from 
unemployment to the stocks of vacancies in the labor market.  
One of the earliest examples of aggregate impact analysis specifically targeted to 





methods used by employers and job seekers affect aggregate vacancies and 
unemployment.  Central to this model is the role of unemployment insurance (UI) 
benefits where Pissarides asserts that UI benefits and costs of job search exhibit the same 
influence on aggregate unemployment.  An increase in UI benefit levels increases the 
attractiveness of unemployment versus employment which in turn decreases the number 
of job seekers searching outside the PES.  This is similar to an increase in job search 
costs which force job seekers to rely more on the PES.  In response, employers adjust 
their recruitment method by advertising more job vacancies through the PES.  Aggregate 
unemployment and registered vacancy levels subsequently rise.  On the other hand, 
increasing employer costs for registering vacancies (or subsidizing advertisement outside 
the PES) reduces the level of registered vacancies while exerting an ambiguous influence 
on unemployment.  However, when combined with increasing job search outside the PES 
(by lowering UI benefits, for example), aggregate unemployment decreases.  
deKoning (2001a) and deKoning (2001b) present more recent approaches used to 
measure the aggregate impact of ALMP and provide a review of aggregate impact 
analysis.  The overall conclusion is that ALMP has at most a very small aggregate 
impact.  There are some indications that ALMP provides positive benefits to the long-
term unemployed but no clear pattern emerges in the literature.  deKoning (2001a) points 
out that the implementation of ALMP may be responsible for the lack of success, rather 
than ALMP itself. 
 The final approach identified by Walwei (1996) is that of microlevel outcome 





clients had they not used the PES.  These evaluations can be organized into experimental 
and nonexperimental categories.  Experimental studies test a theory by separating 
subjects into test and control groups.  Nonexperimental studies rely on econometric 
analysis of survey data to infer microlevel impacts.  One such approach is that by 
Lechner and Wunsch (2009) who analyze a database of administrative data in an effort to 
determine the impact of training programs sponsored by ALMP on both the employment 
and earnings of an individual.  Of particular interest is their focus on the role 
unemployment levels play in the benefit of training to individuals.  They conclude that 
the benefits of training are greater during periods of higher unemployment and public 
funding should vary with the business cycle to maximize the benefits.  
 
3.3.2.2 The Role of Job Search Methods 
Part of the effectiveness of the PES is tied to the job search method utilized by job 
seekers.  One segment of this literature investigates the probability a particular job search 
method transitions a job seeker from unemployment to employment.  Typically, the 
choice of method falls between direct search and search through intermediation.  For 
example, Reid (1972) samples 876 displaced workers from engineering and metal-using 
trades in the West Midlands of England from 1966 to 1968.  The study seeks to compare 
the degree to which job seekers use formal and informal job search methods as well as 
the success rate of each method, controlling for age, gender, and skill level.   
The study finds that method selection and success differ by gender.  For men, an 





used, 61.4% used the employment service, 56.6% (not additive to 100%) used 
advertisements, and 39.3 % relied on friends.  These channels exhibited success rates of 
25.1%, 36.5%, and 84.5%, respectively.  For women, 27.6% used the employment 
service, 43.2% used advertisements, and 34.5% relied on friends.   The resulting success 
rates were 45.1%, 51.3%, and 95.3%, respectively.    
Osberg (1993) presents a different perspective, contending that job search 
methods and subsequent success will vary over the business cycle by using longitudinal 
data from the Labour-Force Survey of Canada for 1981, 1983, and 1986.  For instance, 
informal networks proved less successful overall than the PES in economic downturns 
while the opposite was true during economic expansions.   This agrees with the findings 
of McGregor (1978). 
However, Osberg (1993) points out that PES job openings generally offered lower 
wages than other channels, indicating that the choice of job search strategy is at the same 
time a choice of employers and subsequently a wage offer distribution.  This indicates the 
presence of self-selection bias.  Gregg and Wadsworth (1996), using Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) data from Britain from 1984 to 1992, control for sample selectivity bias 
when evaluating the effectiveness of search methods.  First, the study finds increasing 
returns to an increase in the number of search methods used.   In addition, PES usage 
increases the probability of finding a job 3.4 times the sample mean for unemployed job 
seekers and the increase in unemployment duration is less than 1%.  This job-finding 
probability is even greater for job seekers with vocational and general qualifications 





employers yields better success rates than the PES. 
 
3.3.2.3 Employment Service Placement Equity 
Employment service placements have also been scrutinized as to their specific 
impact on clients of a particular race or gender.  Craft (1973) analyzes Employment 
Security Automated Reporting System data in 1971 from the United States.  The author 
notes that total placements were concentrated in lower-skilled occupations compared to 
the United States labor market.  However, when viewed by race, the ranking of 
occupational categories for Whites remains different from the actual labor market while 
the ranking for Blacks much more resembles that of Blacks in the labor market.  This 
leads Craft to conclude that the PES does little to improve the economic mobility of 
Blacks. 
Brown (1974) argues that Craft failed to account for turnover by comparing 
placements with total employment.  Craft (1974) counters by indicating that occupations 
with the highest employment are proxies for those that experience high turnover leaving 
the ranking scheme in tact. 
Johnson, Dickinson, and West (1985), on the other hand, investigate the impact of 
referrals on earnings and unemployment duration from job seekers using the United 
States ES.  The study finds that women receive substantial, statistically significant 







3.3.2.4 Job Satisfaction and Retention 
The literature also examines the length of employment and job satisfaction of an 
individual following a placement by the PES.  Both the search and intermediation 
literature would cast this issue within the context of match quality. 
Reid (1972) finds that individuals securing a job through a formal intermediary 
exhibited immediate job dissatisfaction.  However, Wielgosz and Carpenter (1987) find 
that job satisfaction was found to be linked more closely with occupation and industry 
than with job search method.  This contradiction may reflect the narrow occupational 
selection of Reid's sample.  Wielgosz and Carpenter conclude that informal methods are 
selected for their speed and not for their ability to lead to higher job satisfaction. 
Clark (1988) argues that quality of placements by the employment service may 
lack because that aspect of government intervention is not monitored.  More specifically, 
Clark tests the C. M. Lindsay (1976) hypothesis that government resources will not be 
directed toward activities that are not monitored or are too difficult to monitor by 
Congress or the public.  However, these activities will appear in private counterparts 
when a customer is willing to pay for them.  The subsequent differences between public 
and private services will highlight these activities and generally point to inefficient 
provision of public services. 
Clark uses the USES to test this hypothesis.  When comparing public and private 
employment agencies, Clark finds that USES offices have lower placement costs than 
private agencies.  However, almost two-thirds of placements made by private 





placed by public employment agencies.  Clark concludes this phenomenon appears 
because public employment agencies are monitored by the number of placements as 
opposed to the quality. 
Zweifel and Zaborowski (1996) attribute this discrepancy of quality placements to 
the motivations of public and private employment agencies.  They develop a theoretical 
model based on behavioral assumptions of public and private employment agency 
workers.  In the model, public agents place applicants in nonoptimal matches with 
employers while private agents are predicted to ask a high wage from applicants during 
recessions when applicants would have little capital on hand.  Despite nonoptimal results 
by either entity, Zweifel and Zaborowski are inclined to uphold the private model as 
superior due to its potential to achieve Pareto optimality. 
The literature also indicates the business cycle contributes to the relative success 
of the PES when it comes to placements.  The raw number of placements made by a SES 
is dependent upon the overall vacancies in the market as is reported by Lindeboom, Van 
Ours and Renes (1994), indicating that labor shortage correlates with the placement 
counts of the SES and not higher periods of unemployment.   
One example from the literature indicates the lack of success may be connected to 
a lack of understanding of how the underlying economics of the free labor exchange 
operates.  Sheldon (2003), for example, using Switzerland data, acknowledges the 
presence of thick market externalities present in the placement of job seekers into 
vacancies.  Sheldon found PES offices operating at less than efficient levels because of 





3.3.2.5 The Efficiency of the Employment Service 
The literature also seeks to evaluate the efficiency of PES, namely the speed by 
which the PES can transition a client from unemployment to employment.  This implies 
that the job search method(s) selected by the job seeker has a direct impact on the 
duration of his or her unemployment spell. 
Wielgosz and Carpenter (1987) conclude search method selection is the largest 
determinant of unemployment duration according to NLSY data.  Using friends and 
relatives is associated with the shortest durations of unemployment while the PES is 
almost always associated with the longest duration of unemployment, followed by direct 
application to employers and private employment agencies.  This is similar to Reid 
(1972) who concludes men finding their jobs through friends had shorter unemployment 
spells.  
This impact even overshadows that of the business cycle.  The longitudinal nature 
of the data enable Wielgosz and Carpenter to control for the impact the overall demand 
for labor has on unemployment duration using the state unemployment rate as a proxy.  
They did find that higher unemployment rates were associated with increased lengths of 
unemployment duration; however, the impact was less than that of search method 
selection.    
Similarly, Lindeboom, Van Ours and Renes (1994) use Netherlands data and find 
employed and unemployed job seekers rely primarily on advertisements for their job 
searches and that when it comes to overall speed at which a particular method results in a 





Like Wielgosz and Carpenter (1987), there is some evidence the business cycle 
affects these results.  When there are more job seekers, as in the case with greater 
unemployment, the unemployed are impacted more negatively than the employed.  In 
addition, the overall number of matches rests on the number of vacancies in the market. 
One factor behind the longer duration associated with the PES may arise from the 
type of activity conducted.  Van Ours (1994) demonstrates the variance in PES activity 
effectiveness by using a competing risk model and applying a matching function on 
Netherlands data to analyze different mediation methods used by the public employment 
office on unemployment duration.  The study finds that intensive matching, as opposed to 
other methods, demonstrates a small ability to reduce unemployment duration for public 
employment office clients.  This conclusion is supported by Sheldon (2003) with 
Switzerland data. 
These nonexperimental studies cast the efficiency of the PES in a negative light.  
These conclusions, however, differ from several experimental studies designed to test 
policy changes in UI.  In these instances, individuals using the PES had shorter 
unemployment spells.  Meyer (1995) provides a comprehensive review of such 
experimental studies. 
Thomas (1997) identifies the apparent disparity between the experimental 
evidence versus that of nonexperimental evidence.  Using microdata from the 1987 – 
1988 U.K. Survey of Incomes In and Out of Work (SIIOW), Thomas concludes that 
nonexperimental studies fail to account for PES usage that occurs as a last resort 





(1993).  Furthermore, when used at the same time, the PES actually exhibits faster results 
than other methods. 
 
3.3.2.6 The  Aggregate Impact of the Employment Service 
Recent evaluations of Active Labor Market Policy (ALMP), which includes such 
activities as the public labor exchange, investigate not just the impact on job seekers or 
the efficiency of the public labor exchange.  Rather, these studies seek to determine the 
overall effectiveness in lowering unemployment.  One such evaluation is represented by 
aggregate impact analysis which attempts to identify the net impact ALMP has on 
aggregate variables such as the unemployment rate.  Bellman and Jackman (1996a), 
deKoning (2001a) and deKoning (2001b) represent the current approaches to aggregate 
impact analysis.  Recalling the analysis previously reviewed in this chapter, the overall 
conclusion is that if ALMP has any net impact, it is small.  While there are some 
indications that ALMP provides positive benefits to the long-term unemployed, no clear 
pattern emerges in the literature. 
Plesca (2010) takes a slightly different approach by using a general equilibrium 
model to determine the impact of ALMP.  In this model, a market is considered with and 
without the public labor exchange.  This model relies on Pissarides (1979) and 
neoclassical job search theory and yields conclusions similar to his research: without the 
public labor exchange, matching would be more efficient and unemployment durations 
would be shorter.   However, this model extends Pissarides (1979) by demonstrating that 





higher skill workers and gains for lower skill workers.   
 
3.3.2.7 The Role of Unemployment Insurance 
Longer unemployment durations associated with employment services have also 
been associated with the high percentage of employment service clients receiving 
unemployment insurance.  According to job search theory, UI raises the job seeker’s 
reservation wage and subsequently, unemployment duration.   
The impact of UI alone on the reservation wage of job seekers lies outside the 
scope of the study.  The question at hand remains whether UI affects unemployment 
duration for PES clients or hampers the ability for the PES to quickly transition job 
seekers to employment.  
Keeley and Robins (1981) use EOPP data to examine the effects of government 
job search requirements (along with cash or in-kind benefits) on unemployment duration.  
They find that individuals who engage in intensive search that entails direct contact with 
employers have shorter durations of unemployment than those involved in government 
job search programs.  They conclude this discrepancy arises because government job 
search programs in their current form increase the reservation wage and misallocate job 
search resources. 
Barron and Mellow (1982) link the level of UI benefits to usage of the PES by 
presenting a model where employers respond to job seeker behavior.  UI benefits provide 
an incentive for job seekers to decline offered employment which in turn raises hiring 





employers continue to use the PES because they are able to minimize these higher hiring 
costs by having dedicated human resource personnel. 
Some empirical research supports these conclusions.  For example, Roed and 
Zhang (2003) find that even a marginal increase in UI benefits can slow the escape rate 
back to employment.  However, as benefits approach exhaustion, the escape rate 
increases sharply.  They find that this effect is more pronounced with women than with 
men.   
However, some empirical tests yield different conclusions.  Wielgosz and 
Carpenter (1987) tested for the impact of UI on unemployment duration and find no 
statistically significant impact.  In a similar fashion, Osberg (1993) controls for sample 
selectivity bias and finds that UI benefits are shown to exhibit little impact on job-finding 
probability.  Thus, the reservation wage is not a contributing factor to the PES 
unemployment duration as predicted. 
This is backed by Director and Englander (1988) who compare two periods (1970 
– 1975 and 1975 – 1980) with different UI policies in New Jersey to investigate the 
impact of job search requirements for UI recipients.  Those job seekers registered with 
the PES had both a higher speed and probability of reemployment. 
 
3.3.3 The Determinants of Employment Service Use 
3.3.3.1 Usage by Employers 
The literature seeks to explain the reasons certain employers choose to use an 





literature, Bishop and Abraham (1993) analyze the 1987 National Federation of 
Independent Business (NFIB) survey as well as the Employment Opportunity Pilot 
Projects (EOPP) survey conducted between February and June 1982.   From the EOPP 
survey, Bishop and Abraham find that employers using labor market intermediaries 
invested more time in the hiring process than those engaged in direct search.  However, 
Abraham readily admits both surveys may not represent the universe of employer hiring 
experiences. 
A common thread in the literature appears to indicate intermediary usage occurs 
when more preferred methods are unavailable or have already been exhausted.  This can 
be seen as early as Rees (1966) who analyzes the information labor market participants 
have about each other within the context of formal and informal job-finding networks.  
The former includes SESA, private fee-charging employment agencies, newspaper 
advertisements, union hiring halls, and school or college placement bureaus.  The latter 
includes referrals from employees, other employers, miscellaneous sources, and walk-ins 
or hiring at the gate.    
Rees finds informal sources are responsible for half of all hires in white-collar 
occupations and more than four-fifths for blue-collar occupations.  Thus, Rees like 
Baldwin (1951) rebuffs notions of an unorganized labor market indicating that the 
importance of informal networks is crucial when there is great variance on both sides of 
the market.  Employers prefer informal networks due to their lower costs and 
informational advantage.   





Stigler (1962), Rees maintains that high wages and high search costs are substitutes, 
forcing low-wage employers to use formal methods.  Newspapers were utilized at least as 
much as the employment service.  In the case of large geographical searches, the U.S. 
Employment service and private employment agencies were utilized more. 
The availability of preferred recruitment methods also depends upon the business 
cycle.  Wood (1985), using data from Germany and Britain from 1980 and 1981, looks to 
the role the business cycle plays in recruitment methods.  Wood finds that informal 
methods are relied on more heavily during recessions and that PES usage increases when 
labor is short.  In terms of selecting candidates, the impact of business cycles was 
ambiguous.  
It is possible employers may not feel confident in the likelihood of success 
offered by preferred methods.  Bull, Ornati and Tedeschi (1987) identify the determinants 
of private employment service (PRES) usage in the United States and find that employers 
will use private agencies to reduce sampling risk even when the private agencies may not 
have any technological advantage.   
 
3.3.3.2 Preferences of Employers 
The literature also strives to explain why certain employers are willing to use a 
fee-charging intermediary over a free one like the PES.  Bishop and Abraham (1993) cite 
that despite the increased time investment associated with intermediary use, employers 
using the PES invest the fewest hours in hiring compared with other labor market 





new hires.  The EOPP survey indicated that 3.6% of new hires resulted from PES 
operations compared with 2.8% reported in the NFIB survey. 
Rees (1966) finds employers show more satisfaction with PRES than public 
employment agencies, primarily citing poor screening on the part of the latter.  This 
would cause employers to prefer a private intermediary over a public one, even though 
the private may be associated with a larger time investment as in Bishop and Abraham 
(1993).  In addition, Haulman, Raffa and Rungeling (1987) provide evidence that the 
usage of different intermediaries may follow a sequential rather than simultaneous path 
where preferred intermediaries are utilized first.  They investigate whether the Johnson 
and Sugarman (1977) findings hold for a service-dominant economy like the Orlando 
MSA.  More specifically, the authors seek to determine if help wanted ads and the PES 
serve different labor market intermediary roles.  According to Johnson and Sugarman, the 
best jobs are filtered out prior to hitting public circles, leaving the newspapers and PES 
with a predominant collection of lesser quality jobs.  Haulman, Raffa, and Rungeling find 
that in Orlando, the newspaper serves as an additional filter and subsequently has a 
slightly better mix of jobs than the PES.  This corresponds to Lindeboom, Van Ours, and 
Renes (1994) who find employers relied on advertisements and informal methods 50% 
more than the PES.   
 
3.3.3.3 Indirect Network Externalities 
A small strand of the PES literature incorporates the role of indirect network 





best explanation of the ranking of one intermediary over another.  Employers choose 
whether or not to post a vacancy to the PES based upon their understanding of what type 
of applicants they can expect from the PES. 
This linkage can be seen as early as Edwards and Krislov (1971) who examine the 
activities of three SES offices in Applachia and conclude that employer usage of PES 
services is tied to the qualifications of referred job seekers as well as the ability of the 
PES to screen potential applicants. 
This framework runs counter to Neoclassical job search theory that has at its core 
a job seeker sifting through job offers.  Adnett (1987), in fact, presents several reasons to 
reject Neoclassical job search theory when analyzing the PES.  First, citing Barron, 
Bishop and Dunkelberg (1985) and Jackman (1985), Adnett argues that employers sift 
between potential candidates rather than job seekers choosing between several offers.  
Adnett further questions whether apparent shifts in the Beveridge curve actually point to 
lack of search intensity in the labor market, claiming instead the shift reflects longer 
durations of employers making hiring decisions. Second, Adnett argues Neoclassical 
search theory has little ability to explain the form and duration of on-the-job search with 
its base assumption that the job seeker is unemployed.  Third, Adnett believes 
Neoclassical theory has difficulty explaining partial registration of job vacancies with the 
PES when the service is offered for free.  Finally, Adnett claims Neoclassical analysis 
leads to ambiguous conclusions as Barron and Mellow (1982) claim unemployed 






The focus on employers removes job seeker search intensity from the center of 
the debate and shifts it to job seeker skill levels.  This shift also breaks the perceived 
relationship between unemployment duration, the number of job offers received and 
search intensity.  The search for qualified applicants gives rise to the extended internal 
labor markets (EILM) as a way to combat large streams of unqualified applicants. 
This may explain why some employers prefer other recruitment methods, even 
when the PES may have the shortest vacancy duration.  Roper (1988) seeks to examine 
the connection between recruitment method and vacancy duration by developing a 
theoretical model and using data from the Survey of Employers' Recruitment Practices 
from November 1976 and February 1977 during the middle of an economic downturn in 
Britain.  In terms of formal recruitment methods, the PES proved to provide the shortest 
vacancy duration.  In addition, the automated PES vacancy tool (job board) provided 
even shorter durations. 
Kubler (1999) identifies client differences between public and private 
employment agencies and recommends employers exploit this discrepancy in an effort to 
screen workers.  Kubler develops a model consistent with public choice theory in which 
public and private employment agencies coexist.  The model seeks to explain the 
difference in clientele between public and private employment agencies by coupling 
agency efficiency with worker quality.  The worker retains private information about 
both ability and effort choice.  Good worker types will bypass inefficient mechanisms in 
order to avoid human capital depreciation while bad worker types will attempt to mimic 





compensation serves as an information rent.  Employers can use contract offers to screen 
workers to reveal worker types. 
 
3.3.3.4 Usage by Job Seekers 
 The literature presents several reasons job seekers use the PES apart from being 
required to do so because of receiving UI benefits.  The primary factors for job seeker 
usage emerging in the literature are implementation of the PES services, quality of job 
seeker information networks, and the business cycle. 
 To begin with, PES client characteristics may be affected by PES implementation.  
Lindeboom, Van Ours, and Renes (1994) find that the Netherlands ES is associated with 
shorter job search duration for unemployed clients than those employed and that usage of 
the ES by unemployed job seekers outpaces that of employed job seekers 4 to 1.  The 
authors suggest these results may highlight the fact that the employment office in the 
Netherlands is designed specifically for the unemployed.    
 This finding is similar to Adnett (1984) who indicates when the UK implemented 
a structural change in service delivery, particularly the establishment of “jobcentres,” it 
induced greater usage by employed job seekers.  The author speculates that this may raise 
the perception of PES job seeker skill levels and attract more employers to post vacancies 
with the PES which in turn will help all job seekers. 
 Job seekers may lack the adequate level of information to utilize preferred search 
methods, such as friends and relatives.  Kahn and Low (1990) conclude that job seekers 





informal contacts that result in higher wage offers than those found in an employment 
service.  More specifically, when a job seeker has a lower discount rate, a lower initial 
stock of labor market information, greater coverage by UI, and a wider range of wage 
offers, usage of the PES increases.  This coincides with the claim by Stiglitz (1985) that 
job search tends to reduce the variance in the wage offer distribution.  In addition, greater 
usage of PES services by employed Blacks than their White counterparts may indicate 
that Blacks may lack access to informal job networks.   
 This is similar to Adnett (1987) who speculates that EILM serves as the true 
constraint to labor market efficiency.  Those without informal connections are at a 
disadvantage and would subsequently need to rely more on ES services.  Adnett uses this 
theory to explain the results of Johnson, Dickinson, and West (1985) where women 
benefitted more from PES activities than men. 
 According to the literature, the business cycle exhibits limited influence on 
unemployment duration and method success.  Job seekers respond by increasing the 
number and type of search channels.  From the vantage point of the PES, this impact is 
most visible in job seeker characteristics. 
 Kahn and Low (1990) claim higher unemployment rates are associated with 
increases in PES usage (although not significantly) because the opportunity costs of using 
intermediaries decreases.  Similarly, Adnett (1984) investigates the flow of employed job 
seekers using the PES in the UK.  The author finds that the level of unemployment had a 
negative influence on the inflow, reducing on-the-job search efforts and presumably labor 





Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) focus primarily on the stock of unemployed job 
seekers using the PES.  The study finds that unemployed job seekers utilize more 
methods than the employed.  However, during economic downturns where the number of 
vacancies per search channel decreases, unemployed job seekers compensate by 
increasing the number of search channels used while employed job seekers decrease their 
search efforts.  Since unemployed job seekers are still searching for the same number of 
vacancies, albeit across more channels, the authors feel this refutes the notion that search 
intensity changes over the business cycle.  In addition, during economic downturns, the 
percentage of long-term unemployed job seekers increases relative to the short-term 
unemployed.  In fact, it is the changing stock of the long-term unemployed that drives the 
overall changes in composition between unemployed and employed job seekers. 
 
3.3.3.5 The Relationship With Unions 
In many ways, the relationship of the USES to the unemployed has similarities to 
that of labor unions.  According to Bassi and McMurrer (1997), unions have 
“traditionally represented a powerful source of information regarding available benefits 
to unemployed workers” (Bassi & McMurrer, 1997, p. 71) and have often assisted union 
members with the UI filing process.  This is further supported by Budd (2007) who 
details the extensive role and impact of labor unions on providing resource information to 
the unemployed.  Furthermore, labor unions have focused on preparing a qualified 
workforce for their employers through training and apprenticeship programs (Freeman & 





attached to a union hiring hall are typically exempt from registering with the SESA. 
With the decline of unionization, one would expect more unemployed workers 
would be looking to the SESA for employment services.  However, the literature suggests 
this may not be the case.  Because of the key information role labor unions played in 
helping the unemployed, it is possible many unemployed individuals are unaware of the 
employment services provided by the SESA or more importantly, that they may qualify 
for UI benefits.  If the individuals filed for UI benefits, they would be required to utilize 
the services of the SESA and become more familiar with USES services.   
Several studies have estimated that it is the decline of unionization that is 
responsible for the decline in UI initial claims, specifically in the 1980s.  Blank and Card 
(1991) estimate 25% of the decline in claims can be attributed to the decline of 
unionization while Baldwin and McHugh (1992) estimate the impact to be as high as 
29%.    Thus, even though the USES and labor unions have similarities in their roles, it is 
possible the transition from labor unions to the SESA has not taken place to the extent 
one would expect. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
As can be observed above, the PES literature has largely focused on empirical 
evaluations of public labor exchange activities and the roles of related workforce 
programs such as UI and job training.  While there have been more recent efforts to 
incorporate theoretical research, these few examples tend to approach the public labor 





programs such as UI, for example, are seen as instruments that prolong unemployment 
and raise reservation wages.  Subsequent policy implications from these models tend to 
conclude the PES brings inefficiency to the labor market, rather than the efficiency that 
lay at the heart of its mission.   
Yet, the PES literature has largely developed independent of intermediation 
theory.  Consequently, as the intermediation literature evolved past simple reselling and 
brokerage models and linked with the literature of matchmaking, search and networks, 
the PES was never evaluated as a two-sided platform.  Thus, the potential of UI or skills 
training as a key subsidy to exploit indirect network externalities has not been 
investigated. 
This paper seeks to incorporate intermediation literature, especially that of 
multisided platforms and the role of subsidies into the body of the PES literature.  By 
evaluating the USES from the multisided platform perspective, one can develop a better 
understanding of how employers and job seekers use the USES and what programs have 
value beyond the immediate group they target because of their ability to help the USES 
reach both sides of the market. 
The following chapters will analyze several periods of ES history under various 
policy regimes.  Through econometric analysis, the SES of Utah and other states will be 
evaluated as an intermediary of a two-sided platform.  In addition, several subsidies will 
be identified that serve to exploit these externalities.  This will lead to new conclusions 







THE FOUNDATIONAL PERIOD: 1947 - 1963 
 
4.1 Background 
4.1.1 The Research Hypothesis 
Intermediaries operating on two-sided platforms “coordinate the demand of 
distinct groups of customers who need each other in some way” (Evans, 2003, p. 191).  
For the market or platform to be considered two-sided, one or more groups using the 
platform must demonstrate indirect network externalities: one group of agents (Group B) 
will only participate on their platform if another group of agents (Group A) participate 
first.   
To solve this problem, intermediaries must understand the nature of the indirect 
network externalities and adjust the cost allocation of participation across both groups.  
By subsidizing one group, the lower cost increases platform participation.  Consequently, 
the other group is induced to participate.  Thus, the intermediary can use subsidies to 
maximize transaction volume and get both groups to join the platform. 
The USES operates as a matchmaking intermediary overseeing a public labor 
exchange platform where job seekers are matched with employers.  This paper 





additional services which act as strategic subsidies to get both sides to participate and 
facilitate matching.  To test this hypothesis, this paper will investigate whether a subsidy 
to one side of the market increases the participation of the other side of the market.   
 
4.1.2 The Subsidies 
To that end, this chapter will investigate the impact of three specific subsidies:  UI 
benefits, job seeker aptitude testing, and employment counseling.  These three subsidies 
would work as follows.  The first is an explicit subsidy paid to job seekers.  When 
employers have few job openings, UI benefits enables the USES to maintain a pool of job 
seekers ready to work when more jobs become available.  Thus, if it generated indirect 
network externalities, it would encourage employer participation after a substantial 
period of time.  Without this subsidy, job seekers would have little incentive to use the 
SES when unemployment is high.  Consequently, as the economy begins to recover, the 
SES would not be able to help employers fill their new openings. 
If UI benefits act as a strategic subsidy to facilitate employment matching, it will 
counter much of the literature’s view of UI’s role in the job search process.  In 
Neoclassical job search theory, for example, UI is seen as the force that impedes 
employment matching by raising the reservation wage and promotes unemployment 
duration.  Examples of this framework include Pissarides (1979), Keeley and Robins 
(1981), Barron and Mellow (1982) and Kahn and Low (1990).   Nevertheless, revisiting 
the role of UI in the job search process may be warranted in that many studies such as 





demonstrated that UI benefits do not actually prolong unemployment durations. 
The second subsidy investigated in this chapter is job seeker testing.  The SESA 
offer aptitude testing to job seekers to help them ascertain their skills and guide their job 
search.  If this generates an indirect network externality for employers, it will resemble 
value addition similar to that discussed by Spulber (1996a) and Li (1998).  When using 
the USES, employers face asymmetric information and subsequently moral hazards when 
hiring job seekers from the SESA.  By conducting aptitude testing of job seekers, the 
SESA also performs quality validation services, improving the welfare of employers and 
reducing their search costs.     
There is already some evidence in the literature that the job seeker testing process 
encourages employer participation because of their desire to find a qualified job seeker.  
This would suggest the presence of indirect network externalities, a feature of two-sided 
platforms.  Rees (1966) finds employers show more satisfaction with private employment 
agencies than public employment agencies, primarily citing poor job seeker testing 
conducted by public agencies.  Thus, it is not the size of the labor pool that influences 
employer participation but rather the type of job seekers that are available on the 
platform.  This is similar to Edwards and Krislov (1971) who conclude that employer 
usage of PES services is tied to the qualifications of referred job seekers as well as the 
ability of the PES to screen potential applicants. 
The third subsidy explored in this chapter is that of employment counseling.    
The SESA provide employment counseling to job seekers who have barriers to 





training gaps, or simply unrealistic expectations.  Regardless of the reason, these job 
seekers have a more difficult time finding a match.  This creates a negative externality for 
employers by reducing the pool of qualified candidates for their job opening. 
At times, this counseling leads to advocacy and education efforts to help 
employers look past age or other issues when making hiring decisions.  In other 
instances, it requires adjusting the occupational goals of the job seeker based on their 
actual circumstances, not their unrealistic perceptions.  However, in the case of skill gaps, 
the SESA often help job seekers obtain training to become more job-ready.   
In many ways, the employment counseling subsidy represents the bargaining role 
of an intermediary as in Yavas, Miceli, and Sirmans (2001) as well as the brokerage 
intermediary role as found in Spulber (1996a) and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) in 
which the intermediary chooses to subsidize the transaction in order for both sides to 
agree to the deal.  Without this intervention and value addition, the employer would have 
one less qualified job seeker to recruit and the job seeker would have fewer options with 
higher wages. 
When employment counseling leads to training, it could function as a subsidy that 
exploits indirect network externalities because it improves the qualifications of the job 
seekers the employer hopes to find and typically includes the validation of skills provided 
by testing.  However, the challenge with employment counseling as it relates to this 
research is the time it takes for the effects of the training implementation of this subsidy 
to be observed.  Both UI benefits and testing are subsidies whose outcomes can be 





mindset of employers or job seekers, it also can have a rather immediate effect.  
However, when it leads to training it may take a substantially longer period of time to 
generate an impact.    
 
4.1.3 Historical Context 
This chapter will explore the formative years of the modern USES which began 
shortly after WWII and lasted until 1963.  This era featured the implementation of the 
USES strategic “Six-Point Program” developed in 1946.  This initiative included a focus 
on placement services, employment counseling, services to special applicant groups (i.e., 
veterans and youth), management service (assisting employers in job analysis and 
testing), labor market information, and community participation (cooperation with 
community organizations involved in employment planning).  These services were 
especially critical with the millions of WWII veterans pouring through the SESA from 
September 1, 1944 through August 31, 1949 (Haber & Kruger, 1964). 
In terms of policy, Ruttenberg and Gutchess (1970) assert that following World 
War II and as late as 1964, the SESA prioritized services to employers over job seekers.  
This priority manifested itself by trying to refer the best workers possible to employers, 
meaning that the needs of some job seekers would be prioritized lower.  Underlying this 
belief was the recognition of indirect network externalities: Employers would not 
participate in the future if the SESA did not refer the most qualified workers in the 
present. 





USES leading up to this period which also focused on serving the need of employers.  
Revitalized in 1933 with the Wagner-Peyser Act, the first years of the USES focused on 
finding labor for WPA programs during the Great Depression.  Similarly, during WWII, 
the USES prioritized finding workers for firms supplying the WWII effort.  When the 
Korean War Conflict emerged, the USES modified the focus of labor market research to 
prepare for the upcoming demands on the labor force and prioritized service to employers 
in the defense industry (Haber & Kruger, 1964). 
Thus, after WWII and into the foundational period, this focus led to a new service 
that benefited employers: aptitude testing of job seekers.  Substantial testing efforts 
emerged during this period in response to employer demand.  As early as 1952, the ES 
reported “the number of employers requesting test selected applicants is steadily 
increasing” (UDES, 1952). 
Nevertheless, this employer focus did not preclude helping those job seekers who 
were not job-ready as the SESA also provided employment counseling to those job 
seekers with barriers to employment.  These barriers included age (youth and older 
workers), training gaps, disabilities or inaccurate occupational goals of the job seekers.   
While at times the remedy was job training, in other instances the SESA took on the role 
of employer education, helping employers see for example, “older workers as a valuable 
manpower resource” (UDES, 1955).  When the job seeker needed direction or readjusting 
in terms of occupational goals, testing served as a great tool to help the job seeker better 
understand their skill set.  Coupled with the ongoing improvement of labor market 






Alongside these activities, USES also provided UI benefits subsidies throughout 
this period.  In fact, UI claim processing often received higher prioritization than ES 
services.  Throughout the 1950s, approximately 17,000 SESA workers across the country 
focused on placements while 28,000 provided UI operations (Janoski, 1990).  Even 
former Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell accused the USES of being too preoccupied 
with processing UI claims (Levitan, 1964). 
 
4.1.4 National Context 
Because of the limited administrative SESA data available, only Utah is analyzed 
during this period.   Thus, it is important to understand how the Utah labor market 
compared to that of the United States.  From 1950 to 1963, Utah labor market demand 
resembled that of the United States as can be seen in Figure 4.1.  This similarity is 
greatest from 1950 to 1955 and from 1962 to 1963.  From 1956 through 1961, however, 
Utah experienced a much lower unemployment rate, especially in 1958 and in 1961.  
Thus, the Utah labor market had much greater employment demand coming out of the 
period of The Korean War Conflict than the United States as a whole. 
 
4.1.5 Testing the Hypothesis 
This chapter will analyze the Foundational Period of the UDES to test the 
hypothesis that the USES in partnership with SESA operates as a two-sided platform and 





the analysis in this chapter will investigate (1) how employment demand affects employer 
participation, (2) the impact of job seeker participation on employer participation, (3) the 
impact of UI benefits, job seeker testing and employment counseling on the participation 
of employers, (3) how employment demand affects job seeker participation, (4) whether 
job seeker behavior is influenced by the number of job openings posted, and (5) the 




4.2.1 Data Sources 
The data set used to test the hypothesis has been constructed uniquely for this 
analysis by the author from two U.S. government publications: the Social Security 
Bulletin (1947-1949) and the Labor Market and Employment Security monthly report 
(1949 – 1954) as well as annual reports published by the Utah Department of 
Employment Security (UDES) from 1947 to 1963.  UDES operated the SES in Utah 
during this period of time in partnership with the USES. 
Collectively, these publications report monthly and annual counts of various labor 
market metrics across the country as well as the breadth of Utah ES activities and 
transactions conducted by the UDES.  While future research should explore this vast data 
set further, this current research will be scoped to the Utah statewide level across all 






4.2.2 Selected Variables 
The scope and criteria outlined above determined what data elements would be 
selected for the 1947 to 1963 analysis.  These variables are described below. 
 
4.2.2.1 Unemployment 
As a matchmaking intermediary, UDES faced the additional challenge of the 
ever-shifting search cost allocations of employers and job seekers.  These search costs are 
allocated to employers and job seekers differently as employment demand fluctuates.  
Unemployment levels have been selected as a variable to reflect this demand.   
To provide economic context to this analysis, Figure 4.2 provides a chart of 
seasonally unadjusted unemployment levels divided by the size of the labor force, thus 
approximating the Utah unemployment rate.  As can be seen in this chart, unemployment 
gradually increased during this period of time.  The Korean War Conflict also exhibited 
substantial volatility on the Utah labor market during the early 1950s. 
It is expected that employers will post more jobs when unemployment is low and 
job seekers will thus require the UI subsidy to maintain participation when 
unemployment is high.  Figure 4.3 compares the unadjusted counts of unemployment, UI 
initial claims and job openings.  As expected, employers tend to post more job openings 
when unemployment is lower and more UI initial claims are generally filed when 
unemployment is higher.  What is also evident in this chart is that the level of activity at 
the UDES is lower than the levels of unemployment in Utah indicating some unemployed 





4.2.2.2 UI Initial Claims 
All individuals have the right to file UI claims, although only those who meet 
certain requirements are able to receive benefits.  Initial claims reflect counts of 
individuals attempting to claim UI, not necessarily those who meet the requirements.  
Typically, workers file for UI when they cannot find a job although they may be only laid 
off for a season. 
However, receiving UI benefits requires claimants to register for work at the ES 
unless they can expect to return to their employer in the near future.  Thus, UI benefits 
act as a subsidy to maintain a pool of labor until the labor market recovers.  Naturally, the 
filing of UI initial claims frequently leads to increases in SES job seeker registrations.  
Thus, counts of UI initial claims have been selected to represent the UI benefits subsidy 
provided to job seekers. 
Figure 4.4 compares counts of UI initial claims to counts of new applicants.  
Similar to unemployment levels throughout this period, UI initial claims fluctuated with 
the season.  In addition, the long-term trend of UI initial claims follows the cycle of 
unemployment increases in the late 1940s and into 1950 followed by a trough throughout 
The Korean War Conflict.  From there, a general trend upward continues with peaks in 
the mid- and late-1950s before leveling off in the early 1960s. 
 Also evident is the fact that UI claims tend to lead new applicant counts although 
UI claims often overshadow new applicant counts in terms of magnitude.  This difference 
reflects the fact that those workers who expect to return to their employer need not 





applicants are higher than UI claims.  This suggests other factors may be influencing job 
seekers to register with UDES rather than just the UI subsidy. 
 
4.2.2.3 Job Openings 
Employer participation on the USES platform is measured by counts of posted job 
openings.  When employers were in need of workers for jobs at their firms, they 
voluntarily notified UDES.  UDES in turn made an effort to notify job seekers registered 
with the UDES by posting these jobs on a public bulletin board giving rise to the term 
“job board.”  UDES also worked to recruit workers for these jobs from the registered job 
seeker pool. 
Each job posted with UDES was counted as a job opening for reporting purposes.  
UDES reported these job openings across two categories: agricultural and 
nonagricultural.  This classification was used because agricultural job openings tended to 
be temporary and highly seasonal in nature.  Agricultural job openings also comprised a 
very small portion of total job openings, especially as the Utah economy developed over 
the next several decades.  Consequently, while this research analysis will utilize the term 
“job openings” throughout, it will only examine counts of nonagricultural job openings.   
Figure 4.5 compares counts of job openings to UI initial claims and reveals job 
openings and UI initial claims have differently seasonal patterns and frequently move in 
opposite directions.  If both of these two forces, which tend to move in opposite 
directions, exhibit influence on the behavior of job seekers, one would expect job seeker 





trends of job openings and UI claims.  Thus, the peaks and troughs of job openings and 
UI claims “cancel” each other out. 
 
4.2.2.4 New Applicants 
Job seeker behavior will be represented by counts of new applicants—those job 
seekers who registered for SES job services.  Specifically, a new application is the 
initiation of a 12-month window for which a job seeker can use and later reuse SES 
services.  This is an important distinction as the UDES annual reports actually contain 
two overlapping data elements related to job seeker activity.  One category is the “Active 
File” which is a current account of all job seekers with active registrations for a given 
period of time.  This is similar to the Total All Applicants category used in more recent 
reporting and in Chapter 7 of this paper.  New applicants, on the other hand, represent the 
event in which a job seeker creates a new registration for ES services. 
Thus, new applicant counts should not be confused with first time users of the 
SES.  For example, after making a new application, a job seeker may use the SES, get 
referred to a job, become unemployed and reactivate their registration—all within a 12-
month period of time.  Under that scenario, there is one new application for that 12-
month period but that job seeker would show up on the active file every month he or she 
is using SES services. 
Figure 4.6 charts the flows of new applicants who registered with the UDES.  As 
expected, despite seasonal patterns, new applicant flows appear relatively flat along with 





4.2.2.5 Individuals Tested 
During this period, UDES began administering aptitude tests to individuals to 
determine and validate skill sets.  Thus, job seeker testing could exploit the indirect 
network externalities of employer behavior because it reduces their moral hazards of 
search and encourages their participation.  Because this process emerged during this 
period of time, counts of individuals tested did not appear in UDES annual reports until 
1949.  Furthermore, because this was a process that received increasing attention during 
this period, much of the increase in testing during this period could be attributed to the 
evolution of this activity rather than typical fluctuations of an established program. 
Figure 4.7 charts counts of individuals tested alongside job openings counts. 
While not even counted in 1947, testing levels increased steadily throughout this period.  
Apart from the small decline from the mid-1950s to 1958, counts of testing appear to 
reflect an institutional priority rather than an activity just driven by employment demand.  
Note also how testing counts spiked during The Korean War Conflict indicating its early 
acceptance and priority among employers using the UDES. 
Figure 4.7 also indicates seasonal spikes beginning in the late 1950s and 
continuing into the 1960s.  These spikes in the fall reflect that UDES regularly went into 
local high schools to administer tests to students as part of a work-readiness effort.  
Because many high school students did not attend college during this period of time, this 
testing effort could lead to increases in new applicant counts independent of labor market 
conditions.  However, this outreach to high school students could include individuals who 





4.2.2.6 Counseling Interviews 
Whereas testing guided the referral decisions of the UDES for job seekers who 
were ready for employment, some job seekers faced barriers to employment.  These 
barriers could include age (older workers), disabilities, training gaps, or unrealistic 
occupational goals.  In these instances, UDES workers counseled the job seekers in order 
to address these barriers.  Thus, it could be some time before these job seekers were ready 
for referral.  Nevertheless, counseling served as a subsidy to both employers and job 
seekers, enabling UDES to serve as bargaining mediator or a broker to help clear the 
market, despite the length of time it may have taken. 
As can be seen in Figure 4.8, while not nearly the increasing activity such as 
testing, counseling interviews increased steadily throughout this period until leveling  
off in 1960 with small declines following.  Furthermore, despite the spikes in testing in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, employment counseling and testing activities tended to 
follow the same seasonal fluctuations and trend.  Thus, while testing received substantial 




While previous charts depicted the values of each series as reported by UDES, 







4.2.3.1 Data Set Truncations 
Monthly counts for most of variables were reported by UDES from 1947 to 1963.  
However, counts of individuals tested did not begin until January 1949.  Consequently, 
data elements available from 1947 were shortened to have a similar start date as 
individuals tested.   
Apart from this data reduction, no other observations were removed for this 
analysis.  This is significant because each data series was affected by The Korean War 
Conflict in some manner.  While the war generated outliers in each data series, this 
research retained these data points because of the overall limited number of observations 
available as well as the differences in the times each series experienced this shock.  In 
addition, the UDES had substantial experience with wartime labor exchange management 
playing a critical role in the labor exchange process as recent as WWII.  Thus, while a 
shock to their operations and the labor market, the data from this period still provide 
valuable insight into the research objectives of this analysis.   
 
4.2.3.2 Seasonal Adjustments 
The charts of the data series in the previous section demonstrate that UDES did 
not make any seasonal adjustments to the reported data.  Because this seasonality could 
affect analysis, multiple seasonal adjustment procedures were considered; however, 
seasonal adjustment was ultimately performed using the X-12-ARIMA procedure 
developed by the United States Census Bureau.  This seasonal adjustment was selected 





Labor Statistics (BLS), the administrator of the unemployment reporting methodology.  
This approach also preserved the original definitions of the series more than those that 
utilize differencing and facilitated bivariate analysis of the seasonally adjusted series 
unlike that of seasonal adjustments that use dummy variables. 
 
4.2.3.3 Conversion to Natural Log Growth Rate 
The X-12-ARIMA approach also simplified the final transformation which was 
the conversion to a natural log growth rate according to the formula found in Equation 
4.1 below. 
 
 𝒘�𝑡 =  ln (𝑥𝑡) −  ln (𝑥𝑡−1) (4.1) 
 
4.2.4 Univariate and Bivariate Analysis 
To better understand the relationship between the growth rates of these series, 
several univariate and bivariate analyses were conducted.  To begin with, Table 4.1 
displays the descriptive statistics of each series.  With the exception of individuals tested, 
each transformed series appears evenly distributed around the mean and median.  
Individuals Tested, however, demonstrates positive skew.  This can be expected given the 
fact testing activities dramatically increased during this period of time. 
A review of the Pearson Correlation Coefficients between these variables is also 
revealing.  As can be seen in Table 4.2, statistically significant negative correlations 





demand on employer job postings.  To further illustrate these correlations, scatter plots 
are provided.  Each of these scatter plots also feature a 95% prediction ellipse according 
to Equation 4.2 below, where 𝛼 = 0.05.   
 
 
𝜋 =  2(𝑛 + 1)
𝑛 − 2 𝐹2,𝑛−2(1 − 𝛼) (4.2) 
 
 
  The negative slope of the prediction ellipse of the scatter plot displayed in Figure 
4.9 further demonstrates the negative correlation between job openings and 
unemployment. 
In addition, the positive, statistically significant correlation between new 
applicants and job openings as well as that between new applicants and initial claims 
provides early confirmation the research hypothesis is correct.  Despite the fact that job 
openings and UI claims move in opposite directions, both series have positive 
correlations with new applicants.  These relationships are visualized in Figures 4.10 and 
4.11.   
What is additionally promising for the hypothesis is the positive correlation 
between job openings and individuals tested as depicted in Figure 4.12.  This suggests 
testing job seekers does exhibit a positive influence on job openings by reducing the 
moral hazards of employers.   
One surprising aspect of Table 4.2 is the statistically significant correlation 





counseling and new applicants.  This suggests counseling, while a subsidy that offsets the 
search costs of job seekers and employers, may influence the participation of employers 
more than job seekers. 
 
4.3 Model Results 
To test the hypothesis, employer and job seeker UDES participation will be 

















where p=1,3, r=7 and s=1, 𝑗𝑡 denotes job openings, 𝑛𝑡 represents new applicants, 𝑚𝑡,𝑢𝑡,  
𝑔𝑡and 𝑐𝑡 represent UI initial claims, unemployment, job seeker testing and employment 
counseling while 𝜖𝑡 represents a white noise process.
 12 
 Several parameters were considered in the selection of this model.  
Autoregressive orders of p=0,...,10 and lags of s=0,…,5 were examined.  The parameters 
of p=7 and s=1 exhibited the lowest AICc of 10.29448 as can be seen in Table 4.3. 
The current term (t=0) was included in this model for the independent variables 
due to the nature of the processes by which employers and job seekers used the UDES 
during this period.  Many of the activities took place within the same month.  For 
                                                 
12 Following Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980), tests were performed for the presence of 
multicollinearity across independent variables along with Variance Inflation Factor analysis.  No indication 





example, when a job seeker came to the UDES to file a UI claim, he or she needed to 
immediately register for the labor exchange if they were not returning to their employer 
at a later date.  This fulfills the “work test” requirement mandated by UI law.  Thus, filing 
an initial UI claim and registering for the labor exchange are likely to occur not only in 
the same month, but on the same day.  Similarly, when the job seeker explores the job 
opportunities at the UDES, they typically have to register in order to get referred for that 
job or even to apply.  Thus, new applications tend to occur in the same month the job 
seeker identifies an intriguing job opportunity. 
 
4.3.1 Employer Behavior: Job Openings Posted 
The results of the employer regression analysis can be viewed in Table 4.4 while 
the F-Test results for all the variables are displayed in Table 4.5.  The regression results 
indicate statistically significant autoregressive terms at t-1 and t-3 which exhibit opposite 
influences on the dependent variable j, reflecting a cycle of employer behavior that 
fluctuates over 4 months.   
As Table 4.4 indicates, unemployment plays a significant role in employer 
participation on the UDES platform.  This is underscored in Table 4.5 where 
unemployment demonstrates a predictive relationship with job openings.  Thus, 
employers post more jobs when unemployment is lower.  This presents a potential 
problem for the USES: matching employers and job seekers when employment demand is 
constantly changing. 





externalities.  One way this could surface is if employers also post jobs because job 
seekers are available on the USES platform.  Unfortunately, Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 do 
not indicate this is the case.  New applicants have no statistical impact on the behavior of 
employers.   
Yet, the research of Rees (1966) and Edwards and Krislov (1971) demonstrate 
that employer participation is linked to how well job seekers are screened by the SESA.  
This suggests that services to job seekers such as employment counseling and aptitude 
testing could generate indirect network externalities. 
Employment counseling encompasses a broad range of activities with some 
leading to short term outcomes and some leading to those taking much longer.  Table 4.4 
and Table 4.5 reveal that employment counseling to job seekers has a positive impact on 
employer participation, confirming the presence of indirect network externalities.  
Because this analysis covers monthly data, this suggests it is counseling with short-term 
outcomes which prove to be influential with employers during this period.  Thus, helping 
employers look past age or disabilities, or helping job seekers adjust their expectations 
both result in the UDES helping the employer find a qualified job seeker.  This is similar 
to Yavas, Miceli, and Sirmans (2001) in which the intermediary serves in a bargaining 
role to facilitate the transaction.   
There is some evidence to suggest that job seeker aptitude testing functions in a 
similar way.  While the regression results indicate job seeker testing demonstrates a 
statistically significant impact on employer participation, the F-Tests indicate the 





reason for the muted effect of testing is the extensive testing outreach conducted by 
UDES during this period.  UDES frequently administered aptitude tests to high school 
students.  These efforts could lead to counts of testing fluctuating independently of other 
labor exchange activities.  Yet, taken together with employment counseling, one can 
observe some degree of indirect network externalities present in the behavior of 
employers. 
 By providing this quality verification process of a value-adding intermediary, the 
ES reduces the employer’s risk of moral hazard as described by Spulber (1996a) and Li 
(1998).  This finding also supports Bull, Ornati and Tedeschi (1987) who find that 
employers use private agencies over the PES to reduce sampling risk even when the 
private agencies may not have any technological advantage.    
The impact of UI benefits to job seekers may also play a critical, positive role in 
helping SESA coordinate the participation of employers and job seekers.  This could lead 
to increased employer participation over the longer term by maintaining a pool of labor 
for when the economy recovers.  However, UI initial claims did not appear to influence 
employer participation in this chapter.  This may be due to the fact that this impact takes 
a longer time to manifest than was captured by the model.  This will need to be examined 
in later chapters that analyze annual data. 
Yet, during the Foundational Period, in addition to periods of lower 
unemployment, it appears employers participated with the UDES not because of the size 
of the UDES labor pool, but because of the quality of this pool.  Thus, because of indirect 





job seekers, it positively influenced employer participation. 
 
4.3.2 Job Seeker Behavior: New Applications 
The regression estimates for job seeker behavior are displayed in Table 4.6 with 
the results of the F-tests displayed in Table 4.7.  Based on the significance of the 
autoregressive terms for new applicant counts, it appears the process of job seeker 
behavior spans a 6-month cycle. 
As can be seen in Table 4.6, unlike employer participation, employment demand 
does not have a direct bearing on the participation of job seekers.  However, because of 
the statistical significance of initial claims and strong correlation between unemployment 
and initial claims (0.47753), employment demand does appear to play at least a limited 
role.  However, these results suggest that job seekers are more likely to participate when 
unemployment is higher.  This complicates the role of the USES in that employers are 
more likely to participate when unemployment is lower. 
This could be offset if job seeker behavior exhibited indirect network externalities 
similar to that of employers.  Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the case as can be 
seen in Table 4.6.  The presence of job openings alone has no impact on job seeker 
participation.  In fact, only the prospect of UI benefits appears to persuade job seekers to 
participate.  
One additional note is necessary relative to the impact of job seeker testing in 
Table 4.6.  Its positive impact seems unexpected until one recalls the efforts of UDES 





UDES substantially ramped up testing efforts in the 1950s.  One key part of this process 
was an outreach to Utah high schools in which students were administered competency 
tests.  This outreach effort likely induced many high school students to register with 
UDES.  Nevertheless, the F-Tests performed on job seeker testing yield no evidence 
testing predicts job seeker participation.  This suggests testing growth was more 
coincident with job seeker registrations than causal. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The analysis of the post-World War II season of the UDES, what ultimately 
serves as the Foundational Period in terms of policies and practices, suggests indirect 
network externalities may have been present in the behavior of employers but not job 
seekers.  Employers appear to have posted more job openings in response to increasing 
employment demand and the prospect of finding qualified job seekers on the UDES 
platform.  By providing aptitude testing and employment counseling to job seekers, the 
UDES also provided quality validation and brokerage services that reduced the search 
costs for employers and encouraged their participation.  Thus, there appears to be initial 
support for the hypothesis that the USES operates as a two-sided platform.  This is further 
supported by the fact that it appears this influence appears to be driven by the usage of 
subsidies utilized by the USES to increase transaction volume. 
The next chapter will examine a larger time period (1947 – 1981) in which the 
USES makes concerted efforts to engage the job seeker beyond the provision of UI 





the breadth of variables available in this chapter is not available for this extended series, 
the analysis of the next chapter will examine whether these policy changes were effective 







Figure 4.1.  Utah vs. United States,13 average annual unemployment rate, 1950 - 196314 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Monthly, seasonally unadjusted unemployment rate in Utah, 1947 - 196315 
                                                 
13 Source: Utah Department of Workforce Services and Bureau of Labor Statistics 
14 Comparable unemployment rate data are not available prior to 1950.  












































Figure 4.3.  Monthly, seasonally unadjusted Utah unemployment, 




Figure 4.4. Monthly, seasonally unadjusted Utah UI initial claims 
and UDES new applicants, 1947 – 196317 
                                                 
16 Source: Utah Department of Workforce Services 






























Figure 4.5. Monthly, seasonally unadjusted counts of UDES nonagricultural 
job openings and Utah UI initial claims, 1947 – 196318 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Monthly, seasonally unadjusted counts of UDES 
new applicants, 1947 – 196319 
                                                 
18 Source:  Utah Department of Workforce Services 





























Figure 4.7. Monthly, seasonally unadjusted counts of UDES individuals tested 
and nonagricultural job openings, 1947 – 196320 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Monthly, seasonally unadjusted counts of UDES counseling interviews 
and individuals tested, 1947 – 196321 
                                                 
20 Source: Utah Department of Workforce Services 


































Figure 4.9. Scatter plot between Utah unemployed growth rate and UDES job openings 




Figure 4.10. Scatter plot between UDES new applicant growth rate and job openings 






Figure 4.11. Scatter plot between UI initial claims growth rate and new applicant growth 
rate with 95% prediction ellipse 
 
 
Figure 4.12. Scatter plot between UDES individuals tested growth rate and job 






Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics of seasonally adjusted growth rate variables 
 N Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum 
Job Openings 179 0.10556 13.73221 0.03424 -38.51956 54.66103 
Unemployed 179 0.12574 9.87544 0.02272 -34.13062 34.34410 
Initial Claims 179 0.36065 24.10734 0.97228 -76.36381 100.85001 
New Applicants 179 0.06097 19.45062 -1.19116 -50.52624 70.36068 
Individuals Tested 179 1.35486 29.19926 1.87326 -106.27850 116.97896 
Counseling Interviews 179 0.52713 21.10861 -0.87173 -57.18709 56.88019 
 


























































































Table 4.3.  Corrected Akaike Information Criterion results 
AR 
Lag of Independent Variables 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
0 10.76032 10.75793 10.78339 10.80091 10.84904 10.89368 
1 10.45687 10.43726 10.45097 10.45617 10.47954 10.54160 
2 10.36335 10.36738 10.39752 10.42021 10.44680 10.50888 
3 10.36118 10.35790 10.39424 10.43262 10.46674 10.51579 
4 10.34209 10.34513 10.38760 10.44269 10.49549 10.54868 
5 10.35788 10.36243 10.41616 10.48023 10.54925 10.59626 
6 10.35533 10.37217 10.43777 10.51839 10.57453 10.62997 
7 10.29612 10.29448 10.35467 10.43032 10.50907 10.57172 
8 10.33385 10.33778 10.39193 10.47135 10.52914 10.59337 
9 10.34712 10.35307 10.42092 10.49421 10.55026 10.62036 












t Value Pr > |t| 
Counseling Growth Rate t 0.11235 0.04434 2.53 0.0123 
Counseling Growth Rate t-1 -0.00920 0.04428 -0.21 0.8357 
Initial Claims Growth Rate t 0.06732 0.05038 1.34 0.1835 
Initial Claims Growth Rate t-1 -0.01137 0.05223 -0.22 0.8279 
Testing Growth Rate t 0.07568 0.03273 2.31 0.0221 
Testing Growth Rate t-1 -0.03985 0.03466 -1.15 0.2521 
Unemployed Growth Rate t -0.51809 0.11465 -4.52 0.0001 
Unemployed Growth Rate t-1 -0.15733 0.11154 -1.41 0.1605 
New Applicant Growth Rate t-1 0.09155 0.05919 1.55 0.1240 
New Applicant Growth Ratet-2 -0.02236 0.06802 -0.33 0.7428 
New Applicant Growth Ratet-3 -0.06646 0.06982 -0.95 0.3427 
New Applicant Growth Rate t-4 -0.11827 0.06814 -1.74 0.0847 
New Applicant Growth Ratet-5 -0.02094 0.06610 -0.32 0.7518 
New Applicant Growth Ratet-6 -0.01054 0.06176 -0.17 0.8647 
New Applicant Growth Rate t-7 -0.01760 0.05321 -0.33 0.7412 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-1 -0.44839 0.07873 -5.70 0.0001 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-2 -0.14053 0.08276 -1.70 0.0916 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-3 0.19982 0.08198 2.44 0.0160 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-4 0.04991 0.08096 0.62 0.5385 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-5 0.01786 0.08336 0.21 0.8306 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-6 0.01314 0.08006 0.16 0.8699 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-7 -0.00689 0.07149 -0.10 0.9234 
 
 
Table 4.5. F-Test results for employer behavior 
Variable DF F Value Pr > F 
All F(15, 149) 4.43 <.0001 
New Applicants  F(7,149) 1.03 0.4134 
Unemployment F(2,149) 9.44 0.0001 
Initial Claims F(2,149) 0.14 0.8727 
Testing F(2,149) 2.68 0.0717 









t Value Pr > |t| 
Counseling Growth Rate t 0.08027 0.06074 1.32 0.1883 
Counseling Growth Rate t-1 0.10202 0.06066 1.68 0.0947 
Initial Claims Growth Rate t 0.34099 0.06901 4.94 0.0001 
Initial Claims Growth Rate t-1 0.18470 0.07154 2.58 0.0108 
Testing Growth Rate t 0.09462 0.04483 2.11 0.0365 
Testing Growth Rate t-1 -0.01409 0.04748 -0.30 0.7670 
Unemployed Growth Rate t -0.18694 0.15705 -1.19 0.2358 
Unemployed Growth Rate t-1 0.00413 0.15279 0.03 0.9784 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-1 0.08550 0.10785 0.79 0.4292 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-2 -0.09115 0.11337 -0.80 0.4227 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-3 -0.04636 0.11230 -0.41 0.6803 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-4 -0.10944 0.11090 -0.99 0.3253 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-5 -0.09998 0.11419 -0.88 0.3827 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-6 -0.13346 0.10967 -1.22 0.2256 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-7 -0.00713 0.09792 -0.07 0.9420 
New Applicant Growth Rate t-1 -0.60397 0.08108 -7.45 0.0001 
New Applicant Growth Ratet-2 -0.46552 0.09318 -5.00 0.0001 
New Applicant Growth Ratet-3 -0.38225 0.09564 -4.00 0.0001 
New Applicant Growth Rate t-4 -0.35214 0.09334 -3.77 0.0002 
New Applicant Growth Ratet-5 -0.35024 0.09054 -3.87 0.0002 
New Applicant Growth Ratet-6 -0.21101 0.08460 -2.49 0.0137 
New Applicant Growth Rate t-7 -0.13472 0.07288 -1.85 0.0665 
 
Table 4.7. F-Test results for job seeker behavior 
Variable DF F Value Pr > F 
All F(15, 149) 3.77 <.0001 
Job Openings  F(7,149) 1.26 0.2724 
Unemployment F(2,149) 0.63 0.5351 
Initial Claims F(2,149) 12.54 <.0001 
Testing F(2,149) 1.44 0.2413 






THREE POLICY REGIMES: 1947 - 1981 
 
5.1 Background 
The USES, together with its partner SESA, operate a public labor exchange 
platform.  This paper investigates whether or not that this platform is two-sided, giving 
the ability for USES policy to coordinate the behavior of employers and job seekers and 
maximize transaction volume (Evans, 2003).  This coordination would come by way of 
strategic subsidies implemented as various services provided by USES to encourage 
employer and job seeker participation. 
One feature of two-sided platforms is the presence of indirect network 
externalities in the behavior of the agents using the platform: One group of agents (Group 
B) will only participate on the platform if another group of agents (Group A) participates 
first.   Therefore, the degree to which the intermediary can provide strategic subsidies to 
Group A will likely determine the intermediary’s ability to influence the participation of 
both Group A and Group B. 
The previous chapter analyzed monthly administrative data from the UDES 
during the Foundational Period of the USES (1947 – 1963) to test this hypothesis.  The 





employer behavior.  Employers post more jobs as employment demand increases and if 
they believe qualified job seekers use the USES platform as well.  By providing 
employment counseling and aptitude testing to job seekers, UDES was able to positively 
influence employers to participate. 
This chapter plays a critical role in the next step of the analysis as it captures a 
longer history of UDES activities and subsequently, a better understanding of employer 
and job seeker behavior.  In addition, this longer period of time encompasses two 
additional policy regimes that placed greater emphasis on the provision of services to job 
seekers.  Both the MDTA and CETA legislation packages, along with the corresponding 
labor-focused programs, attempted to develop a far more sophisticated job seeker 
development infrastructure.  This data set will facilitate the analysis of whether these 
policy shifts influenced the participation of employers and job seekers. 
 
5.1.1 Historical Context 
During the early 1960s, the USES underwent a significant policy shift.  Following 
World War II, and throughout the 1950s, the SESA were largely focused on finding the 
most qualified candidates for employers who used its service.  However, this focus 
dramatically shifted to the job seeker during the 1960s. 
One of the first signs of change occurred during President Kennedy’s first 
Economic Message to Congress in which he directed the Secretary of Labor “to take 
necessary steps to provide better service for unemployed insurance claimants and other 






Substantial job seeker-focused legislation also became the hallmark of the 1960s.  
The Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 (ARA) required SESA offices to provide 
unemployment information to the U.S. Department of Commerce for areas experiencing 
economic distress.  The U.S. Department of Commerce would then use the information to 
determine federal assistance.  In addition, the SESA assisted in the training efforts for the 
unemployed in economically depressed areas by selecting job seekers to be trained and 
placing them in jobs once training was complete (Ainsworth, 1991). 
In addition, three significant pieces of legislation directed a large portion of SESA 
resources away from its established labor exchange activities.  The Manpower 
Development and Training Act of 1962 (MDTA), the Vocational Education Act of 1963, 
and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (EOA) focused the SESA on job training and 
human resource development activities.  The EOA was actually part of the War on 
Poverty legislation established in 1964 that led to a reorientation of the USES.  The 
SESA would now seek out the disadvantaged rather than waiting for them to come to the 
SESA to apply for services (Claque & Kramer, 1976).  By 1965, the SESA concentrated 
much of its efforts on low-income and disadvantaged workers (Ainsworth, 1991; 
Balducchi, 1997).     
Similarly, the MDTA sought to locate jobs for as many of the unemployed as 
possible, upgrade the labor force and provide an escape from poverty (Clague & Kramer, 
1976).  In order to fully comply with these objectives, the USES had to adopt an entirely 





agencies” (Levitan & Mangum, 1967).  This new emphasis is evident in the words of 
Louis Levine who assumed the role of ES Director in 1962: 
The ES “shall not operate merely as a system of labor exchanges but must 
take on expanded responsibilities as a manpower agency concerned with 
all aspects of manpower.  Each local office must serve as the local 
community manpower center and, beyond that, must also function in a 
strongly-linked nationwide network of offices operating to meet national 
manpower purposes and goals.” (quoted in Nemore & Mangum, 1968, p. 
8) 
 
With this new approach came different performance goals.  For instance, the 
SESA had to follow a rule where one-third of placements involved less qualified job 
seekers (Clague & Kramer, 1976).  Frank Cassell, who became administrator of the 
USES early in 1966, described the change in mission from “screening out” to “screening 
in” (Levitan & Mangum, 1967). 
Later, in FY 1967, Operation Mainstream was launched with the goal of aiding 
unemployed workers over the age of 55 who lacked in-demand skills by placing them in 
unsubsidized employment.  While this program was typically sponsored by Community 
Action Agencies (CAA's), the SESA offices were called upon to provide the placement 
services when the CAA's were unable to do so (Claque & Kramer, 1976). 
This focus continued into the 1970s.  For example, under the Nixon 
administration, the departments of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Department of 
Labor sifted through AFDC rolls to locate employable persons.  The SESA would then 
attempt to place these individuals in training or employment.  In some instances, 
placement of WIN clients actually replaced ES activities directed toward UI claimants 





The 1970s also featured the “new federalism” policy of the Nixon Administration 
due to the numerous failed attempts of the 1960s legislative efforts to meet local needs.  
New federalism maintained that the federal government is the best source of tax revenue 
but that local governments are in the best position to manage programs to respond to 
local needs.  This local bias eventually led to the development of the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act (CETA) in 1973 which replaced MDTA in 1962, 
emphasizing more localized control over training efforts. 
While CETA still reflected a desire to provide training to job seekers, it also 
divested much of the job training efforts away from the SESA and reestablished the labor 
exchange activities as the central purpose of the SESA (Balducchi, 1997).  This enabled 
SESA offices to focus on improving employer relations through the use of the Employer 
Services Improvement Program (ESIP).  This program established Employer Advisory 
Committees (EACs) that would coordinate with task forces comprised of personnel from 
local ES offices designed to improve services to employers and subsequently increase 
employer usage of ES services.  This program replaced the Employer Service 
Representatives (ESRs) which served a relatively small role during the MDTA years 
(Chadwin et al., 1977).  In addition, the USES issued a directive in 1975 admonishing 
SESA not to divert ES staff to UI activities.  It is not clear to what degree this directive 








5.1.2 National Context 
SESA administrative data for this period are quite limited.  Consequently, only 
Utah will be analyzed.  However, this necessitates an understanding of how well Utah 
reflects the United States labor market.  As can be seen in Figure 5.1, while the Utah and 
United States unemployment rates were relatively similar from 1950 to 1956, more 
significant differences can be observed from 1957 through 1981.  From 1957 through the 
end of the Foundational Period, Utah labor demand was much stronger than that in the 
United States as a whole.  However, during the entirety of the MDTA period, 1963 to 
1971, labor demand across the United States was far stronger than in Utah.  This 
discrepancy was at its highest during 1969.   
However, during the CETA period, Utah experienced a much lower 
unemployment rate.  In fact, while the United States witnessed its highest levels during 
this period in from 1973 to 1975, Utah’s weaker labor demand was leveling off.   From 
1975 through 1979, the unemployment rates of Utah and United States dropped 
significantly only to begin climbing again toward the end of this period. 
 
5.1.3 Theoretical Context 
This policy shift focused the intermediary role of the SESA from one that 
exploited the indirect network externalities in employer behavior to one that prioritized 
the underprivileged job seeker.  During the previous period, the SESA operated with the 
perspective that employers will continue to participate if the SESA focus on referring the 





shifted to an intermediary role that sought to “add value” to job seekers through 
vocational training aimed at increasing their wage earning ability and employment 
potential. 
This desire to add value to job seekers lessened the focus on providing the job 
seeker testing subsidy which benefitted employers in the past by reducing the moral 
hazards of using the SESA.  In fact, when the USES incorporated the policy of requiring 
one-third of placements to come from lesser qualified candidates, this subsidy to 
employers was substantially eroded.  It is not surprising, then, that Rees (1966), Edwards 
and Krislov (1971), and Bull, Ornati and Tedeschi (1987) all find that employers were 
dissuaded from using the SESA due to poor screening efforts.   
 
5.1.4 Testing the Hypothesis 
This chapter will analyze the UDES administrative data from 1947 to 1981 to 
further test the hypothesis that the USES in partnership with SESA operates as a two-
sided platform and can use strategic subsidies to coordinate employer and job seeker 
behavior.  While the data set used is longer than that of the previous chapter, its limited 
scope constrains the extent of the investigation.  Thus, the analysis in this chapter will 
explore (1) how employment demand affects employer participation, (2) the impact of 
job seeker participation on employer participation, (3) the impact of UI benefits on the 
participation of employers, (3) how employment demand affects job seeker participation, 
(4) whether job seeker behavior is influenced by the number of job openings posted, (5) 





changes had on employer and job seeker participation. 
 
5.2 Data 
5.2.1 Data Sources 
The data set used to test the hypothesis is an extension of the set used in the 
previous chapter which analyzed 1947 – 1963.  The base data set was constructed 
uniquely for this analysis by the author from two U.S. government publications: the 
Social Security Bulletin (1947-1949) and the Labor Market and Employment Security 
monthly report (1949 – 1954) as well as annual reports published by the Utah Department 
of Employment Security (UDES) from 1947 to 1963.  UDES operated the SES in Utah 
during this period of time in partnership with the USES. 
To extend this data set, the author assembled data from 1964 to 1981 using ES 
activity counts published monthly in the UDES publication The Employment Newsletter 
and employment indicators published in UDES annual reports.  UI data for this period 
were obtained from the Unemployment Insurance Review and Unemployment Insurance 
Statistics from 1964 to 1970 and directly from the USDOL from 1971 through 1981. 
This combination of data sources produces a data set with four key monthly 
variables: unemployment levels, UI initial claims, job openings and new applicant counts.  
Unfortunately, counts of individuals tested and counseling interviews are not available at 
the monthly level for this time period. 
The data elements that will be analyzed in this chapter have been described in the 






Similar to the previous chapter, employment demand will be represented with 
unemployment levels. As a matchmaking intermediary, each SESA also has to contend 
with fluctuating aggregate demand and search costs for each participating group.  Thus, it 
is expected that employers will post more jobs when unemployment is low and job 
seekers will thus require the UI subsidy to maintain participation when unemployment is 
high. 
 To provide context for this chapter, Figure 5.2 displays seasonally unadjusted 
unemployment levels divided by the labor force.  In contrast to the previous chapter 
which ended in 1963, this chapter features declining unemployment to 1967 and then 
increasing until 1972.  This cycle reflects the breadth of the MDTA legislation.  During 
the CETA policy regime, unemployment was largely on the decline with the exception of 
an upswing in 1975 and later in 1981.   
 
5.2.1.2 UI Initial Claims 
UI Initial claims reflect counts of individuals attempting to claim UI benefits, not 
necessarily those who meet the requirements.  Typically, workers file for UI when they 
cannot find a job; however, receiving UI benefits requires claimants to register for work 
at the SES unless they can expect to return to their employer after a particular season.  
Consequently, the filing of UI initial claims frequently leads to increases in SES job 
seeker registrations. 





One difference between this series and the abbreviated series used in the previous chapter 
is the shift in relationship between new applicants and UI initial claims that takes place in 
the late 1960s and persists throughout the rest of the series.  From the late 1960s to 1981, 
counts of new applicants appear to be consistently higher in relation to UI claims than for 
the first part of the series.  This shift is likely due to the substantial legislation targeting 
job seekers during this period and encouraging their participation independent of market 
conditions.   
This participation was made possible because many of these individuals were not 
working previously and subsequently not even eligible to receive UI benefits.  However, 
the prospect of prioritized placement or subsidized training encouraged job seeker 
participation. 
A similar phenomenon occurs with UI initial claims and job openings in 1973 as 
can be seen in Figure 5.4 where the relative magnitude of job openings increases when 
compared to initial claims.  This may be due to the impact of CETA legislation and heavy 
emphasis on training prior to that point.  It is possible that Job seekers were participating 
to get training (and thus no UI benefits) and as the economy recovered, employers posted 
jobs with UDES to access the trained workforce.   
Nevertheless, despite this shift, UI initial claims continue to fluctuate in the 
opposite direction to job openings throughout this extended period. Thus, while training 
and legislation may have impacted job seeker and employer behavior, the two forces 
which have tended to drive job seeker participation in the past continued to move in 





5.2.1.3 New Applicants 
New applicants are those job seekers who registered for SESA job services.  
Specifically, a new application is the initiation of a 12-month window for which a job 
seeker can use and later reuse SESA services.  Thus, new applicants represent the event 
in which a job seeker creates a new registration for ES services. 
As stated in the previous chapter, new applicant counts should not be confused 
with first time new applicants.  For example, after making a new application, a job seeker 
may use the SES, get referred to a job, become unemployed and reactivate their 
registration.  Under that scenario, there is one new application for that 12-month period. 
As can be expected from previous analysis in this chapter, the policy shifts 
covered in this chapter will be most reflected in counts of new applicants.  Figure 5.5 
compares counts of new applicants with job openings.  The implementation of the MDTA 
and CETA legislative efforts is immediately evident with the spike in new applicant 
counts in the 1960s as job seekers participate for the subsidy of training, not just the 
prospect of employment. 
 
5.2.1.4 Job Openings 
Employer participation on the USES platform is measured by counts of posted job 
openings.  When employers were in need of workers for jobs at their firms, they 
voluntarily notified UDES.  UDES in turn made an effort to notify job seekers registered 
with the UDES by posting these jobs on a public bulletin board giving rise to the term 






Each job posted with UDES was counted as a job opening for reporting purposes.  
UDES reported these job openings across two categories: agricultural and 
nonagricultural.  This classification was used because agricultural job openings tended to 
be temporary and highly seasonal in nature.  Agricultural job openings also comprised a 
very small portion of total job openings, especially as the Utah economy developed over 
the next several decades.  Consequently, while this research analysis will utilize the term 
“Job Openings” throughout, it will only examine counts of nonagricultural job openings.   
The significance of aptitude testing for employers in the previous chapter would 
suggest the policy shift to MDTA will negatively impact the participation of employers 
due to the decreased emphasis on job seeker validation.  Figure 5.6 displays counts of job 
openings with unemployment levels and suggests this prediction may have some validity.  
During the MDTA policy regime from 1963 to 1973, job openings appear flat even as 
employment demand fluctuates.  This shift appears to end somewhat with the passing of 
CETA in 1974 as the relationship between unemployment and job openings appears to be 
restored. 
It could be argued that lower job opening counts would be expected during 
periods of rising unemployment.  However, the impact of MDTA actually affects job 
seekers in a similar fashion.  Figure 5.7 displays counts of new applicants alongside 
unemployment levels.  Note the similar behavior of new applicants and job openings.  
Despite increasing unemployment levels, there is little corresponding increase in new 





5.2.1.5 Policy Indicator Variables 
The impact on employer and job seeker behavior brought about by MDTA and 
CETA legislation necessitates a mechanism to isolate these policy regimes from the 
Foundational Period of 1947 to 1963.  To that end, policy indicator variables were 




Because counts of individuals tested did not begin until January 1949, the 
previous chapter had to shorten the data set so all variables had the same start date.  
However, because this data set does not include individuals tested, this data set can 
include data as far back as January 1947.   Also, similar to the previous chapter, no 
outlying data points have been removed from the data set, even though The Korean War 
Conflict impacts each variable during the early portion of the 1950s. 
In addition, because UDES did not make any seasonal adjustments to the reported 
data, each variable was adjusted for seasonality based on the X-12-ARIMA procedure 
developed by the United States Census Bureau.  This seasonal adjustment was selected 
because of its common usage, including its use by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 
the administrator of the unemployment reporting methodology.  This approach, as 
opposed to including dummy variables, for example, better facilitates the introduction of 
this new data set because the seasonal adjustments are easily carried into the univariate 





Each data series was also converted to a natural log growth rate.  The X-12-
ARIMA approach simplified the final transformation which was the conversion to a 
natural log growth rate according to the formula found in Equation 5.1 below. 
 
 𝒘�𝑡 =  ln (𝑥𝑡) −  ln (𝑥𝑡−1) (5.1) 
 
5.2.3 Univariate and Bivariate Analysis 
This chapter facilitates the ability to understand the relationship between the 
growth rates of these series across an USES policy shift beginning with MDTA in 1962.  
Before investigating these relationships, the properties of each series are examined.  
Table 5.1 displays the descriptive statistics of each series.  Both job openings and 
new applicants reflect a positive skew, with new applicants exhibiting the more 
substantial skew of the two.   This could be the byproduct of two decades of job seeker 
focused policies included in the data set.  This supposition appears to be strengthened 
with the negative skewness of unemployment during this same period although the 
positive skewness of UI claims diminishes this assertion somewhat.   
 Pearson correlation analysis was conducted on this data set similar to the previous 
chapter.  As can be seen in Table 5.2, while many of the statistically significant 
relationships are the same as before, there are some differences.  This is critical since this 
data set extends that of the previous chapter. 
 To further illustrate these correlations, scatter plots are provided.  Each of these 





where 𝛼 = 0.05. 
   
 
𝜋 =  2(𝑛 + 1)
𝑛 − 2 𝐹2,𝑛−2(1 − 𝛼) (5.2) 
 
 
One such difference is the relationship between new applicants and 
unemployment.  From 1949 to 1963, the correlation was not sizeable and more 
importantly, not statistically significant.  However, from 1947 to 1981, there is a 0.18308 
correlation between the two that is statistically significant.  This relationship can further 
be seen by the scatter plot in Figure 5.8.  Thus, new applicant counts became much more 
linked with fluctuations in unemployment.  This suggests usage of the UDES was tied 
more to employment demand rather than exploited indirect network externalities.  
Nevertheless, the correlation between job openings and new applicant counts was 
slightly higher over this longer period of time than during 1949 – 1963 as evident in 
Figure 5.9.  Similarly, the correlation between job openings and unemployment was less 
during this period as was the correlation between UI claims and unemployment.  These 
relationships can be seen in Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11, respectively. 
 
5.3 Model Results 
As in the previous chapter, to test the hypothesis, employer and job seeker UDES 
participation will be analyzed with a VARX(6,1) model across t months according to 























where p=1,2, r=6 and s=1,  𝑗𝑡 denotes job openings, 𝑛𝑡 represents new applicants, 𝑢𝑡 and 
𝑚𝑡, represent unemployment and UI initial claims while 𝜖𝑡 represents a white noise 
process. 22 
 Several parameters were considered in the selection of this model.  
Autoregressive orders of p=0,...,10 and lags of s=0,…,5 were examined.  The parameters 
of p=6 and s=1 exhibited the lowest AICc of 9.973061 as can be seen in Table 5.3. 
As in the previous chapter, the current term (t=0) was included in this model for 
the independent variables due to the nature of employer and job seeker logistics when 
using the SES.  Many of the activities took place within the same month such as when a 
job seeker files a UI claim, he or she needs to immediately register for the labor exchange 
if they were not returning to their employer at a later date.  Similarly, when the job seeker 
explores the job opportunities at the SES, he or she typically must register in order to get 
referred for that job or even to apply.  Thus, new applications tend to occur in the same 
day the job seeker identifies a potential job. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Following Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980), tests were performed for the presence of 
multicollinearity across independent variables along with Variance Inflation Factor analysis.  No indication 





5.3.1 Employer Behavior: Job Openings Posted 
The results of the employer regression analysis can be viewed in Table 5.4 while 
the F-Test results for all the variables are displayed in Table 5.5.  The regression results 
indicate statistically significant autoregressive terms at t-1 and t-2 which exhibit negative 
influences on the dependent variable j, reflecting a cycle of employer behavior that 
fluctuates over 3 months.  This is similar to the 4-month cycle observed in the previous 
chapter. 
Consistent with the findings of the previous chapter, employers appear to post 
more jobs when unemployment is lower.  This is evident in the regression results in Table 
5.4 as well as the F-Tests in Table 5.5.  Thus, the challenge remains for the USES to 
coordinate the behavior of employers when their demand for workers continues to 
fluctuate.  
There also appears to be no indication of employers participating simply because 
of the number of job seekers available on the USES platform as is evidenced by the 
regression and F-Test results. No new application coefficients in the regression are 
statistically significant and the F-Test results for new applicants show no statistical 
significance either. 
This is also consistent with the previous chapter as it was the presence of qualified 
job seekers on the USES platform that encouraged employer participation.   With testing 
and employment counseling not being available for this data set, investigating further 
consistency between the time periods is unfortunately not possible. 





results seems to suggest some degree of employer participation predicated upon that of 
job seekers.  But, given that fact that the F-Tests suggest very little predictive nature of 
this relationship, it seems most likely this is merely coincidental in nature.  While 
unemployment and initial claims demonstrate a positive correlation (0.36772) as is 
evident in Table 5.2, it is likely that job openings and initial claims simply move in the 
same direction when initial claims are not correlated with unemployment.  Thus, there 
appears to be no evidence of indirect network externalities present. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is possible that UI initial claims requires 
a much longer period to demonstrate its impact on employer participation.  Consequently, 
the nature of this model may not have identified such an effect.  However, the next two 
chapters analyze annual data and may provide a better vantage point. 
Policy indicator variables were also included in the model to test for the 
significance of the Foundational Period policy regime of the previous chapter and the 
CETA regime compared to MDTA.  The regression results and F-Tests indicate policy 
did not alter employer behavior during this period. 
Thus, when viewing employer participation with UDES from 1947 to 1981, no 
evidence of indirect network externalities can be found.  This may be the result of the 
limited scope of the data, as it was employment counseling and aptitude testing which 
generated indirect network externalities in the previous chapter.  Unfortunately, these 







5.3.2 Job Seeker Behavior: New Applications 
The regression estimates for job seeker behavior are displayed in Table 5.6 with 
the results of the F-Tests displayed in Table 5.7.  Based on the significance of the 
autoregressive terms for new applicant counts, it appears the process of job seeker 
behavior spans a 6-month cycle similar to the previous chapter. 
 Unlike the previous chapter, employment demand does demonstrate a significant 
impact on job seeker behavior.  The regression and F-Test results indicate job seekers are 
more likely to participate when unemployment is higher.  Unfortunately, this is the 
opposite of employers who are more likely to participate when unemployment is lower.  
Yet, if the USES operates as a two-sided platform, it will have the ability to utilize 
subsidies to coordinate the participation of employers and job seekers, offsetting their 
opposing participation inclinations. 
 In addition to higher unemployment, UI initial claims also exert a positive, 
predictive impact on job seeker participation.  This can be seen in the regression and F-
Test results.  However, what also is clear is the lack of impact job openings has on job 
seeker participation.  Consistent with the previous chapter, this suggests no evidence of 
indirect network externalities in the behavior of job seekers.    
 As was discussed in the employer analysis, to explore the role of policy regimes, 
policy indicators were included in the regression to determine whether the policies of the 
Foundational Period or CETA, relative to MDTA, influenced employer or job seeker 
behavior.  As can be seen in the regression results in Table 5.6 and the F-Tests in Table 





participation was influenced only by employment demand and UI benefits during this 
period. 
However, this lack of effect should not be construed as an indictment on the 
MDTA and CETA policies.  These were the first substantial attempts by US DOL and 
related agencies to improve the outcomes of job seekers.  Furthermore, because the USES 
was only one of many players in this effort, and often on the outside of the primary 
delivery of services, it is not surprising that policy appears to have no effect.  In fact, it 
was the growing disparity and lack of coordination of services that continued past the 
period covered in this chapter that led to substantial reforms such as the ES Revitalization 
plan in 1992. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter built upon the findings of Chapter 4 by investigating monthly UDES 
data from 1947 to 1981.  This extended data series enabled the analysis of USES policy 
shifts that began with MDTA in 1962 and CETA in 1974.  At the center of these shifts 
was a prioritization of the needs of job seekers over the needs of employers.  Thus, UDES 
became less focused on providing the most qualified candidate to employers and more 
focused on ensuring disadvantaged job seekers were served. 
However, in terms of UDES activity, the policy changes appeared to have no 
effect.  Employers continued to post more jobs when unemployment was lower and job 
seekers continued to participate when unemployment was higher.   





evident in the behavior of employers or job seekers.  However, this could simply be a 
function of the data set used.  Employment counseling and aptitude testing, two services 
to job seekers that demonstrated a positive influence on employer participation in Chapter 
4, are not available in this data set.  Furthermore, it is possible the impact of UI initial 
claims on employer participation may be longer in duration and be more easily observed 
in the annual data sets in the upcoming chapters. 
The next chapter will continue the analysis to an even broader historical context, 
examining annual data from 1947 to 2002.  This will provide the longest series available 
to investigate employer and job seeker participation with the UDES as well as the role of 
the UI, aptitude testing and employment counseling subsidies.  In addition, because this 
data set spans an even longer period of time, additional policy investigation will be 







Figure 5.1. Utah vs. United States,23 average annual unemployment rate, 1950 - 198124 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Utah monthly, seasonally unadjusted unemployment rate, 1947 - 198125 
                                                 
23 Source: Utah Department of Workforce Services and Bureau of Labor Statistics 
24 Comparable unemployment rate data are not available prior to 1950. 












































Figure 5.3. Monthly, seasonally unadjusted counts of Utah UI initial claims 
and UDES new applicants, 1947 - 198126 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Monthly, seasonally unadjusted counts of Utah UI initial claims 
and UDES nonagricultural job openings, 1947 - 198127 
                                                 
26 Source: Utah Department of Workforce Services 

































Figure 5.5. Monthly, seasonally unadjusted counts of UDES new applicants 
and nonagricultural openings, 1947 - 198128 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Monthly, seasonally unadjusted counts of Utah unemployment levels 
and UDES nonagricultural openings, 1947 - 198129 
                                                 
28 Source: Utah Department of Workforce Services 




































Figure 5.7. Monthly, seasonally unadjusted counts of Utah unemployment levels 
and UDES new applicants, 1947 – 198130 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Scatter plot between Utah unemployed growth rate and UDES new 
applicant growth rate with 95% prediction ellipse, 1947 – 1981 
                                                 






















Figure 5.9. Scatter plot between UDES new applicant growth rate and job openings 
growth rate with 95% prediction ellipse, 1947 – 1981 
 
 
Figure 5.10. Scatter plot between Utah unemployment growth rate and UDES job 






Figure 5.11. Scatter plot between Utah UI initial claims growth rate and unemployment 








Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics of seasonally adjusted growth rate variables 
 N Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum 
Job Openings 414 0.17893 12.81384 0.52056 -47.40687 57.42341 
Unemployed 414 0.33146 8.64261 0.50475 -61.38412 45.10516 
Initial Claims 414 0.37270 19.44038 0.53955 -84.92435 100.73828 
New Applicants 414 0.31164 17.07865 -0.33306 -54.07247 82.03346 
 
Table 5.2. Pearson Correlation coefficients of growth rates 































Table 5.3. Corrected Akaike Information Criterion results 
AR 
Lag of Independent Variables 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
0 10.55625 10.56351 10.57275 10.55243 10.53934 10.55883 
1 10.22848 10.20793 10.21469 10.18396 10.16848 10.16819 
2 10.05613 10.04489 10.05061 10.01218 10.00598 9.992309 
3 10.00520 9.983884 9.995028 9.996762 9.994369 9.982829 
4 9.990868 9.975007 9.987432 9.996016 9.979496 9.968866 
5 9.982976 9.968791 9.982109 9.993503 9.988305 9.973957 
6 9.973061 9.962680 9.975711 9.989179 9.984603 9.974817 
7 9.981144 9.970906 9.983633 9.997547 9.994472 9.982607 
8 9.989254 9.977054 9.990711 10.00555 10.00358 9.989898 
9 9.990726 9.977023 9.990788 10.00543 10.00052 9.980404 










t Value Pr > |t| 
Constant 0.82354 0.98309 0.84 0.4027 
Initial Claims Growth Rate t 0.07763 0.03571 2.17 0.0303 
Initial Claims Growth Rate t-1 0.03119 0.03622 0.86 0.3897 
Unemployed Growth Rate t -0.40965 0.07171 -5.71 0.0001 
Unemployed Growth Rate t-1 -0.15121 0.07402 -2.04 0.0417 
CETA t -0.10091 1.48853 -0.07 0.9460 
Foundational Period t -0.36774 1.24059 -0.30 0.7671 
New Applicant Growth Rate t-1 0.06634 0.04183 1.59 0.1136 
New Applicant Growth Ratet-2 0.05099 0.04699 1.09 0.2785 
New Applicant Growth Ratet-3 0.02045 0.04671 0.44 0.6618 
New Applicant Growth Rate t-4 -0.08055 0.04536 -1.78 0.0765 
New Applicant Growth Ratet-5 -0.06290 0.04316 -1.46 0.1458 
New Applicant Growth Ratet-6 -0.02823 0.03741 -0.75 0.4510 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-1 -0.56140 0.05264 -10.67 0.0001 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-2 -0.31783 0.05584 -5.69 0.0001 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-3 0.01968 0.05657 0.35 0.7281 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-4 -0.00744 0.05691 -0.13 0.8961 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-5 0.08879 0.05545 1.60 0.1101 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-6 0.08779 0.04965 1.77 0.0778 
 
Table 5.5. F-Test results for employer behavior 
Variable DF F Value Pr > F 
All F(12,388) 5.05 <.0001 
New Applicants F(6,388) 1.59 0.1478 
Unemployment F(2,388) 20.58 <.0001 
Initial Claims F(2,388 0.32 0.7290 
CETA F(1,388) 0.00 0.9856 











t Value Pr > |t| 
Constant 1.16328 1.23694 0.94 0.3476 
Initial Claims Growth Rate t 0.21327 0.04493 4.75 0.0001 
Initial Claims Growth Rate t-1 0.09540 0.04558 2.09 0.0370 
Unemployed Growth Rate t 0.24664 0.09022 2.73 0.0065 
Unemployed Growth Rate t-1 0.07429 0.09313 0.80 0.4255 
CETA t -0.73688 1.87290 -0.39 0.6942 
Foundational Period t -0.32767 1.56093 -0.21 0.8338 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-1 -0.00356 0.06623 -0.05 0.9571 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-2 -0.10680 0.07025 -1.52 0.1293 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-3 -0.01827 0.07118 -0.26 0.7976 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-4 -0.04073 0.07161 -0.57 0.5698 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-5 -0.09988 0.06977 -1.43 0.1531 
Job Openings Growth Rate t-6 -0.01126 0.06247 -0.18 0.8571 
New Applicant Growth Rate t-1 -0.59493 0.05264 -11.30 0.0001 
New Applicant Growth Ratet-2 -0.39571 0.05912 -6.69 0.0001 
New Applicant Growth Ratet-3 -0.24561 0.05877 -4.18 0.0001 
New Applicant Growth Rate t-4 -0.23431 0.05707 -4.11 0.0001 
New Applicant Growth Ratet-5 -0.15280 0.05430 -2.81 0.0051 
New Applicant Growth Ratet-6 -0.10414 0.04707 -2.21 0.0275 
 
Table 5.7. F-Test results for job seeker behavior 
Variable DF F Value Pr > F 
All F(12,388) 8.93 <.0001 
Job Openings F(6,388) 1.52 0.1692 
Unemployment F(2,388) 8.31 0.0003 
Initial Claims F(2,388) 12.37 <.0001 
CETA F(1,388) 0.30 0.5863 






THE ANNUAL PERSPECTIVE: 1947 - 2002 
 
6.1 Background 
The USES, in partnership with SESA, operates the US public labor exchange 
platform which seeks to match employers and job seekers.  This paper investigates 
whether or not this platform is two-sided, meaning that the USES and SESA can use 
strategic subsidies to coordinate the participation of employers and job seekers and 
maximize transaction volume (Evans, 2003).  These subsidies would be effective due to 
the presence of indirect network externalities: One group participates because of another 
group.  Thus, the subsidies (services) provided to one group would lead to increased 
participation by the other. 
The previous two chapters analyzed monthly UDES administrative data to test 
this hypothesis.  Chapter 4 investigated the behavior of employers and job seekers during 
the Foundational Period of the modern USES from 1947 to 1963 along with three 
potential strategic subsidies: UI benefits, job seeker testing and employment counseling.  
Chapter 5 analyzed a longer period of UDES history from 1947 to 1981 focusing on 
employer and job seeker behavior as well as the UI subsidy and the role of three policy 





The results from both of these chapters suggest the USES does operate as an 
intermediary on a two-sided platform:  When UDES provided job seekers with 
employment counseling and aptitude testing, this positively influenced the participation 
of employers.  This is because these services exploited the indirect network externalities 
present in employer behavior:  Employers will participate if they believe they can find 
qualified job seekers on the USES platform. 
However, despite three different policy regimes spanning this period of analysis, 
there appeared to be no impact on employer or job seeker behavior.  While this may be 
due to the fact that many of the policy changes affected agencies other than UDES, it still 
requires additional investigation. 
This chapter analyzes UDES/UDWS annual data from 1947 to 2002 to further test 
this hypothesis.  This longer data set broadens the analysis of policy to include two new 
regimes: JTPA and the ES Revitalization which bridged the transition from JTPA to 
WIA.  The data set also includes data on the job seeker testing and counseling subsidies, 
variables that were not present in Chapter 5.   
 
6.1.1 Historical Context 
The 1980s brought about a major shift toward increased decentralization of the 
federal-state partnership, placing more SESA operations under state control.  The Job 
Training Partnership Act of 1982 (JTPA) amended the Wagner-Peyser Act enabling 
states to customize both job training efforts for the disadvantaged as well as their SES 





JTPA further required partnership between job training efforts with SES 
operations.  This partnership was critical as JTPA undertook both training and placement 
services, requiring careful coordination from the local ES plan.  At times, this partnership 
led to co-location of JTPA and SES services; however, it also led to competition as JTPA 
programs sought after the same clients, job leads, employer contacts, and placement 
credits as the SESA (Ainsworth, 1991). 
JTPA legislation also changed the funding for SES operations from the FUTA 
tax, emphasizing the role of unemployment indicators (Ainsworth, 1991; Balducchi, 
1997).  The core assumption of the new funding formula was that SES activity was 
closely associated with unemployment.  Thus, if employment growth stagnated or 
declined while unemployment increased relative to that of other states, a state could 
reasonably expect an increase in SES funding.   
The decentralization and restructuring of the SES throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s ultimately led to a GAO finding in 1991 that “wide variations in local office 
performance indicate that active assistance from Labor may help to improve effectiveness 
of their programs” (Balducchi, 1997, p. 470).  GAO further recommended “the Secretary 
of Labor work with the states to identify and solve problems affecting ES program 
quality and performance” (Balducchi, 1997, p. 470). 
Policymakers at both the federal and state levels sought to respond to GAO's 
recommendation to revamp the nation's workforce development system.  In 1994, 
President Clinton proposed the Reemployment Act.  The intent of this bill was to 






While the bill never passed, its objectives were adopted by the USDOL.  These 
new objectives focused on improved customer service that integrates technological 
improvements in service provision, increased labor market information to assist in job 
search and preparation, and the development of “One-Stop Career Centers” (OSCCs) 
designed to be delivery hubs of streamlined workforce development services (Balducchi, 
1997).   
In addition, a renewed emphasis was placed on outcomes of SES customers, 
including customer satisfaction (Balducchi, 1997).  Performance and accountability 
measures such as these increased in emphasis during this time largely because of the 
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 which required greater accountability 
(OECD, 1999).  In 1998, USDOL released a draft of performance measures for comment 
based on input and trials in SESA offices / one-stop centers across the country. 
Many of the objectives designed to integrate services eventually became 
legislated with the 1998 amendment to the Wagner-Peyser Act entitled the Workforce 
Investment Act (WIA).31  Under WIA, the governor of a state identified a state agency to 
administer Wagner-Peyser funds and workforce development services according to a 5-
year strategic plan (USDOL, 2000). 
 
 
                                                 





6.1.2 National Context 
As this chapter investigates Utah data, the degree to which these results can be 
generalized to the rest of the United States depends to a degree on the similarity of the 
Utah labor market to that of the US.  As can be seen in Figure 6.1, Utah’s unemployment 
rate appears the most similar to that of the US during the Foundational Period and during 
JTPA, up until the ES Revitalization.  While both Utah and the US experienced falling 
unemployment rates during the ES Revitalization, Utah’s unemployment rate was 
substantially lower, falling to its lowest point during this period.  In many ways, this 
behavior matches that of the CETA period in which the United States unemployment rate 
was significantly higher than that in Utah, but both were largely declining.  
 
6.1.3 Theoretical Context 
Previous chapters have explored the role of subsidies in ensuring participation of 
both job seekers and employers on the UDES two-sided platform.  If indirect network 
externalities exist, these subsidies are critical for maximizing transaction volume.  
Chapter 4 investigated the role of aptitude testing and employment counseling while both 
Chapters 4 and 5 examined the role of the UI subsidy. 
This chapter will facilitate additional analysis into each of these three subsidies, 
all of which have ties to the intermediation literature.  If indirect network externalities 
exist in the behavior of employers in response to UI initial claims, UI benefits will 
represent a subsidy that functions as a mechanism to maintain a pool of labor until the 





(1985, 1994), Rochet and Tirole (2002a, 2002b), Hagiu (2004), Nocke, Peitz, and Stahl 
(2004) and Reisinger (2004). 
In addition, by providing a subsidy such as employment counseling, the UDES 
functions as an intermediary serving as a broker.  Spulber (1996a) and Myerson and 
Satterthwaite (1983) describe this role.  When a buyer and seller cannot agree on a price, 
a broker intermediary may subsidize or tax the transaction in order to bring the buyer and 
seller to agreement.  
When job seekers receive employment counseling from the SESA, it is because 
the individual typically has one or more barriers to employment.  This barrier often takes 
the form of a gap that can be mediated by training.  In these instances, the SES refers the 
job seeker to training, which is usually funded or subsidized with public funds.  After 
training, the job seeker brings a different skill set to the transaction.  With an 
augmentation of skills, the job seeker can command a higher wage and becomes one 
more candidate that can meet the need of an employer with a vacancy.  Furthermore, 
because training typically includes a validation of skills, this also reduces the moral 
hazards of employers who run the risk of receiving a poorly qualified candidate from the 
SES.  
Spulber (1996a) and Li (1998) discuss how an intermediary can reduce the moral 
hazards of agents by providing quality validation services.  Thus, when the SES provides 
the third subsidy, aptitude testing of job seekers, the SES performs quality validation 
services, improving the welfare of employers and reducing the asymmetric they face 





6.1.4 Testing the Hypothesis 
This chapter will analyze annual UDES administrative data from 1947 to 2002 to 
further test the hypothesis that the USES in partnership with SESA operates as a two-
sided platform and can use strategic subsidies to coordinate employer and job seeker 
behavior.  While the data set used is longer than that of the previous chapter, its annual 
format will constrain the extent of the investigation.  Thus, the analysis in this chapter 
will explore (1) how employment demand affects employer participation, (2) the impact 
of job seeker participation on employer participation, (3) the impact of UI benefits, job 
seeker testing and employment counseling on the participation of employers, (3) how 
employment demand affects job seeker participation, (4) whether job seeker behavior is 
influenced by the number of job openings posted, (5) the impact of UI benefits, job 
seeker testing, and employment counseling on job seeker participation, and (6) the impact 
policy regime changes had on employer and job seeker participation. 
 
6.2 Data 
6.2.1 Data Sources 
Data for this chapter were compiled by the author for UDES and UDWS annual 
reports from 1947 to 2002.  Changing administrative year definitions throughout this 
period led to challenges with data set assembly.  Calendar years were used in reporting 
from 1947 to 1971.  The next section of time utilized the federal fiscal year as the 
reporting basis which runs from October through September.  Federal year reporting was 





followed the Program Year designation which runs from July through June.  Thus, the 
third segment of the data runs from July 1983 through June 2001, leading to a 3-month 
overlap of the data. 
Due to programmatic changes with the USES reporting system, this data set 
cannot be extended past June 2002.  Changes in performance measures led to no 
comparable measure of job seeker behavior with new applicant counts.  In addition, this 
transition to a new reporting system, led to a relaunch of the USES administrative data 




As with previous chapters, unemployment levels are used to reflect fluctuating 
employment demand.  Thus employers will post more jobs when unemployment is low 
and job seekers will pursue the UI subsidy to participate with ES when unemployment is 
higher. 
To provide economic context for this chapter’s analysis, unemployment levels 
were divided by the labor force for 1947 through 2002.  This series is presented in Figure 
6.2. 
The annual nature of this series reveals a long, upward trend in the unemployment 
rate from the end of the Korean War Conflict through 1983, with the exception of a 
significant downturn in the later portion of the 1970s.  However, this trend reversed 







6.2.1.2 UI Initial Claims 
Counts of UI initial claims represent the act of job seekers selecting the UI 
subsidy.  Typically, workers file for UI when they cannot find a job; however, receiving 
UI benefits requires claimants to register for work at the public labor exchange unless 
they can expect to return to their employer after a particular season.  Consequently, the 
filing of UI initial claims frequently leads to increases in ES job seeker registrations. 
 
6.2.1.3 New Applicants 
As with previous chapters, job seeker behavior will be represented by counts of 
new applicants—those job seekers who registered for SES job services.  Specifically, a 
new application is the initiation of a 12-month window for which a job seeker can use 
and later reuse SESA services.  
If indirect network externalities exist in job seeker behavior, individuals will 
register with the SES because they are required to do so as a contingency for receiving 
the UI subsidy or they will register to pursue the job openings posted with the SESA. 
Figure 6.3 displays the counts of UI initial claims alongside counts of new 
applicants.  As discussed in the previous chapter, a shift in the linkage between UI initial 
claims and new applicants appears to occur in the late 1960s and lasts until the early 
1970s.  However, a new decoupling appears with the onset of the JTPA legislation where 





reflecting a substantially different influence than simply the UI work requirement.  This 
trend appears to continue until the onset of WIA, which begins in 1998. 
 
6.2.1.4 Job Openings 
Employer participation on the UDES platform is measured by counts of posted 
job openings.  When employers have vacancies, they voluntarily notify UDES which in 
turn makes an effort to notify job seekers registered with the UDES.  UDES also works to 
recruit workers for these jobs from the registered job seeker pool. 
As a measure of employer participation, the presence of indirect network 
externalities would lead to new applicants increasing as jobs become available.  
Conversely, when jobs are few, individuals would register with the ES as a requirement 
for receiving the UI subsidy. 
Figure 6.4 displays the relationship between job openings, new applicants and UI 
initial claims throughout this period.  What becomes evident is that during the policy 
regimes of CETA and JTPA, new applicant counts appear to follow job openings quite 
frequently.  The exception is during the period around 1983 when unemployment was at 
its height. 
 
6.2.1.5 Individuals Tested 
UDES tested the skill sets of job seekers to determine what skills they possessed 
and to ensure they met the qualifications required by employers.  Thus, testing functioned  





with the SESA. 
Figure 6.5 displays counts of testing and job openings throughout this period.  
What is critical to note is how substantially employer participation increased during the 
CETA years while testing remained relatively flat.  This suggests another influence or 
subsidy was at work encouraging employer participation.  The hypothesis of this chapter 
suggests that employment counseling, which frequently leads to job training, became 
another subsidy which provided employers with the pool of qualified candidates they 
desired.  This hypothesis is supported by Figure 6.5. 
  
6.2.1.6 Counseling Interviews 
When job seekers have barriers to employment, the SES provides employment 
counseling to address these barriers.  Employment counseling often reveals the job seeker 
lacks the skills needed to find employment.  Consequently, employment counseling leads 
to subsidized job seeker training.   
Figure 6.6 reflects the relative size of testing and employment counseling 
throughout this period.  For the most part, job seeker testing efforts exceed employment 
counseling, with the exception of the CETA years.  This suggests the upswing in 
employer participation during the CETA policy regime may have been the result of 
employment counseling (training) activities. 
Figure 6.7 explores this relationship further plotting job opening counts alongside 
counts of individuals tested and counseling interviews.  While the magnitude difference 





suspect that employment counseling can also act as a subsidy to job seekers that also 
encourages employer participation. 
 
6.2.2 Transformations 
Given the annual nature of the data, no seasonal adjustments were made.  
However, given the shorter availability of the individuals tested series, the remaining 
series were truncated to coincide accordingly.  Finally, as with previous chapters, each 
data series was converted to a natural log growth rate according to the formula found in 
Equation 6.1 below. 
 
 𝒘�𝑡 =  ln (𝑥𝑡) −  ln (𝑥𝑡−1) (6.1) 
 
6.2.3 Univariate and Bivariate Analysis 
To provide additional understanding of the data series, descriptive statistics of the 
natural log growth rates of each series have been provided.  As can be seen in Table 6.1, 
counseling interviews, new applicants, and unemployed growth rates each appear evenly 
distributed around the mean with job openings and initial claims exhibiting negative 
skewness and individuals tested skewing positively. 
To further understand the relationships between the data series, Pearson 
Correlations were run for each pair of data series.  The results are presented in Table 6.2.  
To further illustrate these correlations, scatter plots are provided.  Each of these scatter 





𝛼 = 0.05. 
   
 
𝜋 =  2(𝑛 + 1)
𝑛 − 2 𝐹2,𝑛−2(1 − 𝛼) (6.2) 
 
 
A few results are different from those in previous chapters and are worth nothing.  
The first set of correlations worthy of mention is the relationship between job openings 
and unemployment as well as job openings and UI initial claims.  Both pairs indicate a 
strong, procyclical nature of job openings.  This is a stronger negative relationship than 
witnessed in past chapters.  These negative correlations are further illustrated with scatter 
plots in Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9. 
Another key set of correlations to note are between new applicants and initial 
claims and new applicants and job openings.  New applicants and initial claims exhibit 
the strongest correlation compared to previous chapters.  This suggests the strong 
influence the UI subsidy has on new applicants.  However, the statistical significance 
between the correlation of new applicants and job openings is far weaker than in previous 
chapters.  These correlations are visualized in scatter plots in Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11.  
What is immediately evident in the scatter plot is the weakness of the relationship 
between job openings and new applicants.  This weakness will be explored later in this 
chapter. 
The final correlation worth identifying is the negative, statistically significant 





that individuals who receive subsidized training frequently drop out of the employment 
registration process until their training is complete.  Nevertheless, this relationship will be 
explored later in this chapter. 
 
6.3 Model Results 
Unlike previous chapters which examined monthly data, employer and job seeker 
UDES participation will be analyzed in this chapter with a VARX(0,0) model across t 











where 𝑗𝑡 denotes job openings, 𝑛𝑡 represents new applicants, 𝛼𝑡  represents UI initial 
claims while 𝜖𝑡 represents a white noise process.
 32 
Several parameters were considered in the selection of this model.  
Autoregressive orders of p=0,...,10 and lags of s=0,…,5 were examined.  The parameters 
of p=0 and s=0 exhibited the lowest AICc of 10.51629 as can be seen in Table 6.3. 
In previous chapters, the current term (t=0) was included for the independent 
variables due to the nature of employer and job seeker logistics when using the SES.  
Many of the activities took place within the same month such as when a job seeker files a 
                                                 
32 Following Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980), tests were performed for the presence of 
multicollinearity across independent variables in addition to Variance Inflation Factor analysis.  No 





UI claim, he or she needs to immediately register for the labor exchange if he or she was 
not returning to the employer at a later date.  With annual data, more activities are likely 
to take place during the year of a job opening being posted or a new application being 
filed.   Thus, the current term is included in the regression model for this chapter as well. 
 
6.3.1 Employer Behavior: Job Openings Posted 
The results of the employer regression analysis can be viewed in Table 6.4.  In 
keeping with consistency of previous chapters, F-Test results for all the variables are 
displayed in Table 6.5 although these results largely match t-statistics in Table 6.4.  Also, 
in past chapters, the process of employer behavior fluctuates over a period of 3 months.  
Thus, it is not surprising that the autoregressive term is not necessary for this annual 
model. 
As can be seen in the regression results and F-Tests, unemployment does not 
appear to exert a statistically significant impact on employer behavior, unlike previous 
chapters.  However, it appears initial claims can be considered a proxy for unemployment 
in this situation because of the high correlation of unemployment and initial claims 
(0.67092).33   This result is also likely due to the fact that he negative correlation between 
initial claims and job openings (-0.47358) is stronger than that between unemployment 
and job openings (-0.42330).   Nevertheless, it is evident that employers continue to post 
more jobs when unemployment is lower.   
                                                 





 There also appears to be no evidence of indirect network externalities in employer 
behavior.  The impact of UI initial claims does not provide evidence due to the fact that 
the coefficient is negative.  Previous chapters speculated that annual data would be better 
situated to analyze the effect of UI initial claims on employers.  However, there is no 
evidence initial claims positively influenced employer behavior. 
There is also no evidence that employers participated simply because job seekers 
participated.  This is largely due to the fact that the model that minimized the AICc 
excluded lagged effects of job seeker participation on employers and vice versa.  Thus, as 
in previous chapters, employers do not post jobs with UDES simply because job seekers 
are available.   
However, in Chapter 4, the analysis of monthly data determined that employers 
will post jobs with the UDES if they believe qualified job seekers exist on the UDES 
platform.  This was evidenced by the significance of employment counseling and to a 
degree, job seeker testing.  Yet, as can be seen in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5, there appears 
to be no indication of indirect network externalities in the behavior of employers when 
looking at the impact of job seeker testing and employment counseling in the annual data. 
There are two primary possibilities for this result.  The first possibility is that 
there may not be any indirect network externalities present in the behavior of employers 
over the broader history of the UDES.  Under this scenario, employer behavior is strictly 
driven by employment demand, posting more jobs when unemployment is lower. 
The second possibility is that the employer indirect network externalities cannot 





prior month of job seeker testing that demonstrated predictive impact on employer 
behavior.  If this process is short-term, spanning only a few months, then it may not be 
something that can be captured with this data set.  However, this can be explored further 
in the next chapter.  While it also utilizes annual data, it also features 46 different states, 
providing a deeper level of insight. 
This data set also afforded the opportunity to investigate the role of policy on the 
behavior of employers and job seekers.  To that end, policy dummies were added to 
compare the impact of the Foundational Period, MDTA, CETA and JTPA to the ES 
Revitalization regime.  However, as was the case in the previous chapter, the policy 
regime appeared to have no impact on the participation of employers. 
 
6.3.2 Job Seeker Behavior: New Applications 
The regression estimates for job seeker behavior are displayed in Table 6.6 with 
the results of the F-Tests displayed in Table 6.7.  In previous chapters that analyzed 
monthly data, job seeker behavior appeared to follow a 6-month process.  Consequently, 
it is not surprising that with the annual data of this chapter, no new applicant 
autoregressive terms are significant for the model. 
In a manner consistent with previous chapters, job seekers appear to participate 
when unemployment is higher, influenced primarily by the filing of initial claims.  Also 
similar to previous chapters, the regression and F-Tests in Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 
indicate no indirect network externalities appear to be present in job seeker behavior.  In 





an independent variable for new applicants.   
It is also worth noting that when looking at job seeker behavior, there is some 
indication that counseling has an impact in the regression and F-Tests results at the 10% 
significance level.  However, the impact is negative.  Thus, counseling has a negative 
relationship with new applicants.  While one could argue that this negative relationship is 
because counseling is procyclical and new applicant counts tend to increase during 
counter-cyclical employment swings, counseling in fact has almost no correlation with 
unemployment (-0.08644). 
The likely reason for this curious relationship is the way in which counseling 
activities have been influenced during various policy regimes.  During MDTA, 
counseling received increasing attention only to decline sharply through the CETA and 
JTPA periods.  Finally, employment counseling began receiving new emphasis during the 
ES Revitalization.  Thus, because of different shifts in its emphasis, counseling 
developed a seemingly negative relationship with new applicants. 
Despite the impact of policy regimes emphasizing employment counseling and 
other activities differently, different policy regimes continue to exhibit no overall impact 
on employer or job seeker behavior.  To test this relationship, dummy variables for the 
Foundational Period, Manpower, CETA and JTPA were included to measure the 
potential impact relative to the ES Revitalization—the policy regime in force for the 
analysis in Chapter 7.  Yet, similar to the policy analysis in the previous chapter, no 







This chapter analyzed the entirety of the period in question (1947 – 2002) using 
annual administrative data from the UDES.  This extended data series enabled the 
analysis of ES policy shifts that began with JTPA and the ES Revitalization and the 
impact UI, testing and employment counseling had on employer and job seeker behavior. 
In terms of UDES activity, the policy changes appeared to have no effect on 
employer and job seeker behavior and neither did the testing and employment counseling 
subsidies.  Employers continued to post more jobs when unemployment was lower and 
job seekers continued to participate when unemployment was higher.  However, UI initial 
claims did significantly influence the participation of job seekers, similar to previous 
chapters.   
The next chapter seeks to determine whether these results can be generalized to 
all states or whether these are merely specific to the Utah experience.  To that end, a 
panel data set comprised of 45 states plus the District of Columbia will be investigated 
during a dynamic period in USES history:  the ES Revitalization of 1992 – 2002 which 
bridges the transition from JTPA to WIA.  In addition, because of the detailed nature of 








Figure 6.1. Utah vs. United States,34 annual average unemployment rate, 1950 – 200235 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Annual Utah unemployment rate 1947 - 200236 
 
                                                 
34 Source: Utah Department of Workforce Services and Bureau of Labor Statistics 
35 Comparable data are not available prior to 1950. 









































Figure 6.3. Annual counts of Utah UI initial claims and UDES 
 new applicants, 1947 - 200237 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Annual counts of Utah UI initial claims, UDES job openings 
and new applications, 1947 - 200238 
                                                 
37 Source: Utah Department of Workforce Services 
































Figure 6.5. Annual counts of UDES job openings and individuals tested, 1947 – 200239 
 
 
Figure 6.6.  Annual counts of UDES counseling 
and individuals tested, 1947 - 200240 
                                                 
39 Source: Utah Department of Workforce Services 































Figure 6.7.  Annual counts of UDES job openings, counseling interviews 
and individuals tested, 1947 - 200241 
 
 
Figure 6.8. Scatter plot between UDES unemployed growth rate 
and job openings growth rate with 95% prediction ellipse 
                                                 

















Figure 6.9.  Scatter plot between UI initial claims growth rate and UDES job openings 
growth rate with 95% prediction ellipse 
 
Figure 6.10. Scatter plot between Utah UI initial claims and UDES new applicant 






Figure 6.11. Scatter plot between UDES new applicant growth rate and job 







Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics of annual growth rate variables 
 N Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum 
Job Openings 52 2.48931 22.06962 1.24568 -59.01164 41.46540 
Unemployed 52 2.52470 18.04556 0.93177 -46.43056 44.18328 
Initial Claims 52 1.67149 18.11299 1.11974 -53.81384 39.81723 
New Applicants 52 2.36447 9.54926 2.85472 -28.28113 31.74751 
Individuals Tested 52 4.82305 21.93788 4.09688 -38.95353 59.86003 
Counseling Interviews 52 -4.59781 21.56829 -3.05470 -56.33661 51.20968 
 


























































































Table 6.3. Corrected Akaike Information Criterion Results42 
AR 
Lag of Independent Variables 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
0 10.51629 10.78607 11.21167 11.8177 12.54781 14.31238 
1 10.63779 10.88654 11.37452 11.90135 13.06383 15.27798 
2 10.77222 11.11757 11.68258 12.24007 13.84415 16.73996 
3 10.84232 10.95429 11.62141 12.50637 14.18724 17.68219 
4 11.13864 11.33022 12.21714 13.60216 16.0669 21.63187 
5 11.65665 12.00706 13.15784 15.02353 18.67623 25.99855 
6 12.21819 12.86735 14.39956 17.02914 23.05185 38.17072 
7 12.79170 13.82679 16.05870 19.4511 30.90611 88.97001 
8 13.77635 15.50515 19.13130 26.45276 57.85997 * 
9 15.21356 17.90787 24.45503 43.81347 * * 
10 17.09162 21.77681 36.20469 * * * 
 




t Value Pr > |t| 
Constant 1.15841 6.78286 0.17 0.8652 
Initial Claims Growth Rate t -0.46979 0.21792 -2.16 0.0367 
Counseling Growth Rate t -0.09748 0.14166 -0.69 0.4951 
Testing Growth Rate t 0.09845 0.13856 0.71 0.4812 
Unemployed Growth Rate t -0.22665 0.21823 -1.04 0.3048 
CETA t 7.04393 9.52910 0.74 0.4638 
Foundational Period t 2.26915 8.74443 0.26 0.7965 
JTPA t -2.32577 9.82895 -0.24 0.8141 





                                                 






Table 6.5. F-Test results for employer behavior 
 
Variable DF F Value Pr > F 
All F(8, 43) 2.07 0.0604 
Unemployment F(1,43) 1.08 0.3048 
Initial Claims F(1,43) 4.65 0.0367 
Testing F(1,43) 0.50 0.4812 
Counseling F(1,43) 0.47 0.4951 
CETA F(1,43) 0.55 0.4638 
Foundational Period F(1,43) 0.07 0.7965 
JTPA F(1,43) 0.06 0.8141 
Manpower F(1,43) 0.02 0.8910 
 




t Value Pr > |t| 
Constant 0.46397 2.71994 0.17 0.8654 
Initial Claims Growth Rate t 0.30593 0.08739 3.50 0.0011 
Counseling Growth Rate t -0.10894 0.05681 -1.92 0.0618 
Testing Growth Rate t 0.07810 0.05556 1.41 0.1670 
Unemployed Growth Rate t -0.05490 0.08751 -0.63 0.5337 
CETA t 0.16805 3.82120 0.04 0.9651 
Foundational Period t -1.18385 3.50654 -0.34 0.7373 
JTPA t 2.23771 3.94144 0.57 0.5732 
Manpower t 2.73788 3.72051 0.74 0.4658 
 
Table 6.7. F-Test results for job seeker behavior 
Variable DF F Value Pr > F 
All F(8, 43) 3.29 0.0051 
Unemployment F(1,43) 0.39 0.5337 
Initial Claims F(1,43) 12.26 0.0011 
Testing F(1,43) 1.98 0.1670 
Counseling F(1,43) 3.68 0.0618 
CETA F(1,43) 0.00 0.9651 
Foundational Period F(1,43) 0.11 0.7373 
JTPA F(1,43) 0.32 0.5732 








ES REVITALIZATION ACROSS THE COUNTRY: 1992 - 2002 
 
7.1 Background 
In partnership with the SESA, the USES operates the US public labor exchange 
platform, seeking to match employers with job seekers.  This paper investigates whether 
or not this platform is two-sided and implies that the USES could implement strategic 
subsidies to coordinate the simultaneous participation of employers and job seekers.  This 
is because the presence of indirect network externalities:  One group participates because 
the other group participates.  By subsidizing one side of the market, both sides will 
participate.  This leads to maximized transaction volume and a great impact on the US 
labor market. 
Previous chapters analyzed monthly and annual UDES administrative data to test 
this hypothesis.  Chapter 4 investigated monthly data to analyze the behavior of 
employers and job seekers during the Foundational Period of the modern USES from 
1947 to 1963 along with three potential strategic subsidies: UI benefits, job seeker testing 
and employment counseling.  Chapter 5 also analyzed monthly data comprising a longer 
period of UDES history from 1947 to 1981 focusing on employer and job seeker behavior 





MDTA and CETA.  Chapter 6 analyzed annual UDES from 1947 to 2002 to further 
investigate the role of policy on employer and job seeker behavior as well as the impact 
of the UI, job seeker testing and employment counseling subsidies.   
The findings from these chapters reflect mixed results as to whether the USES 
operates as an intermediary on a two-sided platform.  Chapter 4, which focused on the 
Foundational Period of the modern USES, revealed the presence of indirect network 
externalities in employer behavior:  employers are more likely to participate if they 
believe qualified job seekers are available on the USES platform.  Consequently, when 
UDES provided employment counseling and aptitude testing services to job seekers, it 
positively influenced employer participation.   
Yet, this result was not as evident in Chapter 5.  Employer participation was 
driven solely by employment demand and job seeker participation was driven solely by 
the desire to receive UI benefits.  However, the data set used in Chapter 5 did not include 
job seeker testing and employment counseling which may explain why no indirect 
network externalities could be detected.  Nevertheless, the analysis of Chapter 6 also 
failed to confirm the hypothesis and the data set did include employment counseling and 
aptitude testing.  Thus, the results were consistent with Chapter 5. 
Chapters 5 and 6 also looked at the role of policy as it relates to employer and job 
seeker behavior.  Neither chapter revealed a significant impact from a particular policy 
regime.  However, this may be due to the fact that much of the policy changes affected 
agencies other than USES from the beginning of MDTA up until the ES Revitalization 





Consequently, this chapter plays a critical role in the investigation of the 
hypothesis and the discussion surrounding the effectiveness of USES policy as it 
investigates a data set that is quite different from that of the previous chapters.  Instead of 
Utah data that are limited over a period of time, this chapter utilizes a panel data set 
comprised of 46 SESA from 1992 to 2002 and gives a glimpse into the dynamics of the 
ES Revitalization Period which bridged the JTPA and WIA policy regimes.  This data set 
not only includes the subsidies investigated in previous chapters but new subsidies such 
as skills training and job search support.  In addition, because of the reporting 
requirements states had to follow, this data set contains greater detail with regard to 
critical research questions posed in previous chapters. 
 
7.1.1 Historical Context 
In 1991, as a result of the decentralization and restructuring of the USES 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the GAO found “wide variations in local office 
performance indicate that active assistance from Labor may help to improve effectiveness 
of their programs” (Balducchi, 1997, p. 470). 
By 1994, federal and state policymakers had developed a series of objectives to 
better facilitate service provider collaboration and competition in a workforce system that 
was substantially fragmented.  USDOL incorporated these new objectives which focused 
on improved customer service that integrated technological improvements in service 
provision, increased labor market information to assist in job search and preparation, and 





streamlined workforce development services (Balducchi, 1997).   
In addition, a renewed emphasis was placed on outcomes of SES customers, 
including customer satisfaction (Balducchi, 1997).  Performance and accountability 
measures such as these increased in emphasis during this time largely because of the 
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 which brought about greater 
accountability (OECD, 1999).   
This focus on performance was part of a larger “ES Revitalization Work Plan” 
launched by DOL in 1994 aimed at improving information and services to customers.  
This plan established three tiers of service to customers: 
Tier I – Self-Help (resource center and automated self-help system containing 
information on jobs, and job search assistance); 
 
Tier II – Basic Intervention (basic assessment and services, such as referral to 
jobs, job search assistance, and training); 
 
Tier III – Intensive Services (job seekers could be served by ES or referred to 
other workforce development programs) (Balducchi, 1997, p. 472). 
  
The Clinton administration also placed great emphasis on labor market 
information and fostered America's Labor Market Information System (ALMIS).  The 
goal of this effort is to provide one-stop access to a wealth of labor market information to 
SES customers.  In many ways, innovations in technology and dissemination in the 1990s 
were utilized to deliver this information. 
At the same time, the Interstate Job Bank was replaced with America's Job Bank 
(AJB).  In 1995, AJB became fully accessible on the Internet (Balducchi, 1997).  By 
1997, virtually every state employment agency had linked their job openings databases 





job openings (OECD, 1999). 
 
7.1.2 Theoretical Context 
The three-tiered service model implemented during this period represents two 
significant impacts for this study. First, the separation of services by tiers represents a 
new intermediation direction of the SESA serving as an information gatekeeper for job 
seekers and employers.  While Tier I services (self-help) provide an approach with low 
marginal costs for the SESA to serve clients, the information gatekeeper model can lead 
to a different set of indirect network externalities.  For example, employers may want to 
post jobs to ensure their openings compete with the postings of other employers.  
However, their desire to participate will be contingent upon the demand for information 
in the market by job seekers, and the amount of employers already participating.  
Similarly, the demand for information by job seekers will be tied to the exclusivity of the 
information possessed by the SES and the number of employers participating.  In 
addition, the market share of the SESA in the information market also plays a factor in 
the decision of both employers and job seekers.  Nevertheless, while this is an intriguing 
dynamic to explore, the data available for such an analysis are limited and beyond the 
scope of this paper. For more information on information gatekeepers and the role of 
market forces and indirect network externalities, see Baye and Morgan (2001). 
The second impact brought about by the tiered service model is a clear delineation 
between levels of value addition / broker activities that has not been established in the 





III) found in Spulber (1996a) and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) from bargaining 
mediation represented in basic employment counseling (Tier II) as seen in Yavas, Miceli, 
and Sirmans (2001).  This in turn helps identify with greater specificity how each of these 
services serves as a subsidy to facilitate employer and job seeker behavior. 
 
7.1.3 Testing the Hypothesis 
This chapter will analyze a panel data set comprised of 46 SESA from 1992 to 
2002 to further test the hypothesis that the USES in partnership with SESA operates as a 
two-sided platform and can use strategic subsidies to coordinate employer and job seeker 
behavior.  The detailed nature of this data set will facilitate the investigation of several 
research questions posed in previous chapters.  Thus, the analysis in this chapter will 
explore (1) how employment demand affects employer participation, (2) the impact of 
job seeker participation on employer participation, (3) the impact of UI benefits, job 
seeker testing,  employment counseling, skills training, job search support and the 
presence of employed job seekers on the participation of employers, (3) how employment 
demand affects job seeker participation, (4) whether job seeker behavior is influenced by 
the number of job openings posted, and (5) the impact of UI benefits, job seeker testing,  
employment counseling, skills training, job search support and the presence of employed 









7.2.1 Data Sources 
The data used for this analysis are part of a unique set assembled by the author.  
Beginning July 1, 1992, each state was required by the JTPA-amended Wagner-Peyser 
Act to submit quarterly labor exchange reports to the Employment and Training 
Administration.  To fulfill this reporting requirement, states completed the revised ETA 
9002 form according to the ETA Handbook Bo 406, ETA 9002 Data Preparation 
Handbook. 
ETA provided the author with annualized program year counts of this reporting 
which took place from July 1, 1992 through June 30, 2002.  The author combined these 
data with UI initial claims data from ETA as well as unemployment levels from BLS. 
While this data set has some limitations as noted below, it also facilitates a unique 
understanding of the role of job seeker employment status, aptitude testing, counseling 




Monthly, seasonally adjusted unemployment levels were averaged by program 
year to reflect employment demand consistent with the reporting periods of the labor 
exchange activities.  However, as a representation of a point in time, one must be careful 
when comparing unemployment levels with counts of administrative data which reflect 





unemployment levels are used; however, for regression analysis, the natural log growth 
rate transformations of each variable are used instead. 
 
7.2.1.2 UI Initial Claims 
One example of where care must be taken with comparisons is with UI initial 
claims and unemployment.  Figure 7.1 displays this comparison.  Note that UI initial 
claims did not exceed unemployment for any given period of time.  Rather, the 
magnitude differences are due to counting methodologies.  However, what can be seen 
from Figure 7.1 is the relatively consistent way UI initial claims track with 
unemployment levels.  Unemployment levels and UI initial claims both bottomed in 1999 
before rising rapidly to program year 2001, which ended June 30, 2002 and includes the 
terrorist attacks and subsequent economic impact of September 11, 2001. 
Nevertheless, despite the close relationship between unemployment and UI initial 
claims, the role of a subsidy to attract job seekers appears to have a lesser influence than 
in previous chapters.  This can be inferred when looking at the next section and 
identifying the number of applicants who use the SESA.  This suggests the emergence of 
a new subsidy which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
7.2.1.3 Total Active Applicants 
While previous chapters utilized new applicant counts to capture job seeker 
behavior, no corresponding reporting category is available with the ETA 9002 report 





represents the entire stock of applicants.  This leads to significant counting differences.  
A new applicant is only counted the month or year of the initial registration.  They are 
only counted 12 months later if they reapply with the SES.  Total active applicants, 
however, will track an applicant as long as he or she is active.  Since registrations last as 
long as 12 months, this means the same applicant can be counted on four quarterly 
reports.  Nevertheless, this data series is the best available across states to reflect job 
seeker activity. 
Figure 7.2 charts counts of total active applicants versus those applicants who are 
unemployed and monetarily eligible to receive UI benefits any time during the program 
year.  While the magnitude of total applicants seems to consistently exceed UI eligible 
applicants, these two series appear to track more closely than in previous chapters where 
applicant counts appeared equally driven by job openings as they were by the UI subsidy.  
This is further observed in Figure 7.3 where counts of total applicants, unemployed 
applicants and unemployment also track each other.  Thus, counts of total applicants and 
related series such as unemployed and UI-eligible appear highly dependent on labor 
market conditions. 
The disparity between the counts of UI eligible applicants in Figure 7.2 and 
unemployed applicants in Figure 7.3 may be explained by the following reasons.  First, 
not all unemployed individuals are monetarily eligible to receive UI benefits.  This could 
be because of inadequate work history or because of recently exhausting benefits.  
Second, a job seeker may not have worked for an employer covered under UI legislation 





time in the past, and not accrued adequate wages. 
 
7.2.1.4 Job Openings 
Job openings reflect the total number of jobs posted with a SES by an employer.  
If, for example, an employer posts five jobs of the same type with a SES, that one job 
order will count as five job openings. 
Figure 7.4 demonstrates the cyclical nature of job postings as witnessed in 
previous chapters continues in this analysis as well.  In this example, job openings are 
tracked versus counts of UI eligible applicants.  Thus, UI applicants decline from PY 
1992 through PY 1999 and then climb through PY 2001.  Conversely, job openings 
increase from PY 1992 through PY 1999 and subsequently decline through PY 2001. 
The job seeker measurement difference in this chapter may be the reason behind a 
different relationship between job seeker and employer activity counts.  As can be seen in 
Figure 7.5, whereas new applicants often increased when more jobs were posted, total 
applicant counts actually declined as job openings increased.  This suggests total 
applicant counts are more heavily driven by UI claimant activity than new applicant 
counts observed in previous chapters. 
 
7.2.1.5 Applicant Employment Status 
Each SES was required to identify whether an applicant was employed or 
unemployed at the time of initial registration.  Specifically, an applicant was considered 





business or farm.  An individual would also be considered employed if they had a job but 
were laid off or unable to work because of illness, weather, labor management disputes, 
vacation, or personal reasons.  On the other hand, applicants were considered 
unemployed if they did not meet the conditions for employment or they had received a 
notice of termination of employment prior to registering with the SES. 
Figure 7.6 tracks the average percentage of employed applicants versus the 
average unemployment rate during this period of time.  These reveal the percentage of 
employed job seekers is less than Lindeboom, Van Ours, and Renes (1994) who 
identified 25% of applicants as employed in the Netherlands.  The maximum average 
from this data set is less than 16% which occurred in PY 2000.  However, the chart does 
support the findings of Adnett (1984), namely that as unemployment falls, employed job 
seekers are more likely to register with the SESA.  Adnett (1984) considers this a positive 
dynamic because it is presumed the employed job seekers are more skilled than the 
unemployed and can positively influence the reputation of the SES with employers. 
 
7.2.1.6 Individuals Counseled and Counseling Transactions 
Employment counseling provides applicants with onetime or ongoing assistance 
with the goal of helping the applicant gain a better understanding of who they are and 
what occupations are the most realistic for them to pursue.  This activity often includes 
developing a plan with steps and a timetable to achieve an occupational goal.  Counseling 
can be individual or take place in a group setting.   





number of counseling events which could include serving a particular individual more 
than once during a program year.  As can be seen, counseling activities were relatively 
flat but began declining in PY 1998.  This may be a byproduct of the increased use of 
technology and heavier reliance on self-assistance during this period.  Counseling 
activities can only be reported as such when provided by a qualified counselor or 
counselor trainee. 
 
7.2.1.7 Testing Transactions and Individuals Tested 
USDOL did not mandate any standardized tests that states need to administer to 
job seekers during this time.  The individuals tested counts reflect unique individuals who 
were administered any type of standardized test during the program year.  Testing 
transactions, however, reflect counts of the total number of standardized tests 
administered, allowing for the case where multiple tests can be administered to the same 
individual. 
During this time period, both counts of individuals tested and counts of testing 
transactions followed a downward trend, until leveling off from PY1999 through PY 
2001 as can be seen in Figure 7.8.  Also, Figure 7.9 displays that average counseling 
transactions outpaced average testing transactions throughout the entire period, reflecting 
a prioritization of activity similar to that of the CETA years. 
For a state to report its testing activities to ETA, the test administered must 





knowledge.”43  However, this lack of specificity or commonality across states creates a 
challenge with interpreting the impact of individuals tested or testing transactions.   
 
7.2.1.8 Education and Training Referrals 
This data set also features counts of applicants being referred to skills training and 
educational services.  Skills training consists of any state or federal training program 
focused on developing job-related competencies.  Educational services, on the other 
hand, include any “program or course designed to develop competency in basic 
educational skills such as reading comprehension, mathematics, writing, speaking and 
reasoning and/or programs leading to educational credentials such as a GED or high 
school diploma or college degree.”44 
Figure 7.10 charts the average counts of referrals to skills training and educational 
services.  What is clear from this chart is how government-funded skills training 
represented a substantial portion of all training referrals during this time while 
educational services represent a much smaller component.  However, the dynamics 
affecting the counts of these referrals are quite different.  While skills training referrals 
appear to fluctuate with the business cycle, educational services referrals appear to grow 
steadily during this time.   
Because referrals to training often took place in the employment counseling 
process in the past, it is helpful to see how these specific activities compare with each 
                                                 
43 ETA Handbook No. 406, ETA 9002 Data Preparation Handbook, p. III-8. 





other in this new detailed data set.  Figure 7.11 compares the average counts of 
individuals counseled and individuals referred to skills training.  While there still could 
be overlap between these two activities, the separation provided by Figure 7.11 provides 
a better understanding.  Both series seem to track closely, following the trend of 
unemployment levels.  The exception happens in PY 2001 where skills training referrals 
continue to increase with unemployment while employment counseling continues its 
downward trend.  
 
7.2.1.9 Job Search Support 
One uniquely identified activity in this data set that in previous chapters also has 
fallen under the umbrella of employment counseling is that of job search support.45  This 
broad category includes a variety services designed to help applicants effectively execute 
a job search.  However, this activity represents the SES acting as an information 
gatekeeper intermediary, rather than one that adds value via brokering or subsidization.  
Thus job search support include resume assistance, job search workshops, job finding 
clubs, providing specific labor market information and job search planning.   
This information-centric activity coincides with the USES trends of greater use of 
technology and to a degree, self-service.  While this activity is not part of the research 
scope of this paper, it is included to provide context for this period in USES history.  For 
reference, Figure 7.12 compares average counts of job search support with those of 
                                                 
45 ETA uses the term “Job Search Activities” but the author has used Job Search Support to 





employment counseling.  What is evident from this chart is the substantially greater 
emphasis on providing job search information rather than employment counseling.  In 
fact, while job search activity assistance steadily grows, employment counseling declines.   
Previously in section 7.2.1.5, it was suggested that a new subsidy may be 
influencing the participation of job seekers.  Given the data in Figure 7.12, it is 
reasonable to suggest that this subsidy could be job search information.  Job seekers 
participate in the SESA because of the information they can receive about the labor 
market and how to find a job.  
 
7.2.2 Transformations 
Given the annual nature of the data, no seasonal adjustments were made to the 
data.  However, for the correlation, regression and diagnostic analysis, six states were 
excluded due to inconsistent reporting resulting in missing values:  California, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio and Oregon. 
Finally, as with previous chapters, each data series was converted to a natural log 
growth rate according to the formula found in Equation 7.1 below for each state s. 
 
 𝒘�𝑠𝑡 =  ln (𝑥𝑠𝑡) −  ln (𝑥𝑠𝑡−1) (7.1 ) 
 
7.2.3 Univariate and Bivariate Analysis 
To provide additional context for this analysis, Table 7.1 displays the descriptive 





exception of employment counseling, which skews somewhat negative.  This could be a 
byproduct of the reduced emphasis on employment counseling through this period.  In 
addition, it should be noted that the observations are the same for each series.  This is 
because the six states with inconsistent reporting were excluded from this analysis.  In 
addition, the District of Columbia, was included in this data set because it is considered a 
state for ES partnership purposes. 
In addition to the descriptive statistics, Pearson Correlations were run on each pair 
of data series.  These results are displayed in Table 7.2.  As can be seen from this table, a 
few of the correlations are worth highlighting.  First, the correlation between job 
openings and total applicants is no longer significant; however, there is a new correlation 
of interest between job openings and skill training (0.15747).  Similarly, total applicant 
counts are also significantly correlated with skills training (0.32990) as well as job search 
support (0.28291).  The correlation between counseling and skills training (0.14973) as 
well as counseling and job search support (0.18667) reflect the likely co-occurrence of 
these services as delivered by the SESA.    
A few correlations raise the concern of possible multicollinearity.  Of particular 
interest is the high correlation between total applicants and unemployed applicants as 
well as that between unemployment and UI initial claims.  To ensure no multicollinearity 
exists, analysis of variance inflation factors and the tests developed by Belsley, Kuh, and 







7.3 Model Results 
Employer and job seeker SESA participation will be analyzed across i states and t 










where 𝑗𝑖𝑡 denotes job openings, 𝑛𝑖𝑡 represents total applicants, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑖𝑡 
represent unemployment, employed applicants, counseling, skills training and job search 
support while 𝜖𝑡 represents a white noise process.
 46 
Several parameters were considered in the selection of this model.  Due to the 
brevity of the years available, smaller numbers of autoregressive orders and lags were 
examined.  Thus, only autoregressive orders of p=0,...,3 and lags of s=0,…,3 were tested.  
The parameters of p=0 and s=0 exhibited the lowest AICc of -6.43180 as can be seen in 
Table 7.3. 
To ensure that a random effects model was appropriate for this panel data set, 
Hausman tests were conducted for each dependent variable.  The results are displayed in 
Table 7.4 and confirm a random effects approach is appropriate for this analysis. 
 
 
                                                 
46 Following Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980), tests were performed for the presence of 
multicollinearity across independent variables as well as variance inflation factor analysis.  No indication of 





7.3.1 Employer Behavior: Job Openings Posted 
The results of the employer regression analysis can be viewed in Table 7.5.  F-
Test results for all the variables are displayed in Table 7.6 in keeping consistent with the 
pattern established in previous chapters, although the nature of the model implies the F-
Test results will largely replicate the t-statistics in the regression results.  Also, in 
previous chapters that examined monthly data, the process of employer behavior was 
demonstrated to fluctuate over a period of 3 months.  Thus, it is not surprising that the 
autoregressive term is not necessary for this annual model. 
Each of the previous chapters found that employer participation was regularly 
influenced by employment demand.  Employers would post more jobs during periods of 
lower unemployment.  However, the regression results and F-Tests indicate employment 
demand does not have a statistically significant impact on employer demand for this data 
series.  Sometimes this influence is only evident from the influence of initial claims.  Yet, 
this lack of relationship is still evident when looking at the impact of both the 
unemployment and the initial claims independent variables, except at the 10% 
significance level. 
It is possible this result is due to the ES Revitalization efforts taking place during 
this period.  USES made significant attempts at engaging employers and these results 
may in fact validate the implemented changes.  If true, this would suggest employer 
behavior transitioned from being driven by employment demand to being driven by other 
factors.  This is plausible in that job openings and unemployment are still negatively 





factors were successful due to indirect network externalities present in employer 
behavior. 
 Previous chapters also found mixed results when investigating employer behavior 
for the presence of indirect network externalities, namely that employers are more likely 
to participate if they believe qualified job seekers are available on the USES platform.  
Utah monthly data from the Foundational Period appeared to support this reality while 
the annual Utah data appeared to disprove it.  This conflicting result suggested that the 
time period of analysis may be a factor in observing this aspect of employer behavior.   
The two key variables used to investigate this hypothesis were job seeker testing 
and employment counseling.  These activities provided a validation step to the 
employment matching process helping to ensure the employers find qualified job seekers 
on the USES platform.  In the analysis of this chapter, these variables are only significant 
at the 10% level.  Considering this chapter also features annual data, it is once again 
possible that this aspect of employer behavior can only be observed at the monthly level.   
However, the significance of skills training indicates ongoing validity to the 
presence of narrow indirect network externalities.  By providing job seekers with skills 
training and increasing their qualifications, this activity had a positive impact on 
employer behavior.  In fact, the importance of this factor obfuscated the role typically 
played by employment demand in previous chapters.  Employers during this period 
posted jobs with the expectation they would find a qualified job seeker on the USES 
platform. 





lack of significance employed job seekers played in employer behavior.  Adnett (1984) 
postulated that employed job seekers attract the participation of employers because 
employed job seekers possess greater skill sets than those who are unemployed.  While 
that feature may be true of the UK data set analyzed by Adnett (1984), the opposite 
appears to be the case across the United States during this period.  The employment status 
of job seekers appears to be far less of a factor to employers than skills training. 
 
7.3.2 Job Seeker Behavior: New Applications 
The regression estimates for job seeker behavior are displayed in Table 7.7 with 
the results of the F-Tests displayed in Table 7.8.  In previous chapters that analyzed 
monthly data, job seeker behavior appeared to follow a 6-month process.  Consequently, 
it is not surprising that with the annual data of this chapter, no new applicant 
autoregressive terms are significant for the model. 
Each previous chapter using Utah data has found that job seekers are more likely 
to participate when unemployment is higher.  The regression results of this chapter are 
consistent with these findings.  However, what is different than observed previously is 
the lessened impact of initial claims.  One reason for this result may be due to the 
difference in how job seekers are counted in this chapter compared to others, namely total 
applicants in this chapter versus new applicants in previous chapters.  Total applicant 
counts represent a stock of job seekers available as opposed to the net increase of new job 
seekers who registered.  While this change in reporting may be the cause, the difference 





Nevertheless, what remains consistent with previous chapters is the lack of 
indirect network externalities in the presence of job seeker behavior.  Even as in previous 
chapters, the presence of job openings does not appear to persuade job seekers to register 
with the SESA. 
Yet, it should also be noted that the new subsidies investigated in this chapter 
demonstrate a positive impact on job seeker participation: Job Search Support and Skills 
Training.  The significance of this Job Search Support on job seeker behavior appears to 
provide credence to the theory of Adnett (1984) that users of the PES have less 
sophisticated employment information networks.  This is further evidenced by the fact 
that job search support has a weak correlation with unemployment (0.10831) suggesting a 
more systemic need for job search information on behalf of USES job seekers.47  Using 
technology and the tiered service model, job search support can be provided to a much 
larger volume of job seekers than ever before.  If job seekers who use the USES tend to 
have this need, this service can attract their participation across the business cycle. 
Likewise, the significance of skills training demonstrates that job seekers feel 
their qualifications or inadequate based on what is needed in the labor market.  However, 
skills training has a very low correlation with unemployment (0.09817), suggesting it is a 
need which transcends labor market conditions.  This is especially significant because 
this was the subsidy to job seekers that was highly influential in encouraging employer 
participation.   
Unlike job search support, skills training is not a new service provided to job 
                                                 





seekers although the specificity of its reporting category is.  Thus, the ability to analyze 
its effectiveness is greater with this data set than with the others used in this paper.  In 
fact, skills training has been a key policy piece since MDTA.  However, due to the 
agencies that administered the training program and the relationship between these 
agencies and USES, its effectiveness in reaching job seekers is very difficult to detect.  
With the ES Revitalization regime and the new integration of services and reporting, the 
effectiveness of skills training is now far more evident. 
The importance of skills training also explains the hints at the importance of 
employment counseling to job seeker participation.  One aspect of employment 
counseling is assessing the job-readiness of a job seeker and any critical skills gaps that 
need to be addressed.  Thus, counseling can often lead to skills training.  Because training 
is a more time consuming process, it is observable in this annual data series.  However, 
counseling can lead to other outcomes, such as helping employers see past age or 
disability or even adjusting the occupational expectations of a job seeker.  In these 
circumstances, counseling provides positive externalities to employers because it 
increases the number of qualified job seekers available; however, because these outcomes 
are short-term, it is less likely they will appear in annual data. 
The impact of these subsidies also provides implications for the question as to 
whether USES policy can effectively implement strategic subsidies to coordinate 
employer and job seeker behavior and maximize transaction volume.  The analysis of this 
chapter seems to suggest that this indeed possible.  





seekers to use an intermediary.  For employers, they are not just searching for job 
seekers, but qualified job seekers.  They will participate if they believe they can find 
qualified job seekers on the USES platform.  However, the job seekers who appear to be 
using the USES platform have a tendency to lack job-ready skills and appropriate 
information networks to find employment.  These two factors increase the search costs 
for job seekers regardless of the business cycle.  When the USES provides skills training 
and job search support, it reduces the search costs for these job seekers and encourages 
USES participation.  However, because these efforts also improve their qualifications, 
employers are encouraged to participate as well.  This enables the USES to meet the 
needs of both employers and job seekers regardless of labor market conditions and thus 
fulfill its mission. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter explored to what degree the results of the previous chapters could be 
generalized to the US workforce system as a whole by analyzing a panel data set 
comprised of 45 states’ employment service administrative data from 1992 to 2002.  In 
addition, the detail with which these data were reported enabled the inquiry and 
resolution of key questions that emerged in previous chapters.   
Consistent with previous chapters, this chapter demonstrated that employers post 
more job when unemployment is lower; however, the impact of employment demand on 
employer participation was far less than in previous chapters.  In addition, employers are 





platform.  This reflects the presence of indirect network externalities and provides initial 
evidence the SESA do operate as intermediaries on a two-sided platform. 
Also consistent with previous chapters, this chapter found that job seekers are 
more likely to participate when unemployment is higher.  However, unlike in previous 
chapters, initial claims did not appear to be the significant factor influencing job seeker 
participation.  Instead, innovative subsidies that were less linked to the business cycle, 
such as job search support, appeared to influence job seeker participation greater than UI 
benefits.   
One additional key finding is that providing skills training to job seekers 
positively influenced employer participation.  Because skills training appears to attract 
job seekers across the business cycle, this may represent one of the most effective 
subsidies at helping the USES coordinate the behavior of employers and job seekers, 
regardless of labor market conditions.  This in turn helps the USES better achieve its 







Figure 7.1. Annual averages of unemployment and total counts of UI initial claims48 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Annual averages of total ES applicants and ES applicants 
who qualify for UI benefits49 
                                                 
48 These data are displayed with mixed periodicity to illustrate their relationship.  If UI initial 
claims were presented as a monthly average, the magnitude between the two series increases and inhibits 
understanding.  Source: Employment and Training Administration and Bureau of Labor Statistics. 










































Figure 7.4.  Annual average counts of UI eligible applicants and total job openings51 
                                                 
50 Source: Employment and Training Administration 


































Figure 7.5. Annual average counts of total ES applicants and total ES job openings52 
 
 
Figure 7.6. Comparison of average percent employed ES applicant 
and the average unemployment rate53 
                                                 
52 Source: Employment and Training Administration 









































Figure 7.7. Annual average counts of counseling transactions and individuals counseled54 
 
 
Figure 7.8.  Annual average counts of ES testing transactions and individuals tested55 
                                                 
54 Source: Employment and Training Administration 


































Figure 7.9.  Annual average counts of counseling transactions and testing transactions56 
 
 
Figure 7.10.  Annual average counts of individuals referred to skills training versus those 
referred to educational services57 
                                                 
56 Source: Employment and Training Administration 



































Figure 7.11.  Annual average counts of individuals counseled versus 
those referred to skills training58 
 
 
Figure 7.12.  Annual average counts of counseling transactions 
versus job search support59 
                                                 
58 Source: Employment and Training Administration 




































Table 7.1.  Descriptive statistics of annual growth rate variables 
 N Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum 
Unemployment 405 -0.0143746 0.1351729 -0.0352000 -0.3586000 0.5907000 
Initial Claims 405 0.0155333 0.1410084 -0.0125000 -0.4361000 0.5811000 
Total Applicants 405 -0.0194156 0.1602069 -0.0251000 -0.8698000 1.2839000 
Job Openings 405 -0.0173647 0.2968194 -0.0130000 -1.9161000 2.5081000 
Counseling 
Transactions 405 -0.0889094 0.5384851 -0.0500000 -4.7140000 2.1411000 
Testing Transactions 405 -0.1131983 0.5874308 -0.1011000 -5.0637000 4.9955000 
Employed Applicants 405 0.0445884 0.3613977 0.0041000 -1.8405000 1.9792000 
Skills Training 405 0.0028390 0.5363239 -0.0052000 -3.3440000 2.5802000 










Table 7.2. Corrected Akaike Information Criterion results 
AR 
Lag of Independent Variables 
 0 1 2 3 
0 -6.43180 -6.39714 -6.34052 -6.29636 
1 -6.42296 -6.39146 -6.33391 -6.28903 
2 -6.40030 -6.36880 -6.31334 -6.26787 
3 -6.39253 -6.35992 -6.30306 -6.25101 
 
Table 7.3. Hausman Test for Random Effects 
Dependent 
Variable 
DF m Value Pr > m 
Job Openings 7 6.21 0.5152 
New Applicants 7 7.89 0.3425 
 




t Value Pr > |t| 
Unemployment t -0.21141 0.1283 -1.65 0.1001 
Employed Applicants t 0.02778 0.0399 0.70 0.4862 
Initial Claims t -0.22869 0.1229 -1.86 0.0634 
Testing Transactions t 0.048747 0.0251 1.94 0.0531 
Counseling Transactions t 0.048466 0.0273 1.77 0.0769 
Skills Training t 0.083391 0.0278 3.00 0.0029 
Job Search Support t -0.01733 0.0375 -0.46 0.6441 
 
Table 7.5.  F-Test results for employer behavior 
Variable DF F Value Pr > F 
All F(7,398) 5.09 <.0001 
Unemployment F(1,398) 2.72 0.1001 
Employed Applicants F(1,398) 0.49 0.4862 
Initial Claims F(1,398) 3.46 0.0634 
Testing F(1,398) 3.76 0.0531 
Counseling F(1,398) 3.15 0.0769 
Skills Training F(1,398) 8.98 0.0029 









t Value Pr > |t| 
Unemployment t 0.36181 0.0614 5.89 <.0001 
Employed Applicants t 0.053624 0.0191 2.81 0.0052 
Initial Claims t 0.061905 0.0588 1.05 0.2930 
Testing Transactions t 0.017705 0.0120 1.47 0.1418 
Counseling Transactions t 0.043022 0.0131 3.29 0.0011 
Skills Training t 0.070035 0.0133 5.26 <.0001 
Job Search Support t 0.044217 0.0179 2.47 0.0141 
 
Table 7.7. F-Test results for job seeker behavior 
Variable DF F Value Pr > F 
All F(7,398) 22.84 <.0001 
Unemployment F(1,398) 34.74 <.0001 
Employed Applicants F(1,398) 7.90 0.0052 
Initial Claims F(1,398) 1.11 0.2930 
Testing F(1,398) 2.17 0.1418 
Counseling F(1,398) 10.82 0.0011 
Skills Training F(1,398) 27.66 <.0001 










This paper investigated the hypothesis that USES, in partnership with SESA, 
operates as an intermediary of two-sided market, the public labor exchange.  To confirm 
this hypothesis, the presence of indirect network externalities needed to be identified in 
the behavior of either employers or job seekers.  If present, then the USES could use 
strategic subsidies to one side of the market to get both sides of the market on board.  
This would enable the USES to shape policy in such a way as to maximize USES 
transaction volume and positively impact the US labor market. 
To test this hypothesis, four data sets that each captured different aspects and time 
periods of USES labor exchange activity were analyzed.  The research explored the 
participation of employers and job seekers and the impact of employment demand and 
policy.  In addition, five subsidies were investigated to determine whether or not they 
exploited indirect network externalities:  UI benefits, aptitude testing, employment 
counseling, skills training and job search support. 
The analysis revealed that job seekers participate with the USES to receive UI 





benefits lead to very cyclical job seeker participation while job search support and skills 
training appear to be influence job seeker participation across the business cycle. 
On the other hand, employers will post jobs when employment demand increases, 
but they will also be influenced to participate if the USES provides skills training services 
to job seekers.  Employment counseling and aptitude testing exhibit similar but much 
lesser effects.  Yet, what each of these services has in common is that they exploit the 
indirect network externalities of employers:  They will increase their participation if they 
believe qualified job seekers exist on the USES platform. 
The fact that skills training plays a significant role in both the behavior of 
employers and job seeker participation provides great insight into how USES can shape 
future policy.  By helping job seekers develop job-ready skills, the USES increases the 
participation of employers on the public labor exchange and, consequently, positively 
impacts the U.S. labor market.  Thus, if there was a silver bullet for USES to pursue, it 
would be the provision of skills training to job seekers. 
While the significance of skills training emerged in the data covering the vast 
portion of the United States, much of this research was limited to the Utah.  While at 
times employment demand in Utah closely resembled that of the United States, there are 
times during key policy regimes where the demand is much different such as MDTA and 
CETA.  Future research should explore the behavior of employers and job seekers in 
other states during these policy periods to determine how well the Utah experience 
represents the rest of the US. 





market literature and the PES literature.  Existing two-sided market research has focused 
on industries such as payment cards, online auctions, telecommunications, and operating 
systems.  Identifying the US public labor exchange as another possible two-sided market 
expands the reach of this discipline not only into the realm of the labor market, but also 
into the domain of public policy. 
This research also contributes to the ongoing evaluation of the PES and its role in 
the US labor market.  While at times PES researchers and implementers have identified 
particular employer behavior patterns, this research provides a theoretical framework to 
better understand that behavior as the manifestation of indirect network externalities on a 
two-sided platform. 
 
8.2 Recommendations for USES Policy 
This research also implies policy recommendations for the USES and SESA.  In 
particular, the importance of skills training to both job seekers and employers is 
especially relevant given the recent passage of WIOA in 2014.  While much of the 
attention of this legislation is focused on job seekers and those who facilitate vocational 
training, the findings in this research suggest employers will greatly benefit as well.   
What remains to be seen is how well the SESA will exploit these indirect network 
externalities or more importantly, allow the public to internalize these externalities.  
WIOA presents an unprecedented opportunity for SESA to partner with vocational 
training providers in developing the skills of the workforce.  Not only will this engage job 





reengage with employers eager to find the most qualified workers.   
The findings of this paper would propose a continued, balanced implementation 
of the three-tiered approach implemented as part of the ES Revitalization Plan of the 
1990s.   
Tier I provides information services at a low marginal cost and proves to be a 
factor which encourages job seeker participation with the US workforce system.  In a 
similar fashion, services provided by Tiers II and III, specifically skills training, provide 
benefits to both employers and job seekers and encourage the participation of both groups 
in the US workforce system.  However, unlike the information services provided in Tier 
I, the benefits of training to both employers and job seekers can be demonstrated in 
UDES administrative data as far back as the launch of the modern USES system 
following World War II. 
Unfortunately, SESA have operated for decades without the awareness they 
appear to serve two-sided markets.  Decisions regarding the funding and prioritization of 
services on one side of the market have taken place without the knowledge the other side 
of the market is affected as well.  It would be easy for SESA to justify reduction in 
services, placing undue emphasis on Tier I activities based on a lack of employer 
participation when in fact employer participation is actually lessened because of SESA 
reduction of services to job seekers.   
In short, employers will participate if they find job seekers who are qualified.  
Policymakers can exploit these indirect network externalities through various subsidies 





Furthermore, these subsidies can be strategically applied to optimize SESA transaction 
volume and subsequently, enable the USES to fulfill its mission to make the US labor 
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